TESORO AND CONVIVIO: A STUDY OF THE EARLIEST
ITALIAN VERNACULAR ADAPTATIONS OF ARISTOTLE'S
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1260-1308

Alice Ours Vitiello

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Kevin Brownlee, Supervisor of Dissertation

Rita Copeland, Graduate Group Chairperson
DEDICATION

Thank you to my husband Anthony for your abiding love. You are wise, patient, generous, flexible, unselfish, and kind. I am blessed to have you! Thank you for not asking me to be anything but happy. You can’t get lost when you’re always found!

I love you the most.

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ABSTRACT

Tesoro and Convivio: A Study of the Earliest Italian Vernacular Adaptations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, 1260-1308

Alice Ours Vitiello

Kevin Brownlee

This dissertation focuses on two of the earliest known Italian vernacular adaptations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: Tesoro, the anonymous Italian translation of Brunetto Latini’s French Trésor, and Dante Alighieri’s Convivio. Although both texts make use of the Ethics, to different stated ends, the final presentation of Aristotelian content in each of these texts varies widely from that found in the Ethics itself, of which Moerbeke’s complete revised copy was in circulation at the time of their composition. Because Tesoro and Convivio were two of the first Italian attempts to render the Ethics accessible to a vernacular readership, my objective in this inquiry is thus to identify these inconsistencies in order to gain a clearer understanding of the content that was attributed to the Ethics during this period and with this readership in mind.

I take two different methodological approaches, each tailored to the prevailing questions surrounding the Aristotelianism of Tesoro and Convivio, respectively. As
Tesoro claims to provide a direct summation of Ethics, in the first half of this study I address Latini’s likely sources for the Aristotelian text, particularly the Summa Alexandrinorum of Hermannus Alemannus. As well, I provide a point-by-point analysis of the virtues and vices as attributed to Aristotle in Tesoro in contrast with their actual elaboration in Moerbeke’s complete version of the Ethics. My approach to the Convivio addresses instead the matter of the Ethics as a pervasive source underpinning Dante’s original theses, focusing primarily on the ways in which Dante manipulates, and thus at times misrepresents, Aristotle’s ideas in support of his own.
CONTENTS

Dedication ........................................................................................................ iii
Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... vi
Abstract ........................................................................................................ viii

Part I: The Tesoro and Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

A. Tesoro Manuscript Tradition ................................................................. 1
B. Brunetto’s Possible Sources of the Ethics .............................................. 5
C. Brunetto’s Possible Sources of the Summa Alexandrinorum:
Hermannus Alemannus and Taddeo Alderotti ................................. 10
D. Ethics in Trésor and Tesoro ............................................................... 14
E. Analysis ................................................................................................. 16

1. Costanza ......................................................................................... 16
2. Dio ..................................................................................................... 18
3. Fortitude ............................................................................................ 19
4. Friendship .......................................................................................... 20
5. Honor .................................................................................................. 25
6. Justice ............................................................................................... 26
7. Liberality ............................................................................................ 28
8. Love .................................................................................................. 32
9. Magnanimity ..................................................................................... 34
10. Magnificence .................................................................................... 36
11. Meekness .......................................................................................... 39
Part II: Dante’s Convivio and the Ethics

A. Introduction: Aristotelian Ethics and the Convivio .................................. 52
B. Survey of Literature ...................................................................................... 64
C. Aristotle’s Ethics in Convivio IV.i-xxii ......................................................... 76
1. The Aristotelian “Perfected Soul” and Dantean “Nobilitade” .................... 76
2. Aristotelian Virtues and Vices in Convivio ............................................... 89
3. Dante’s Christian Aristotelianism .............................................................. 95
4. Seed Analogy and the Infusion of Grace ................................................... 102
5. Aristotelianism and the Highest Good ...................................................... 105
D. Conclusion .................................................................................................. 121

Appendix 1: Tesoro MSS Tradition ................................................................. 126
Appendix 2: Editions of Tesoro ...................................................................... 131
Appendix 3: Mussafia Division of Tesoro MSS Families .............................. 133
Appendix 4: Marchesi (1903) List of L’Etica MSS ........................................ 136
Bibliography .................................................................................................... 138
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: “Costanza” in Tesoro ................................................................. 16
Table 2: “Dio” in Tesoro ...................................................................... 18
Table 3: “Fortitude”/“Fortezza” in Ethics/Tesoro ..................................... 19
Table 4: “Friendship”/“Amistade” in Ethics/Tesoro ............................... 20
Table 5: “Honor”/“Onore” in Ethics/Tesoro .......................................... 25
Table 6: “Justice”/“Giustizia” in Ethics/Tesoro ........................................ 26
Table 7: “Liberality”/“Larghezza” (“Liberalitade”) in Ethics/Tesoro ........ 28
Table 8: “Love”/“Amore” in Ethics/Tesoro ............................................. 32
Table 9: “Magnanimity”/“Magnanimità” (“Magnanimitade”) in Ethics/Tesoro ................................................................. 34
Table 10: “Magnificence”/“Magnificenza” in Ethics/Tesoro ................. 36
Table 11: “Meekness”/“Mansuetudine” in Ethics/Tesoro ....................... 39
Table 12: “Pleasure”/“Dilettazione” in Ethics/Tesoro ............................. 41
Table 13: “Prudence”/“Prudenza” in Ethics/Tesoro ................................. 44
Table 14: “Temperance”/“Castitade” in Ethics/Tesoro ............................ 48
Part I: The *Tesoro* and Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*

A. *Tesoro* Manuscript Tradition

The *Tesoro*—the Italian rendition of Brunetto Latini’s *Trésor*, produced by an unknown translator who is sometimes suggested to have been Bono Giamboni⁠—exists today in the form of 47 remaining MSS, dating from the late duecento (*F*³ and *F*⁵) to the quattrocento (*B*, *Br*, *F*, *F*², *L*², *L*⁵, *L*⁶, *P*, *R*, *R*², *R*³, *T*, *V*, *V*¹). Of these, the earliest two MSS are held at the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence, and are thought to date from the late duecento to the early trecento.² The bulk of the existing MSS date to the trecento—24 of them, to be exact³—demonstrating the popularity that the *Tesoro* had during this period. The number of existing MSS dating to the quattrocento drops to 14; however, this may not be due to waning popularity, as the first critical edition of *Tesoro*  

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¹ MS M, Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, 5035 (già It. II. 53); [sec. XIV]; I, is the only contemporary MS with Bono Giamboni attribution, and it is preceded at the very least by the two earliest MSS of *Tesoro*—*F*³ and *F*⁵—neither of which contains a Bono Giamboni attribution; see Appendix I. Carrer (1839), Sorio (1857), and Gaiter (1877-83) in their published editions attribute translation of *Tesoro* to Bono Giamboni; see Appendix 2. Most recently, Sonia Gentili has also acknowledged this belief: “A complicare il quadro attributivo c’è poi il fatto che l’*Etica* volgare, oltre ad avere circolazione indipendente, si trova pure incastonata nella traduzione toscana del *Tresor* in passato attribuita a Bono Giamboni ed edita dal Gaiter.” *L’uomo aristotelico alle origini della letteratura Italiana* (Roma, 2005), 32.


³ Specifically: A, Ar, As, Bo/Bo¹, C, C¹, F¹, F⁴, F⁶, F⁷, G, G¹, G², L, L¹, L³, L⁴, L⁷, M, P¹, P², R¹, S, Y¹; see Appendix I.
was published by Girardo Flandrino in Treviso in 1474, and was followed in the
cinquecento by the published editions of Nicolò Garanta (1528), Marchio Sessa (1533),
and Giovanni de Tornes (1568).

_Tesoro_, like its model text, _Trésor_, is an encyclopedic work in three parts. Book I
addresses the creation of the world and of man, the history of the Old and New
Testament, the lives of saints and the history of the church, astronomy, geography, and
natural history. Book II focuses on moral philosophy, providing first a compendium of
Aristotle's _Nicomachean Ethics_, followed by a practical demonstration of ethics citing
the philosophers. Book III discusses rhetoric and politics.

It is difficult today to understand precisely what changes were made to the _Trésor_
by its first Italian translator because there does not exist an original, autograph copy of
the text, and therefore it is impossible to know how it was altered in its first Italian
redaction. Although some critical editions of the _Tesoro_—Luigi Carrer in 1839,
Bartolomeo Sorio in 1857, and Luigi Gaiter in 1877—attribute its vernacularization to

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4 _Il tesoro_ (Treviso: Girardo Flandrino, 1474).
5 _Il tesoro_, Ed. Nicolò Garanta (Venice: Fratelli da Sabbio, 1528); _Il tesoro_ (Venice:
Marchio Sessa, 1533); _L'Ethica D'Aristotele ridotta in compendio da ser Brunetto
Latini_ (Lione: Giovanni de Tornes, 1568). For a complete list of editions of the _Tesoro_,
see Appendix 2.
6 The division of _Trésor_ into three books is the only division inherent to the original text
itself. See Brunetto Latini, _Tresor_, ed. Pietro G. Beltrami, Paolo Squillacioli, Plinio
Torri, and Sergio Vatteroni, (Torino: Einaudi, 2007), L-LII.
7 The two earliest MSS known are _F3_ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. VIII.
36; [Bertelli 33: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.]; I and _F5_ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale
Centrale, Landau-Finaly 38; [Bertelli 58: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.; missing in Mascheroni
and Bolton].
8 _Il 'Tesoro' volgarizzato da Bono Giamboni_, ed. Luigi Carrer (Venice: Gondoliere,
1839). Julia Bolton Holloway notes that Carrer's edition is the first published ascription
to Bono Giamboni, and is based on _Il tesoro_ (Venice: Marchio Sessa, 1533); see
Holloway, 38. _Volgarizzazione del primo libro del 'Tesoro' di ser BL fatto per Bono
Bono Giamboni, the earliest MSS do not contain any such attribution. Among the existing MSS of the *Tesorò* that circulated throughout the duecento and trecento, there are many discrepancies. Because of this, editors of critical editions have traditionally made use of multiple MSS in compiling their own copies of the text. Bartolomeo Sorio, in his critical edition of 1857-8, utilizes three primary Italian MSS of *Tesorò*, as well as making reference to at least four others in his notes. In producing the most recent critical edition to date—published in 1878—Luigi Gaiter consulted the earlier critical

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9 MSS *F*\(^3\) and *F*\(^5\); see note 1, above.

10 See Appendix I.

11 Mussafia outlines this problem: “La prima difficoltà che si presenta a chi si faccia a studiare i manoscritti del Tesorò consiste nella grande varietà dei singoli testi. E qui volsi distinguere fra le diversità d’argomento e quelle di forma. Le prime concernono le ommissioni od aggiunte di passi più o meno lunghi. La natura enciclopedica dell’opera dava ampio facoltà ai copiatori di modificare il testo a loro talento, o sopprimendo alcunché, o ancor più spesso inserendovoi or brevi or lunghe aggiunte. Anche l’originale francese non ne andò scorto; ma pure in esso (a stare all’edizione dello Chabaille) le aggiunte non sono molte, e le più importanti si ristringono ai capitoli di storia, che altri attribuisce a Brunetto stesso, ed ai pochi capitoli che si leggono alle pagine 621—646 dell’edizione stessa. Molto più numerose sono le aggiunte in alcuni de’ codici italiani.”


13 MS. Marciano Farsetti N. LIIL; MS. Marciano Bergamasco N. LIV.; MS. Ambrosiano di Milano, s. XIV G. 75. P. sup.. Gaiter 1:XLI-XLII.

14 MS Bodleiana 319; MS Biblioteca reale di Parigi N. 7069; MS Laurenziana XIX; MS Laurenziana XXIII. Gaiter, 1:XLI-XLIII.
editions of Sorio (1857-8), and Carrer (1839), as well as comparing his text with the earliest critical edition of the *Trésor*, produced by Chabaille in 1863.\(^{15}\)

In 1869, Adolfo Mussafia produced a study of the MSS of the *Tesoro* that demonstrated two distinct trends within the MSS tradition.\(^{16}\) The first group of MSS does not contain amendments to the historical content of the text;\(^{17}\) the second family, additionally subdivided, contain historical amendments\(^{18}\) to books I and II, one or more chapters of *Natura*, and in some cases have replaced book VII with the *Libro di costumanze*.\(^{19}\) In all complete versions, the second book of the *Trésor* contains a version of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. The presentation of the *Ethics* differs between editions of Brunetto's text, hinging upon the choice of verbs characterizing its presentation. In the most recent French edition, edited by Beltrami, Squillacioti, Torri, and Vatteroni (2007) with a facing page contemporary Italian translation of the text, the

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\(^{15}\) While Sorio's focus had been to produce a new critical text of Tesoro from the MSS, Gaiter's originality lies in comparing this critical text with the Chabaille edition of *Trésor*. Chabaille consults over forty MSS of *Trésor* in his critical edition, commissioned by Napoleon I. *Li Livres dou Tresor par Brunetto Latini*, ed. P. Chabaille (Paris: Imprimerie Impériale, 1863). See Gaiter 1:XXXIV; Holloway, *Brunetto Latini*, 49.

\(^{16}\) See Appendix 3.

\(^{17}\) Mussafia, 2: "I codici della prima, fra' quali era altresì quello che servi all' *edito princeps* italiano, contengono quello che si legge nei più codici francesi, in quelli cioè che non hanno l'aggiunta storica."

\(^{18}\) These alterations reflect historical events that had taken place in Italy following the time of *Trésor*'s composition; specifically, the battle of Benevento. Gaiter, 1:XXXIII: "Le violente invettive contro Manfredi, la sua dinastia, ed il suo partito, furono aggiunte dopo la battaglia di Benevento nella quale peri, e dopo la disfatta dei ghibellini ed il trionfo dei guelfi. Questi brani mancano infatti nei manoscritti più antichi."

\(^{19}\) Mussafia, 2: "La seconda famiglia può...suddiversi in più classi. Carattere comune a tutte è l'aggiunta nel I. libro di numerosi brani qua e là sparsi e nel II. di vari capitoli di storia ecclesiastica, fra i quali uno su Maometto, d'una lunga narrazione storica, che in parte corrisponde a quella inserita in alcuni codici francesi, e finalmente d’uno o più capitoli di Natura;" see Gaiter 1:XXXV. Specific divisions of group 2, as well as Mussafia's descriptions of the MSS, can be found here in Appendix 3.
verb used is *traslater*: “Mes, tout avant, viaut il fonder son edifice sor le livre de Aristote, et il le traslatera de latin en romans.”\(^{20}\) The same term is rendered as the Italian *trasmutare\(^2\) in Gaiter’s edition of the *Tesoro*: “Ma innanzi vuole fondare suo edificio sopra lo libro d’Aristotile, lo quale si chiama Etica, e si lo trasmuterà di latino in romanzo.”\(^{22}\) As neither the *Trésor* nor the *Tesoro* gives any explicit indication of its source of the *Ethics*, and the characterization of its engagement with the *Ethics* varies between editions, only an analysis of the texts themselves has yielded any further information on the provenance of the *Ethics* in the work.

**B. Brunetto’s possible sources of the *Nicomachean Ethics***

All scholars seeking to address Brunetto’s sources for Aristotle have been challenged by the fact that there were multiple versions of the *Ethics* circulating at the time of the *Trésor*’s composition. The estimated date of the *Trésor* is between 1260 and

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\(^{22}\) Brunetto Latini, *Tesoro*, ed. Gaiter, 3:9-10. Because the critical text of each of these editions is the product of multiple MSS, it is impossible know the use of these terms—and whether or not they differ between MSS—without consulting the MSS themselves. This would be excellent fodder for a future study of the MSS.
1267, composed sometime during Brunetto Latini’s exile from Italy while he was living in France; the earliest known MS of Tesoro is dated 1286 (F3, Florence, Bibl. Naz. II. VIII. 36). During the mid-duecento, when the Trésor was written, four primary Latin sources of the Ethics were in circulation: the Ethica vetus (containing just books II-III of the original), the Ethica nova (book I and fragments of II-X), Robert Grosseteste’s complete translation (estimated date 1246-47), and William of Moerbeke’s revision of Grosseteste (1250-60). In addition to these, the Latin translation of an Arabic epitome of the Ethics—produced by Hermannus Alemannus—called the Summa Alexandrinorum was also in circulation. Because Trésor does not explicitly identify its source of Aristotle, it has been the task of scholars to try to discern its sources from clues within the text itself.

Because the content of the Ethics is presented by Brunetto in a condensed fashion, there are two possibilities for its sources. Either it is modeled after a condensed text (such as the Summa Alexandrinorum), or it is a condensation produced by Brunetto himself (of one of the more complete versions of the Ethics, such as that of Grosseteste or Moerbeke). Having observed the strong similarities between the Trésor and the Summa

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24 See Appendix I.
Alexandrinorum—both in Latin and in an Italian version—Marchesi was the first to propose that Brunetto had worked from a condensed version of the Ethics—the Summa Alexandrinorum, a Latin summation of the Arabic commentary by Averroes, produced by Hermannus Alemannus in 1243-4. Marchesi contends that Brunetto, in addition to engaging directly with the Latin text of the Summa Alexandrinorum, also utilized an Italian translation of the same text: l’Etica, translated by Taddeo Alderotti. Because Taddeo’s l’Etica translates somewhat loosely the original Summa Alexandrinorum, Marchesi concludes that Brunetto most likely engaged directly with l’Etica—adopting it almost verbatim, albeit in French, into the Trésor—but utilized the Summa Alexandrinorum where necessary to repair some of Taddeo’s more problematic translations.
Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, Marchesi’s work on Brunetto’s sources of Aristotle has remained unassailed. In his 1948 critical edition of the Trésor, Carmody relies upon Marchesi’s arguments to establish the Summa Alexandrinorum as Brunetto’s source. However, while utilizing Marchesi’s scholarship in his own

latin

non di rado si vede la sicurezza ch’è nell’intendimento del traduttore e la buona conoscenza ch’egli ha del linguaggio filosofico: spesso compendia la materia, d’altra parte allarga tante volte la frase o il concetto e diluisce nel volgare il testo latino per bisogno di ripetizioni e di esempi o di ampliamenti, servendosi, come fa in principio, di qualche altro rifacimento, e aggiungendo dichiarazioni proprie ... Brunetto Latini, nella seconda parte del Tresor accolse il volgare di Taddeo, modificato secondo il testo originale latino ch’ei conobbe e a cui portò contributo di novissime meditazioni.” See also Marchesi, “Il compendio volgare,” 23: “Giacché essendosi Brunetto servito non solo del volgare di Taddeo, ma anche, come vedremo, della redazione originale latina, anzi avendo acconciato e rifatto in molti punti il volgare in base al testo latino, è chiaro come abbia potuto dire d’aver tratto il suo compendio dal latino, che del resto è anche l’originale dell’Etica di Taddeo;” and Gentili, 36: “Lungi dall’essere una semplice traduzione della Summa Alexandrinorum, l’Etica volgare ne rappresenta piuttosto una rielaborazione, caratterizzata da un costante e intelligente recupero dell’originale aristotelico volgare, entro lo schema formale dell’epitome. Taddeo fruisce la lettera della Nicomachea in modo diretto, oppure—assai spesso—attraverso una fonte intermedia che pare coincidere col commento di Tommaso d’Aquino. Il volgarizzamento risulta dunque critico condotto su varie tradizioni latine del testo aristotelico, metodo che l’Aldorotti dovette seguire anche per i testi cui dedicò un commento scolastico.”

32 Francis J. Carmody, introduction to Li Livres dou Tresor de Brunetto Latini, ed. Francis J. Carmody (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), XXVIII-XXIX: “Les commentaires et le choix des extraits ne sont pas originaux, mais remontent à la Translatio Alexandrina (ou Compendium) publiée par Marchesi. Latini a traduit le Compendium avec une très grande fidélité: les différences entre le Trésor et le texte de Marchesi sont toutes de nature à indiquer que le ms. du Compendium utilisé par Latini était plus correct que celui de l’édition de Marchesi. Par exemple: Tr. 2.18.2, un passage qui dérive d’Aristote mais qui a été omis dans le ms. de Marchesi; Tr. 2.18.24 sur les deux manières d’ignorance; Tr. 2.16.7-9 avec les mots grecs eutrepelos, tacophia. Le Compendium, tiré d’une version arabe en avril 1243-44, est attribué à Hermann l’Allemand. C’est un épitome qui simplifie l’Ethique par un effort méritoire quoique souvent marqué par l’infidélité. L’élément original ne comprend que le commentaire, le nouvel ordre des matières (cf. Tr. 2.32-38), et quelques innovations, tel le changement du pluriel Dei en <<Dieu et ses Anges>> (Tr. 2.7.4, 2.44.22, 2.47.12). Le Trésor offre un moyen critique très important pour le rétablissement du Compendium / original. Pour cette raison j’ai idiqué dans mon édition les chapitres d’Aristote d’abord, ensuite (par le sigle Comp.) les commentaires latins de l’édition de Marchesi, enfin (sans sigle) les
introduction, Carmody does not mention Brunetto’s possible use of multiple sources of the *Ethics*, as Marchesi does. In 1983 D’Alverny, while working on the MS tradition of the *Summa Alexandrinorum*, expressed her own agreement with Marchesi’s view that Brunetto had availed himself of both the *Summa Alexandrinorum* and *l’Etica*: “Elle a été traduite assez librement en italien par le médecin Taddeo Alderotti; cette traduction a été utilisée, ainsi que la version latine par Brunetto Latini pour rédiger une version française dans le *Tresor.*” Still, in the context of her study Brunetto receives only a footnote.

Sonia Gentili has revisited the issue, engaging with the scholarship of both Marchesi and D’Alverny. Looking closely at the text of the *Trésor, Summa Alexandrinorum,* and *L’Etica,* Gentili broadens Marchesi’s initial conclusions by further elaborating on Brunetto’s possible technique in adapting the two Aristotelian texts:

Tuttavia Brunetto sembra aver utilizzato il volgare alderottiano confrontandolo costantemente col latino della *Summa*: nei luoghi in cui il recupero critico della lettera aristotelica operato da Taddeo è più complesso e dunque il dettato volgare risulta particolarmente lontano dal compendio alessandrino, Brunetto si riavvicina a quest’ultimo.

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passages qui manquent à la fois au *Compendium* et à *l’Ethique*: ce sont ces derniers qui seraient à expliquer dans une édition critique du commentaire latin.”


34 Gentili engages Marchesi on the matter of Brunetto’s relationship to *l’Etica,* and D’Alverny insofar as the MS history of the *Summa Alexandrinorum* is concerned.

35 Gentili, 42. In one specific example, she observes: “Emergono qui e in molti altri luoghi le opposte direzioni seguite dai due traduttori: in Taddeo la tensione a una lingua concettualmente esatta determina una continuazione del lessico filosofico latino sino al reimpianto volgare di talune concettosità di ordine grammaticale ed etimologico (ad esempio la tecnica ‘derivata’ di esprimere l’oggetto del verbo col relativo deverbale: *perfectio quam natura intendit > ultimo intendimento lo quale la natura intende*). Brunetto invece sfrutta le *voces mediae* e generiche del volgare (qui il polivalente *chose)*
Most recently, this viewpoint was reiterated by Beltrami (2007) in the introduction to his edition of *Trésor*.  

C. Brunetto’s possible sources of the *Summa Alexandrinorum*:

*Hermannus Alemannus and Taddeo Alderotti*

An outgrowth of this scholarship has been an equal interest in Brunetto’s sources for the *Summa Alexandrinorum*, whether the Latin version of Hermannus Alemannus or the Italian version of Taddeo Alderotti. The *Summa Alexandrinorum* is thought to be based upon a Greco-Alexandrine epitome of the *Ethics* composed prior to the seventh century, translated into Arabic around the ninth century, and rendered in Latin by Hermannus Alemannus in 1243 or 1244.  

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fragmentary) MSS of the *Summa Alexandrinorum* survive.\(^{38}\) The most recent work on the direct relationship between the *Tesoro* and the *Summa Alexandrinorum* was produced by Marchesi (1904), who published a complete copy of the summa within the context of his study of the Ethics in the Latin medieval tradition.\(^{39}\)

Because the *Summa Alexandrinorum* is a translation from Arabic, Dunlop has observed that it demonstrates specific features particular to Arabic translations.\(^{40}\) For this reason, frequent references to God are not the addition of Christian copyists but are inherent to the Arabic original. Dunlop elaborates:

> There is of course no doubt that the *Summa Alexandrinorum* is a translation from Arabic. Apart from the colophon, the text contains ascriptions of praise after the name of God, a type characteristic of Muslim writing at all times, thus: deus benedictus et excelsus;\(^ {41}\) deus sublimis et excelsus;\(^ {42}\) deo gloriose;\(^ {43}\) and we have also a quotation from Hesiod in Book I of the *Ethics*\(^ {44}\) here attributed to Homer.\(^ {45}\)

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38 *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices I*, 68-9 and 157-8; *Aristoteles Latinus. Codices II*, ad indicem; D'Alverny, 265; Gentili, 33.

39 Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. Plut. 89 inf. 41, f. 134-144, 32.8x24 cm, 13\(^{th}\) century, 2 cols., perg. fols. 2r-58v. See Fowler, 195. Fowler also publishes a complete copy of the *Summa Alexandrinorum*, combining two MSS: Admont 608, f. 43a-60c; and Oxford, Bodl. Canon. Cl. 271, f. 218b-245a, noting that he rarely includes variants from Marchesi’s text because his edition is based heavily upon the MS Admont, which varies widely from the version used by Marchesi; 196. See also D’Alverny, 267.

40 The Arabic original exists today only in excerpts. See Dunlop, 254 ff.

41 Marchesi, *L’Etica Nicomachea*, XLV.

42 Ibid., LXIII.

43 Ibid., LXIV, LXXXIV.

44 1095b8 ff; cited by Dunlop, 255.

45 Marchesi, *L’Etica Nicomachea*, XLII.
This mistake Hermannus Alemannus found in the Arabic text which he had before him.\textsuperscript{46}

These Arabic features were retained by the text in its Latin manifestation, and thus made their way into Brunetto’s rendition of the \textit{Summa}. By these means, they could take on a Christian significance with which they were not originally endowed.

While acknowledging that Brunetto likely consulted the Latin \textit{Summa Alexandrinorum}, Marchesi (1903, 1904), D’Alverny (1982), and Gentili (2005), all agree that Taddeo Alderotti’s \textit{l’Etica} is his primary source of the \textit{Ethics} in the \textit{Trésor}.\textsuperscript{47} An Italian vernacular translation of the \textit{Summa Alexandrinorum}, \textit{l’Etica} survives today in twenty nine MSS, twenty two of which reside today in Brunetto’s home city of Florence.\textsuperscript{48} Of all surviving MSS, one third of them attribute the text to Taddeo Alderotti, while the rest make no attribution.\textsuperscript{49} Based on a study of the MSS, Marchesi (1903) concludes that \textit{l’Etica} circulated widely as an independent text, unlinked to any other works,\textsuperscript{50} and when it did not circulate anonymously, it was attributed to Taddeo Alderotti.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Dunlop, 255.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See Marchesi, “Il compendio volgare,” 25; \textit{L’Etica Nicomachea}, 117; D’Alverny, 272; and Gentili, \textit{L’uomo aristotelico}, 42. See above.
\item \textsuperscript{48} Marchesi, “Il compendio volgare,” 5. See Appendix 4. In addition to the MSS, there are also five published editions of \textit{l’Etica}, none of which contain critical commentary: \textit{L’Etica d’Aristotile ridotta in compendio da ser Brunetto Latini et altre traduzioni et scritti di quei tempi. Con alcuni dotti Avvertimenti intorno alla lingua} (Lione, Giov. de Tornes, 1568); \textit{L’Etica d’Aristotile e la Rettorica di M. Tullio aggiuntovi il libro de’ Costumi di Catone} (Firenze, 1734); \textit{Trattato delle quattro virtù cardinali compendiata da ser Brunetto Latini sopra l’Etica d’Aristotile} (Verona, 1837); \textit{Etica d’Aristotile compendiata da ser Brunetto Latini e due leggende di autore anonimo} (Venezia, 1844). These editions are all cited by Marchesi, “Il compendio volgare,” 2.
\item \textsuperscript{49} Gentili, \textit{L’uomo aristotelico}, 32. With the exception of one MS: Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale, Pal. 634, del sec. XIV, which attributes itself to “maestro Giovanni minorita” (ibid., 32, note 11).
\item \textsuperscript{50} Marchesi, “Il compendio volgare,” 16; for rationale, see 15-16.
\end{itemize}
Alderotti. There is only one version of the vernacular *l’Etica* in all MSS, and all but one of the MSS bearing the translator’s name attribute the text to Taddeo. Also, in *Convivio* I.10 Dante attributes *l’Etica* to Taddeo: “come fece quelli che trasmutò il latino dell’Etica, ciò fu Taddeo Ippocratista;” in Marchesi’s view, this “dichiarazione esplicita” has “l’aria di parlarne come dell’unico, comunemente noto, volgarizzamento ch’esistesse a suo tempo dell’*Etica* latina.” Gentili cites the same passage from the *Convivio*, emphasizing that, given Dante’s familiarity with the literary tradition of his age, it would be unlikely for him to have made this attribution incorrectly.

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51 Ibid., 15.
54 Ibid.
55 Gentili, *L’uomo aristotelico*, 31-2: “In grazia della sua fama menzionata da Dante in *Convivio* I x 10, l’*Etica* volgare ha pagato l’enorme successo arrisogli col progressivo inabissarsi della sua origine e identità ... la menzione dantesca del volgarizzamento, di tono piuttosto antonomastico, presuppone una compiuta diffusione dell’opera, e implica quindi che i codici oggi noti siano parte d’una tradizione già consolidata entro la fine del Duecento.”
56 Ibid., 33: “Va anzitutto notato che, seppure una eventuale tradizione dell’*Etica* dipartitasi dal Tesoro volgare cui fosse concresciuta una falsa attribuzione a Taddeo si possa ipotizzare all’epoca del *Convivio* costituita e circolante, Dante era profondo conoscitore dell’opera del suo maestro Brunetto, e abbastanza informato in merito alla figura dell’Alderotti (cfr. PAR. 1.5). È dunque poco plausibile che l’attribuzione del volgarizzamento a Taddeo constituisca, nel *Convivio*, il puro riverbero d’una tradizione attributiva. Nello sbrogliare i fili della tradizione latina medioevale della *Nicomachea*, Concetto marchesi si dedicò pure al piccolo groviglio rappresentato dal volgarizzamento italiano, e confutò la precedente opinio con argomenti cui le mie ricerche hanno dato conferma e approfondimento. Attraverso il confronto dei testi Marchesi riveni tracce di dipendenza del dettato del Tesor da quello dell’*Etica* volgare, mentre lo studio comparato delle relative tradizioni manoscritte lo condusse a notare che alcuni codici del Tesoro toscano conservano, in coda all’*Etica*, l’explicit di chiusura che ne attribuisce la versione a Taddeo.”
D. Ethics in the Trésor and Tesoro

Based on the scholarship, a complex genealogy of the Nicomachean Ethics in the Tesoro emerges, resulting from the following process of transmission:

1. Greco-Alexandrine epitome of the Nicomachean Ethics (7th century?)\textsuperscript{57} -->

2. Arabic translation (11th century?)\textsuperscript{58} -->

3. Summa Alexandrinorum by Hermannus Alemannus (Latin; 1243 or 1244)\textsuperscript{59} -->

4. L’Etica by Taddeo Alderotti (Italian; oldest MS dates before 1250)\textsuperscript{60} -->

5. [Both 3. and 4. above are thought to have influenced] Trésor by Brunetto Latini (French; 1260-1267) -->

6. Tesoro by unknown translator (Italian; earliest MSS date to late duecento-early trecento)\textsuperscript{61}

The evolution of the Aristotelian content, as it made the way from its Greco-Alexandrine epitome to the Italian vernacular Tesoro, has been studied in stages by

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} The oldest MS of l’Etica, according to Gentili, is Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 16581 (=PI). She elaborates: “Fatto copiare da Richard de Fournival ante 1250, discenderebbe direttamente dal testo che Ermanno stesso portò allo Studium parigino, poiché rispecchia il primo adattamento alla dottrina ivi sostenuta attraverso correzioni marginali, che l’altro testo parigino, il lat. 12954 (=P2; Aristoteles Latinus. Codices I., n. 626), del sec. XIII ex., reca ormai a testo” (ibid., 34).
\textsuperscript{61} The two earliest MSS known are F\textsuperscript{3} = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. VIII. 36; [Bertelli 33: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.]; 1 and F\textsuperscript{5} = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Landau-Finaly 38; [Bertelli 58: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.; missing in Mascheroni and Bolton]. See Appendix 1.
various critics. Marchesi (1903) produced comparative close readings of *l’Etica*, the *
Liber Ethicorum* (another name for one specific MS of the *Summa Alexandrinorum*), and *
Trésor*. Gentili (2005) first compares *l’Etica* and *Summa Alexandrinorum*; she then compares *l’Etica* and the *Trésor*. Gaiter (1877-83) compared *Tesoro* and *Trésor* (in the footnotes to his edition of *Tesoro*).

Each of these studies has contributed to the scholarly understanding of the works involved. What as yet does not exist is a reading of *Tesoro* in comparison with a complete and original version of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This at first might appear to be an unnatural comparison, because there is no evidence that Brunetto Latini or his Italian *volgarizzatore* utilized a complete copy of the *Ethics* at any point, instead choosing to use an older version of the text even though two newer and complete versions were in circulation. Such a comparison is useful, however, in providing a complete picture of the textual product that resulted through the aforementioned evolutionary process of multiple translations. By reading the *Ethics* in direct comparison with the *Tesoro*, it is possible to illustrate the exact nature of what was circulating in Italy and attributed to Aristotle in the name of the *Nicomachean Ethics* during the late duecento and early trecento (when *Tesoro* first began to circulate).

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64 Ibid., 41.
65 Two complete versions of the *Ethics* were available at the time of *Trésor’s* composition: Robert Grosseteste’s 1246-7 translation, and William of Moerbeke’s 1250-60 revision thereof. See Dod, 77.
Below is provided a systematic examination of each of the major topics treated by both *Tesoro* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, organized alphabetically according to their English name. References to *Tesoro* are made from Gaiter’s edition (the most recent critical text); references to the *Ethics* are made from C. I. Litzinger’s 1964 English translation of Moerbeke’s edition (1250-1260). The Moerbeke version of *Ethics* was chosen for this comparison because it represents a complete version of *Ethics* that was circulating at the same time as *Trésor* and *Tesoro*.

### 1. Costanza (no comparable term in *Ethics*)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, <em>Tesoro</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della costanza</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della costanza **&lt;sup&gt;69&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>66</sup> Topics such as Dio (God), present in *Trésor / Tesoro* but not in *Ethics*, are also included in this list. Topics present in *Ethics* but not in *Trésor / Tesoro* are excluded.


<sup>68</sup> Dod, 77.

<sup>69</sup> ** Indicates that these mentions of the virtues are not attributed to the *Ethics*, but rather appear in the latter part of *Tesoro* II in the context of a generalized discussion of the virtues and vices. I do not examine *Tesoro*’s treatment of these virtues because *Tesoro* does not attribute them to Aristotle; however, I indicate them here for the possibility of future research. *Tesoro* defines the objective of the latter part of book II as being to clarify and expand upon the opinions of Aristotle previously presented: “Appresso che ‘I maestro ebbe messo in iscritto il libro dell’*Etica* di’ Aristotile, ch’è quasi fondamento di questo libro, vuole egli seguitare la sua materia su gli insegnamenti delle moralitadi, per
Summary: Costanza is a virtue treated independently in *Tesoro*, used in characterizing a man’s drive, resolve, strength, and commitment to following his virtuous path. It is mentioned in the segment of *Tesoro* attributed to *Ethics*, but it is mostly elaborated in the latter part of *Tesoro* II’s discussion of virtues and vices which is not attributed to Aristotle. A similar concept is found in *Ethics* as a subspecies of Aristotle’s treatment of the virtuous man’s love of self (IX.X), describing the continent man’s self-control.

E.g. Definition of costanza in *Tesoro* is like definition of continence in *Ethics*, focusing on self-control.

*Tesoro*: “Generalmente l’uomo constante si é meglio che ’1 mobile, però che ’1 mobile si move ad ogni vento, ma l’uomo constante non si move per forti desierii; ma tal fiata per la buona e nobile dilettazione si move dalla sua falsa credenza, e consente alla veritate.”


70 *Tesoro*, 128. Brunetto elaborates on this definition, drawing upon the views of Seneca, Horace, and Juvenal, in the latter part of *Tesoro* II, in which he provides an account of virtues and vices that meant to compliment and expound upon the earlier reiteration of Aristotle’s *Ethics*. There, costanza is defined as follows: “Costanza é una stabile fermezza di cuore, che si tiene a suo proponimento. Suo ufficio è a ritenere fermezza nell’una fortuna e nell’altra, sì che l’uomo non innalzi troppo nella prosperitate, né si turbi troppo nell’avversitate, ma tenga lo mezzo, chè nobile cosa é avere in ciascuna fortuna una fronte ed un medesimo volto.” 370.
Ethics: “A person is called continent or incontinent inasmuch as this element is in control or not, which supposes that it is man himself.”

2. Dio (no comparable term in Ethics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>“Dio” in Tesoro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</strong></td>
<td>Cit.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</strong></td>
<td>Cit.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dell’amore che l’uomo ha con Dio</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come Domenedio è partitore de’ beni</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: There is one sentence in Tesoro indicating that all goods originate with God, a sentiment that is missing in Ethics.

E.g. Tesoro states that all goods originate from God.

Tesoro: “Lo eguale partitore de’ beni si è Domenedio, lo quale dà a ciascuno secondo che la sua natura è acconcia a ricevere.”

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71 Ethics, 1168b34-35, 566.
72 For discussion of segment “Dell’amore che l’uomo ha con Dio,” see subject heading for “Love/Amore” below.
73 Tesoro, 3:149.
3. Fortitude / Fortezza

Table 3 “Fortitude”/“Fortezza” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fortitude**</td>
<td>1115a6-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1115b4 (p.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The act of fortitude</td>
<td>1115b7-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1116a10 (179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts of civic and military fortitude</td>
<td>1116a16-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1116b15 (184)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterfeit fortitude</td>
<td>1116b23-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1117a28 (188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The properties of fortitude</td>
<td>1117a29-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1117b22 (192)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della fortezza</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui dice della terza virtù, cioè della fortezza**</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delle sei maniere di forza**</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancora della fortezza**</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: Treatment of fortezza in Tesoro is decisively more brief than in Ethics. Tesoro establishes three types of strength—animal, spiritual, and divine—which are not present in Ethics.

E.g. Fortezza animale, ispirituale, and divina in Tesoro. Fortezza divina belongs to men of God.

*Subject headings are direct quotations from original text, and can be found on the page references listed in “Cit.” column of chart.*
Tesoro: “Fortezza animale si è quella, la quale l’uomo fa per compiere suo desiderio, lo quale ardentemente desidera. Fortezza ispirituale si è quella, l’uomo fa per acquistare fama, onore e grandezza. Fortezza divina si è quella, che gli uomini forti amano naturalmente, e gli uomini di Dio sono ben forti.”

4. Friendship / Amistade

Table 4 “Friendship”/“Amistade” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friendship, a subject of moral philosophy</td>
<td>1155a3-1155b16 (475-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, the object of friendship</td>
<td>1155b17-1156a5 (479)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinds of friendship</td>
<td>1156a6-1156b35 (482-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful and pleasurable friendships compared</td>
<td>1156b35-1157b5 (488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The act and habit of friendship</td>
<td>1157b5-1158a1 (491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship in relation to its subject</td>
<td>1158a1-1158b11 (494-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship between unequals</td>
<td>1158a11-1159a12 (499)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loving and being loved as related to friendship</td>
<td>1159a12-1159a24 (503-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendship and civic association</td>
<td>1159a25-1160a30 (507)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinction of the kinds of states</td>
<td>1160a31-1161a9 (511)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friendships conform to kinds of states</td>
<td>1161a10-1161b10 (515)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

75 Tesoro, 3:106.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subdivisions of friendships</th>
<th>1161b11-1162a33 (519-20)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quarrels and complaints in friendship</td>
<td>1162a34-1163a23 (526-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complaints in friendships between unequals</td>
<td>1163a25-1163b28 (531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionate properties in friendship</td>
<td>1163b32-1164b21 (535-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubts on the duties of friendship</td>
<td>1164b22-1165a35 (540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor doubts on the dissolution of friendship</td>
<td>1165a36-1165b36 (544)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The acts or effects of friendship</td>
<td>1166a1-1166b29 (547-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodwill</td>
<td>1166b30-1167a21 (553)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>1167a22-1167b16 (556)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficence</td>
<td>1167b17-1168a27 (559)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubt concerning love of self</td>
<td>1168a28-1168b28 (563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A virtuous man’s love of self</td>
<td>1168b28-1169b2 (566-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A doubt on a happy man’s need of friends</td>
<td>1169b3-1170a13 (571)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why a happy man needs friends</td>
<td>1170a13-1170b19 (575)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitation of the number of friends</td>
<td>1170b20-1171a20 (579)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends needed in both prosperity and adversity</td>
<td>1171a20-1171b28 (582)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends’ pleasure in living together</td>
<td>1171b29-1172a15 (586)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</th>
<th>Cit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Come l’amistade è virtude che regna nell’uomo</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delle specie dell’amistade</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary: The most notable feature of Tesoro’s treatment of friendship is the degree to which it constitutes an abbreviated version of the extensive account provided in Ethics. In addition, the first mention of friendship in Tesoro acknowledges that it is a characteristic of both man and God, an assertion not present in Ethics. Both works identify three types of friendship, and both provide the same definition for the best and most desirable type of friendship. However, Tesoro defines this type of friendship as "divina," a term providing spiritual connotations which is absent from the Ethics. Additionally, Tesoro provides a unique descriptive passage of activities common to the best type of friends, which include the celebration of Easter, taking of Holy Communion, "immolazioni delle vittime," congregations of the cities, all activities performed for the exaltation of God.

E.g. Tesoro specifies that friendship is a quality of both man and God.

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Table 4 (continued)

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Come quello delli boni amici dee essere comune tra loro</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come l'amore è comunicazione intra gli amici</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delle cose che aiutano all'amistade **</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come noi dobbiamo amare gli amici **</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della vera amistade **</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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76 Ibid., 3:132.

Tesoro: “L’amistade è una delle virtudi di Dio e dell’uomo, ed è molto bisognosa alla vita dell’uomo, e l’uomo ha bisogno d’amici si come di tutti gli altri beni.”

E.g. Both works identify three types of friendship: for good, for utility, and for delight.

Tesoro: “Le specie dell’amistà sono tre. L’una si è amistà per bene, l’altra si è per utile, e l’altra si è per dilettazione.”

Ethics: “There are then three kinds of friendship corresponding to the objects of love ... those who love one another for utility ... those who love each other for pleasure ... perfect friendship, however, is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another according to virtue.”

E.g. The best type of friendship is between men who love one another for their virtue.

However, this edition of Tesoro characterizes this type of friendship as “divina,” utilizing a term with religious connotations that is absent from Ethics.

Tesoro: “Questa amistade della utilitate si è tra i vecchi, e l’amistà della dilettazione si è tra giovani; ma la perfetta amistade si è solamente tra gli uomini che son buoni, e sono simili in virtudi, e vogliansi bene per la similitudine ch’è intra loro delle

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78 Ibid., 3:129. Gaiter does not observe any variation in this statement between Trésor or MS. Vis..
79 Ibid., 3:132.
80 Ethics, 1156a6-1156b8, 482.
81 Gaiter doe es not observe any variation in this term between Trésor or MS. Vis.
virtudi; e questa cotale amistà si è amistà divina, che contiene tutti i beni, ed intra loro non ha detrazione, nè niuna cosa di rio.”

Ethics: “Perfect friendship, however, is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another according to virtue, for those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous ... these things then are most lovable. Hence love of them should be most intense, and such friendship is the noblest.”

E.g. Tesoro provides a unique descriptive passage characterizing the Christian religious practices of the best type of friends.

Tesoro: “E però si fanno solennitadi delle pasque, ed oblazioni delli sacrifici, e le immolazioni di vittime, e le congregazioni delle cittadi, acciò che di queste cose nasca compagnia ed amore intra li prossimi, dalla qual cosa procede onore ed esaltamento a messer Domenedio. E soleansi fare nel tempo antico quelle solennitadi dopo la ricolta del grano e delle biade, per ciò che di quel tempo sono più acconci gli uomini ad aiutare amici, ed a render grazie a Dio de’ beneficì ricevuti.”

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82 Tesoro, 3:132-3.
83 Ethics, 1156b7-1156b24, 482-3.
84 This passage also appears in Tesoro Ms. Vis. and Trésor. However, Trésor lacks reference to “immolazioni delle vittime.” See Gaiter note 3, Tesoro, 3:135.
85 Tesoro, 3:135.
5. Honor / Onore

Table 5 “Honor”/“Onore” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happiness, a good deserving honor</td>
<td>1101b10-1102a4 (70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues dealing with hoors</td>
<td>1107b21-1108b10 (115-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The virtue concerned with ordinary honor</td>
<td>1125b1-1125b25 (252)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dell’onor che dee essere tra gli uomini</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: Tesoro and Ethics differ slightly in their accounts of man’s ability to praise God / the gods.

E.g. Tesoro states that man can never praise God or his father enough; Aristotle’s explanation is more complex, specifying that there are different kinds of praises reserved for gods and for men.

Tesoro: “Non può l’uomo sufficientemente rendere onore a Domenedio, ed al suo padre, addivegna ch’egli si sforzi quanto puote.”

Ethics: “Our point is obvious too from the praises of the gods, for such praises would be ridiculous if judged by our standard. This happens because praises are given by reason of relation to another, as we have indicated. If praise belongs to things of this kind, clearly something greater and better than praise is given to the best. This seems to

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86 Ibid., 3:146.
be true, for we call gods blessed and happy as we do the most godlike among men. We speak in a similar way of goods, for no one praises happiness as he praises a just man, but he ascribes to happiness something better and more divine, namely, blessedness.”

6. Justice / Giustizia

Table 6 “Justice”/“Giustizia” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1129a3-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1129b11 (279-80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal justice</td>
<td>1129b11-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1130a13 (284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular justice</td>
<td>1130a14-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1130b29 (288-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributive and commutative justice</td>
<td>1130b30-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1131a29 (293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>1131a29-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1131b24 (297)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The mean of commutative justice</td>
<td>1131b25-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1132a25 (300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding the mean of commutative justice</td>
<td>1132a25-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1132b20 (304)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The opinion of Pythagoras</td>
<td>1132b21-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1133a18 (307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>1133a19-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1133b18 (311)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just action as a mean</td>
<td>1133b30-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1134a16 (316)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The unjust man</td>
<td>1134a17-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1134b18 (319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A division of political justice</td>
<td>1134b18-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1135a15 (324)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions which make a man just or unjust</td>
<td>1135a15-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1136a9 (329-30)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

87 Ethics, 1101b18-27, 70.
Summary: Aristotle’s treatment of justice is much more extensive than the comparatively brief account in *Tesoro*. In addition to being shorter, *Tesoro*’s account of justice departs significantly from Aristotle’s in two ways: first, by introducing the subject of divine justice, and second, by introducing the novel concept of sopraggiustizia.

E.g. Baseline definition is similar.

*Teso*ro: “Giustizia si è abito laudabile, per lo quale l’uomo si è fatto giusto, e fa opere di giustizia, e vuole e ama le cose giuste.”

*Ethics*: “Apparently everyone wants to call justice that habit by which men are disposed to just works, and by which they actually perform and will just deeds.”

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88 *Tesoro*, 3:86.
E.g. Subject of divine justice is introduced in *Tesoro*.

*Tesoro*: “Il danaio si è legge la quale non ha anima, ma il giudice è la legge la quale ha anima; e Domenedio glorioso si è legge universale a tutte le cose.”

E.g. Subject of sopraggiustizia—the type of justice which makes man more like God—is introduced in *Tesoro*.

*Tesoro*: “La sopraggiustizia si è meglio che non è la giustizia; ma secondo la verità, nel vero mezzo non si può dividere. E cotal giustizia, vera non è quella ch’è nella legge, ma quella giustizia la quale è in Domenedio glorioso, ed è data agli uomini: per la quale giustizia l’uomo si fa simigliante a Dio.”

### 7. Liberality / Larghezza (Liberalidade)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberality</td>
<td>1119b22-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1120a23 (211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The act of liberality</td>
<td>1120a23-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1120b27 (215)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, <em>Tesoro</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della larghezza</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89 *Ethics*, 1129a6, 279.
91 *Tesoro*, 3:96-7.
Summary: Both *Tesoro* and *Ethics* are consistent on this topic, but their modes of delivery differ: the approach of *Tesoro* is practical, while the approach of *Ethics* is philosophical. The works also contain comparable accounts of the differences between ancestral and earned wealth, demonstrating the high level of specificity with which this particular content was transmitted as it made its way into *Tesoro*.

E.g. Baseline definition of liberality/larghezza is consistent.

*Tesoro*: “Larghezza è mezzo in dare e in ricevere pecunia.”

*Ethics*: “Let us next discuss liberality, which seems to be a mean in regards to wealth.”

E.g. Baseline definitions of related virtues/veses are consistent.

*Tesoro*: “Larghezza è mezzo in dare e in ricevere pecunia. Dunque colui è liberale, che usa la pecunia convenevolmente, cioè quello che dà quello che si conviene, e dove e quanto e quando ed a cui si conviene. Prodigo, ovvero distruggitore, si è quello che superchia in dare, e viene meno in ricevere. E l’avarò fa tutto il contrario.”

*Ethics*: “Who has virtue dealing with wealth will use riches to the best advantage.”

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92 Ibid., 3:68.
93 *Ethics*, 1119b22, 211.
94 *Tesoro*, 3:68.
95 *Ethics*, 1120a4-8, 210.
"A man is praised as liberal for his giving and taking of wealth. (Wealth here means whatever can be evaluated in terms of money.) Extravagance is the excess and miserliness, the defect in the use of wealth."\textsuperscript{96}

E.g. The mode of delivery in \textit{Ethics} is philosophical.

\textit{Ethics}: "Things that have utility—among which are riches—can be used well or badly. And the man who possesses the virtue concerned with particular objects uses each one best. Therefore he who has the virtue dealing with wealth will use riches to the best advantage. This man is the liberal man."\textsuperscript{97}

Here, Aristotle begins at the level of highest generality, with the object (riches). He then moves to consider the man who acts upon the object, performing the act of using. Ascribing virtue to the act of using the object that has utility, Aristotle philosophically pinpoints his definition of liberality.

E.g. The mode of delivery in \textit{Tesoro} is practical.

\textit{Tesoro}: "Degna cosa e` che larghezza sia piu` in dare che in ricevere. Pi`u` da lodare e` colui che d`a le cose che si conviene che non e` colui che non riceve le cose che si convengono. E` pi`u` degna cosa nella virtude operare la cosa dritta e buona che non e`
astenersi da quello di che l'uomo si dee astenere. Poco è da laudare quegli che riceve temperatamente; ma quegli che dà temperatamente è molto da laudare. Non è largo quegli che si contrista di quel che dà; quegli è largo, che dà con allegrezza. L'uomo largo si è contento a sè di poco...o poco ch'egli posseggia, sempre si sforza di fare opere di larghezza, secondo la sua facultade.  

Tesoro’s account of larghezza is action oriented. Its discussion of larghezza begins with the definitions of the related virtues and vices—liberalitade, prodigo, and avarizia—and then juxtaposes them to one another in order to illustrate their varying levels of importance. This is followed by a number of examples modifying what constitutes behavior that is “largo” and what does not.

E.g. The two works note the same features and benefits of ancestral versus earned wealth, but Tesoro demonstrates a slightly more flattering tone towards those with earned wealth than does the Ethics. This could possibly be due to differences in the implied readers of the two works over time; Ethics was the product of Aristotle’s teachings to educated, wealthy men, while Tesoro is the product of a summa and two vernacularizations, all of which were geared towards individuals of more common social status.

99 Ibid., 68-71.
Tesoro: “È usanza, che la ricchezza che l’uomo ha sanza fatica, si ‘l fa esser più largo; e grande maraviglia è, quando l’uomo è ricco con gran fatica, s’egli è largo.”

Ethics: “People who inherit wealth—not having any experience of need—are more liberal than those who earn their money. All men esteem more highly what they themselves have produced, like parents and poets.”

Tesoro: “Rade fiate si trova l’uomo largo essere ricco, però che la ricchezza non cresce per donare; ma cresce per raunare e per ritenere.”

Ethics: “It is not easy to increase the wealth of the liberal man who is inclined neither to accept nor keep riches but rather to distribute them, placing value not on riches themselves but on the bestowal of them.”

8. Love / Amore

Table 8 “Love”/“Amore” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loving and being loved as related to friendship</td>
<td>1159a12-</td>
<td>1159a24 (503-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubt concerning love of self</td>
<td>1168a28-</td>
<td>1168b23 (563)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A virtuous man’s love of self</td>
<td>1168b28-</td>
<td>1169b2 (566-7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100 Ibid., 3:70.
101 Ethics, 1120b11-14, 215.
102 Tesoro, 3:69-70.
103 Ethics, 1120b14-17, 214.
Summary: Accounts of love are present in both *Tesoro* and *Ethics* within the context of the discussion of friendship. *Tesoro* contains an extensive treatment of the love between man and God—comparing it to the love of man and family—that is nowhere present in *Ethics*.

_Tesoro:_ “Lo amore che l’uomo ha con Dio, e l’amore che l’uomo ha al padre, si è d’una natura, però che ciascuno di questi amori è per ricordamento di ricevuto beneficio, e per donamento; ma l’amore di Dio dee passare l’amore del padre, chè ‘l beneficio che l’uomo ha da Dio è maggiore e più nobile che quello c’ha ricevuto dal padre. L’amistà de’ parenti e dei fratelli e deli vicini e deli strani si è maggiore e minore secondo la diversità della cagione, per la quale l’uomo vole bene l’un all’altro; però che quelli che sono nutricati insieme e disciplinati e d’un lungo tempo conversati insieme, si si vogliono grande bene. L’amore lo quale è tra moglie e ‘l marito si è amore naturale, e più antico amore che non è quel de’ cittadini intra loro; ed in questo amore è grandeutilità, però che l’operazione dell’uomo si è diversa da quella della femina, e quello che non può fare l’uno si fa l’altro, e così si compie il loro bisognoamento. Li figliuoli sono legame lo quale lega la moglie col marito in uno amore, però che ‘l figliuolo si è comune bene di amendue.”

104 _Tesoro*, 3:142-3.
9. Magnanimity / Magnanimità (Magnanimitade)

Table 9 “Magnanimity”/“Magnanimità” (“Magnanimitade”) in *Ethics/Tesoro*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magnanimity</td>
<td>1123a34-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1124a4 (236-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The acts of magnanimity</td>
<td>1124a4-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1124b6 (241)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Properties of magnanimity</td>
<td>1124b6-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1125a17 (244-5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vices opposed to magnanimity</td>
<td>1125a17-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1125a35 (250)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, <em>Tesoro</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della magnanimità</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della magnanimitade</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della magnanimitade**</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: The treatment of magnanimità stands out in *Tesoro* because of its explicit references to God, which are entirely absent in *Ethics*. Whether these were features of the original Arabic summa, or were the later additions of a Christian author or copyist, is unclear at this time but could be uncovered by further examination of the MSS. Whatever their source, it is undeniable that for the Italian readership of the *Tesoro* these references to God bore a distinctly Christian significance, and perhaps (for the reader uninformed that Aristotle had not been Christian) even in turn colored their understanding of the *Ethics* itself. In addition, the Aristotelian notion of magnanimity is altered somewhat between the two works. For example, while *Tesoro* indicates that nobility of blood and ancestral wealth are necessary for the attainment of this virtue, *Ethics* makes no such indication.

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105 See Dunlop, 255.
E.g. While *Ethics* defines magnanimity in terms of a man’s worthiness to think highly of himself, *Tesoro* restricts this worthiness only to the men who have performed great acts in honor of God.

*Tesoro:* “La vera magnanimità si è solamente nelle cose grandissime, cioè nelle cose per le quali l’uomo serve a Domenedio glorioso.”

*Ethics:* “A person seems to be magnanimous in thinking himself worthy of great things when he is worthy.”

E.g. *Tesoro* connects magnanimity with the concept of beatitude, an exclusively Christian concept. There is no comparable passage in *Ethics*.

*Tesoro:* “La dritta beatitudine si è pensar di quelle così altissime cose, e così grandi e così onorevoli, che di questo pensare nasce tutto bene, e poi viene in maggiore, lo qual non si puote estimare. L’uomo ch’è magnanimo, si è il maggiore uomo ed il più onorato che sia. E’ non si move per piccolo cosa, e non china la magnanimità sua a veruna sozza cosa. Dunque la magnanimitade si è ornamento e corona di tutte le virtudi.”

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106 *Tesoro*, 3:74.
107 *Ethics*, 1123b1-2, 236.
108 As understood in the Christian context of *Tesoro*.
109 *Tesoro*, 3:74: Gaiter notes that this entire sentence is absent in *Trésor*, and is exclusive to *Tesoro*.
110 Ibid.
E.g. Tesoro specifies that ancestral wealth and noble bloodlines help a man to attain magnanimity. There is no comparable passage in Ethics.

Tesoro: “Nobilità di sangue, e ricchezza antica, si aiuta l'uomo a esser magnanimo. E quegli è veramente magnanimo, che ha in sè due cose per le quali egli debbia essere onorato, ciò son quelle che sono dette di sopra.”

10. Magnificence / Magnificenza

Table 10 “Magnificence”/“Magnificenza” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Magnificence</td>
<td>1122a18-1122b18 (227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The objects of magnificence</td>
<td>1122b19-1123a33 (231)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della magnificenza</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della magnificenza in tempo di pace</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della magnificenza in tempo di guerra</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

111 Ibid., 3:75. It is possible that Tesoro is interpreting magnanimity as a subspecies of magnificence, involving people who do good things for others and not just for themselves. Brunetto writes that the magnanimous man “non è solamente buono a sè, anzi è buono a molti altri.” (ibid., 3:74) Although Tesoro does list many of the same behaviors present in Aristotle’s list of the magnanimous man’s specific qualities (See Ethics, 1124b6-1125a17, 244-5)—for example, in Tesoro the magnanimous man “rallegrasi di far bene altrui, e vergognasi di riceverlo da altrui” (Tesoro, 3:74) and in Ethics he “likes to show himself in need of nothing or hardly anything, but to minister to the needs of others promptly” (Ethics, 1124b17-18, 244)—Tesoro seems to imply that the man with noble bloodlines or ancestral wealth can somehow accomplish these things, and thus attain magnanimitiy, more effectively.
Summary: Treatment is similar with the one exception that *Ethics* discusses sources of wealth, while *Tesoro* does not.

E.g. Basic definition is the same.

*Tesoro*: "Magnificenza si è una virtù, che si adopera nelle ricchezze, e solamente nelle grandi ispese."  

*Ethics*: Magnificence is "a certain virtue concerned with wealth," embracing "only lavish expenditures of money."

E.g. Both *Tesoro* and *Ethics* cite similar instances in which this virtue is demonstrated.

*Tesoro*: "Questa virtù detta magnificenza si s'intende nelle grandi cose maravigliose, si come in fare tempii e chiese, ove s'adori Dio, da cui è mandato e viene ogni bene; e simigliantemente è in fare gran nozze, e ricchi conviti, e dare altrui grandi albergherie, e in fare grandi presenti."  

*Ethics*: "Magnificence belongs to those princely outlays we call most honorable, like votive offerings to the gods, preparations, sacrifices and other things pertaining to divine worship. It belongs, also, to any lavish gifts made for the common good, such as a

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112 *Tesoro*, 3:71. Gaiter notes here that the French original adds "et grans maison" after "ispese."
113 *Ethics*, 112a18-19, 227.
114 Ibid., 1122a20-23, 227.
splendid donation for the benefit of all, or the fitting out of a trireme, or the giving of a banquet to the whole community.”

E.g. Both *Tesoro* and *Ethics* warn of the dangers of vulgar excess using similar specific examples of “buffoni”/”buffoons” and the desire to appear wealthy before others.

*Tesoro*: “L’uomo che soperchia a quello ch’è detto di sopra si è quello, che spende in queste cose che non dee, e che non si conviene, e colà ove può fare la piccola spesa si la vi fa grande, si come sono coloro che danno il loro a giucolari ed a buffoni, e come coloro che gittano le porpori nella via; e questo non fanno per amare della virtude, ma solamente per parer meraviglioso e glorioso alle genti.”

*Ethics*: “One who sins by excess, i.e., the vulgarian, is immoderate in spending contrary to what he ought, as has been pointed out. He expends great sums on paltry things, and his lavishness is out of harmony, figuratively speaking, he banquets buffoons with dishes fit for a marriage feast, gives presents to comedians, and rolls out a red carpet for their entry like the Megarians. In all such affairs he does not act to attain the good but to show off his wealth, hoping this way for admiration.”

E.g. Only *Ethics* discusses the sources of a man’s wealth.

116 *Ethics*, 1122b19-23, 231.
117 *Tesoro*, 3:72-3.
118 *Ethics*, 1123a19-27, 231.
**Ethics:** “A great expenditure is suitable for those who have wealth themselves, from their parents, or from others transferring it to them; likewise for the noble and those renowned for fame or other similar public acclaim, since all these things have a certain greatness and distinction.”\(^{119}\)

### 11. Meekness / Mansuetudine

**Table 11** “Meekness”/“Mansuetudine” in *Ethics/Tesoro*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meekness and its opposed vices</td>
<td>1125b26-1126b10 (255-6)</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, <em>Tesoro</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dell’ira e della mansuetudine</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della mansuetudine</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: Both works display similar attitudes with regard to this virtue. However, *Ethics* emphasizes that excessive anger is more opposed to the virtue than excessive meekness, while *Tesoro* vituperates both extremes. In addition, *Tesoro* contains a mention of anger in response to particular offenses that is absent from *Ethics*.

E.g. Basic definitions are similar.

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\(^{119}\) Ibid., 1122b29-33, 231.
Tesoro: The "mansueto" individual "si si adira di quello che dee, e con cui, e quanto, e come, e quando, e dove."\(^{120}\)

Ethics: Meekness is "moderation concerned with anger."\(^{121}\)

E.g. Tesoro and Ethics differ with regard to their view of extremes of excess or defect.

Tesoro: "Tenere lo mezzo si è cosa da laudare, e tenere gli estremi è cosa da vituperare."\(^{122}\)

Ethics: "Excess is more opposed to meekness, for it happens more frequently since man is prone to take vengeance, and it makes the ill-tempered worse to live with."\(^{123}\)

E.g. Tesoro mentions a type of reactionary anger, common to all men whose sentiment is not dead, that is absent from Ethics.

Tesoro: "Colui che non si commove, e non si adira per ingiurie, o per offesa che sia fatta a lui, o a' suoi parenti, è uomo lo cui sentimento è morto."\(^{124}\)

\(^{120}\) Tesoro, 3:79.
\(^{121}\) Ethics, 1125b26-29, 255.
\(^{122}\) Tesoro, 3:80.
\(^{123}\) Ethics, 1126a29-31, 255.
\(^{124}\) Tesoro, 3:108.
12. Pleasure / Dilettazione

Table 12 “Pleasure”/“Dilettazione” in Ethics/Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some place happiness in virtue with pleasure; others say external goods are</td>
<td>1099a7-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessary for happiness</td>
<td>1099b8 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How sorrows, pleasures, and desire affect the temperate man</td>
<td>1118b28-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1119a20 (204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinds of pleasures</td>
<td>1148b15-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1149a24 (430)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure and pain</td>
<td>1152b1-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1152b24 (457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refutation of previous arguments</td>
<td>1152b25-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1153a35 (460-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One pleasure is the highest good</td>
<td>1153b1-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1154a7 (465-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical pleasures</td>
<td>1154a8-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1154b34 (469-70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Useful and pleasurable friendships compared</td>
<td>1156b35-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1157b5 (488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends’ pleasure in living together</td>
<td>1171b29-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1172a15 (586)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>1172a19-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1172b8 (589)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions on pleasure as a good</td>
<td>1172b9-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1173a13 (592)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure is not a good according to Plato</td>
<td>1173a13-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1173b20 (596)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A fourth argument that pleasure is not a good</td>
<td>1173b20-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1174a12 (600)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasure is neither a motion nor a process of change</td>
<td>1174a13-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1174b12 (602)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature and properties of pleasure</td>
<td>1174b14-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1175a21 (606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleasures differ in kind</td>
<td>1175a21-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1175b24 (610)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The morality of pleasures</td>
<td>1175b24-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1176a29 (614)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The nature of happiness</td>
<td>1176a30-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1177a11 (618-19)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 12 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Happiness is an activity according to the highest virtue</td>
<td>1177a12-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1177b4 (623)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness and leisure</td>
<td>1177b4-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1178a8 (627)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness and the moral virtues</td>
<td>1178a8-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1178b32 (631-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness and external goods</td>
<td>1178b33-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1179a32 (635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The need of virtue</td>
<td>1179a33-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1180a24 (638-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man must be capable of legislating</td>
<td>1180a24-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1180b28 (643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to learn the science of lawmaking</td>
<td>1180b28-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1181b23 (646-7)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Cit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Del diletto</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come l’uomo si diletta in molte cose</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come la dilettazione è naturale</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della dilettazione sensibile, ed intellettuale</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della più dilettovole dilettazione</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Del diletto, e del desiderio **</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancora parla qui del diletto **</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Di quello che ama per suo diletto **</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: Pleasure receives a much less extensive treatment in *Tesoro* than in *Ethics*. The first nine chapters of *Ethics* X are devoted to the theoretical aspects of pleasure; Plato’s arguments that pleasure is not a good, for example, are accounted for in *Ethics* X.III. *Tesoro* establishes three categories of things delighted in by man that are not found in *Ethics*. 
E.g. The first treatment of diletto in *Tesoro* focuses heavily on the perverted pleasures which are contrary to virtuous action, such as cannibalism and sodomy. The passage is instructive and illustrative, but lacking the philosophical argumentation characteristic of the Aristotelian account. Seven categories of pleasures are defined.

*Tesoro:* “Sono dilettazioni naturali, e sono dilettazioni bestiali, e sono dilettazioni fierali, e sono dilettazioni per cagione di tempo, e sono altre dilettazioni per cagione d’infermitade, e sono altre per cagione d’usanza, e sono altre per male nature. Dilettazioni fierali son quelle di coloro che si dilettano di fare fendere femine pregne, acciò che si satollino deli figliuoli ch’ elle hanno in corpo, si come coloro che mangiano carne d’uomini, e carne cruda. Dilettazioni d’infermità, o di mala usanza, è di pelarsi ciglia, o di rodersi l’unghie, o di mangiare fango, o carboni. Dilettazioni per mala natura si è giacere l’un maschio con l’altro, e tutte le altre cose vituperevoli di lusuria.”

E.g. *Tesoro* establishes three categories of delights not found in *Ethics.*

*Tesoro:* “L’uomo si diletta in tre cose, cioè nelle cose presenti usandole, e nelle cose passate ricordandole, e nelle future sperandole.”

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125 *Tesoro*, 3:121-2. This complete passage extends, with additional descriptions, from pp. 120-3.
126 Ibid., 3:155.
Table 13 “Prudence”/“Prudenza” in *Ethics/Tesoro*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, <em>Nicomachean Ethics</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prudence</td>
<td>1140a24-1140b30 (369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding, the habit of first principles; wisdom</td>
<td>1140b31-1141a19 (373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom, the principal intellectual virtue</td>
<td>1141a19-1141b22, (376)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prudence, the principal value in human affairs</td>
<td>1141b22-1142a32 (380-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Eubulia</em> (excellence in deliberating)</td>
<td>1142a32-1142b33 (386)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Synesis</em> (habit of right judgment in practical individual cases)</td>
<td>1142b34-1143b17 (390-1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubts about the usefulness of wisdom and prudence</td>
<td>1143b18-1144b1 (396-7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral virtue and prudence</td>
<td>1144b1-1145a11 (402)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, <em>Tesoro</em></th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della prudenza</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Di ciò medesimo</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della prima virtù, cioè della prudenza **</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della prudenza **</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary: On the subject of prudence, *Tesoro* accords with *Ethics* on major definitions. Treatment of prudence is much more thorough in *Ethics*, however, with *Tesoro* lacking any discussion of eubulia and synesis. *Tesoro* contains a mention of God that is absent in *Ethics*. The two works also differ in their representation of the innate virtues of animals: *Tesoro* claims that animals are born with the same innate virtues as men, while *Ethics* does not make this claim.
E.g. Basic definitions are similar, and emphasize the nature of prudence as a habit guided by reason.

*Tesoro:* "La prudenza si è abito, con lo quale l'uomo può consigliare con verace ragione nelle cose degli uomini buoni e ree."\(^{127}\)

*Ethics:* Prudence is "a genuine habit concerned with action under the guidance of reason, dealing with things good and bad for man."\(^{128}\)

E.g. *Tesoro* contains a mention of God that is absent in *Ethics.*

*Tesoro:* "È detto, che concupiscenza desidera, ma lo intelletto si afferma, e non si fa nulla elezione senza lui. Dunque il principio della elezione si è desiderio intellettuale, per cagione d'alcuna cosa. E niuno uomo usa la elezione nella cosa, la quale è passata dinanzi, però che quello ch'è fatto può essere non fatto. Domenedio non ha potenza di ciò. E non cade elezione in quella cosa ch'è di necessità, si come nel sole, che si corica e leva per natura."\(^{129}\)

E.g. Both works emphasize the interdependence of intellectual and moral virtue, and utilize the example of the innately just, temperate, and brave nature of man—but *Tesoro*

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\(^{127}\) Ibid., 3:369.

\(^{128}\) *Ethics,* 1140b4-6, 369.

\(^{129}\) *Tesoro,* 3:98. Gaiter notes that the "sole" example is absent in *Trésor,* and in its place is the following: "ou que ne sont possibles."
also ascribes these virtues to “alquanti animali,”\textsuperscript{130} while \textit{Ethics} states that the natural habits of animals are “detrimental without the direction of reason.”\textsuperscript{131}

\textit{Tesoro}: “La ragione, e la scienza, e l’intelletto, si sono di quelle cose che sono naturalmente nobili.”\textsuperscript{132}

“Le virtù morali si intendono a fare gli uomini forti e casti e giusti infino alla loro adolescenza, siccome ne’ garzoni ed in alquanti animali. Dunque queste virtù di sono per natura e non per intelletto; ma la signoria di tutte le virtù si si conviene alla virtù intellettuale, per ciò che non si puote fare eleizione senza l’intelletto, e non si puote compire senza virtù morale. E così la prudenza insegna a fare quello che conviene, e nel modo che si conviene; ma la virtù morale mena le cose a fine ed a compimento colle operazioni.”\textsuperscript{133}

\textit{Ethics}: “Virtue has a relation to a similar quality—as prudence to shrewdness, not that they are identical but that they have some likeness. In this way natural virtue is related to the principal virtue, for it seems to everyone that each kind of moral practice exists by nature to some extent. Indeed immediately from birth we are just, temperate, and brave and have other qualities. However, we are looking for something different, a good as a principle, so that virtues of this kind may be in us according to another manner

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 3:103-4.
\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Ethics}, 1144b1-17, 402.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Tesoro}, 3:100.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 3:103-4.
of existence. It is a fact that children and dumb animals have natural habits, but these seem detrimental without the direction of reason.”

E.g. There is a notable amount of variation between the MSS of Trésor and Tesoro on the subject of shrewdness, indicating that this portion of the text endured frequent alteration. However, the final result of Tesoro (in Gaiter’s edition) is very close to the content of Moerbeke’s Ethics.

Tesoro: “La prudenza si misura per li cominciamenti e gli uscimenti delle cose. Per l’intelletto ci viene solerzia e astuzia. E la solerzia è senso per lo quale si giudica avacciatamente in diritto giudicio, e tostantemente si acconsentisce ad un buono consiglio. Astuzia, cioè scaltrimento, è di prudenza, col quale l’uomo viene a fine con grande sottigliezza de’ suoi intendimenti nelle cose buone; ma questa sottigliezza è detta calliditate nelle cose ree, si come sono gli incantamenti e gli’ indovinamenti; e questi cotali che queste cose fanno, non sono detti savi, ma son detti consiglianti per naturale intelletto, e briganti.”

134 Ethics, 1144b1-17, 402.
135 Tesoro, 3:101. Gaiter compares this passage with the following from Trésor: “Solerte est un sens par quoi l’on juge isnel et tost l. droit jugement, et consent legierement et tost à bon conseil: mais astuce est touzjors encoste le preposement, et quant li preposemens est bons, proprement lor est il apelés astuce; mais quant il est malvais, lors est il apelze malice, et de lui est enchantemens et devainilles: et cil qui ces choses ont, ne sont mie sachant ne sage, ains sont sollers, et sonseillé par intellect de nature;” and from MS. Vis.: “E la solerzia è avacciamiento per lo quale si giudica avacciatamente in diritto o giudicio, e tostantemente si acconsentisce ad un bono consiglio. Astuzia, cioè scaltrimento, è di prudenza, col quale l’uomo viene a fine con grande sottigliezza è detta qualitade nelle cose ree, si come sono gli incantamenti e gli indovinamenti; e questi cotali non sono detti savi, ma son detti consiglianti, e briganti, ed astuti.” Gaiter notes: “Rappattumata la
Ethics: "There is a particular quality called shrewdness, which is of such a nature that it enables a man to do the things ordained to a determined end and to attain the end by means of these things. When the intention is good, shrewdness is praiseworthy, but when the intention is evil it is called craftiness. For this reason we call both prudent and crafty people clever."\textsuperscript{136}

14. Temperance / Castitate

<p>| Table 14 | “Temperance”/“Castitate” in Ethics/Tesoro |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Temperance</td>
<td>1116b2301117a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26 (195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperance in relation to touch and taste</td>
<td>1118a26-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1118b28 (200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How sorrows, pleasures, and desires affect the temperate man</td>
<td>1118b28-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1119a20 (204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intemperance compared with cowardice and the sins of children</td>
<td>1119a21-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1119b18 (207)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment by Brunetto Latini, Tesoro</th>
<th>Cit.:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Della castitate</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della castitate</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della castità, e della continenza</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Della castità **</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{136} Ethics, 1144a22-28, 396-7.
Summary: The content of *Tesoro* is more or less consistent with the *Ethics* on this topic.

E.g. Temperance/*Castitate* is a mean between extremes regarding pleasure.

*Tesoro*: “Castitate si è mezzo intra seguire le dilettazioni corporali tutte, e non seguirne nulla.”\(^{137}\)

*Ethics*: “Temperance is a mean in dealing with pleasures.”\(^{138}\)

E.g. Temperance/*Castitate* relates specifically to pleasures of the body.

*Tesoro*: “Nel gusto e nel tatto,...e specialmente nel tatto è grande dilettazione.”\(^{139}\)

*Ethics*: “Temperance will be concerned with the pleasures of the body.”\(^{140}\)

**F. Conclusion**

Brunetto’s actual sources of the *Ethics* can never be known for certain. Therefore, in providing this scheme, my intentions have been to illustrate the content of the *Ethics* as it is presented in *Tesoro*, as well as to identify the ideas attributed to Aristotle that are not actually his own. Through side-by-side analysis of a complete copy of the *Ethics* and the *Tesoro*, we have observed that some virtues weighing heavily in the

\(^{137}\) *Tesoro*, 3:65.
\(^{138}\) *Ethics*, 1117b24, 195.
\(^{139}\) *Tesoro*, 3:65-6.
\(^{140}\) *Ethics*, 1118a2, 195.
original *Ethics* play a very small role in *Tesoro*: friendship, justice, and pleasure. Other virtues which are not as central to the *Ethics*—such as liberality—are treated in *Tesoro* consistently with their treatment in the original *Ethics*; this demonstrates that they were transmitted with a great deal of specificity over time by all of the authors and translators involved (i.e. from the author of the Greco-Alexandrine summa, to Hermannus Alemannus, to Taddeo Alderotti, to Brunetto Latini, to another anonymous Italian translator).

The *Ethics* takes diverse manifestations in *Tesoro*, all of which share the key characteristic of having been written for an audience in need of a simplified or more accessible form of the work. This was clearly the intention of the Greco-Alexandrine summa (the earliest known link in the chain of *Tesoro*’s sources) and by translating it into Latin, Hermannus Alemannus provided the function of rendering it accessible to a broader European readership. If indeed the summa was introduced in the Italian vernacular by Taddeo Alderotti, rendered in French by Brunetto Latini, and reconverted into Italian by an anonymous translator in the form of the *Tesoro*, it is important to note that, even when a complete version of the *Ethics* became available between 1250 and 1260 at the hands of William of Moerbeke, the account of *Ethics* in *Trésor* and *Tesoro* was never modified to account for the lacking philosophical material (particularly in the areas of justice, friendship, and pleasure).

Finally, this analysis has enabled us to observe that *Tesoro* introduces Christian content into its account of the *Ethics*. While it outside the scope of this study to say whether or not these references to God can be traced back to the Arabic roots of the
Summa Alexandrinorum, such an inquiry could be a valuable direction for future scholarship. The present comparison of Tesoro and Ethics has enabled us to observe that the references to God in Tesoro, irrespective of their origins, effectively attribute such assertions to the Ethics itself. Thus, the Tesoro allows its readers to attribute to the Ethics the notions of divine justice and love between man and God, as well as the assertions that all goods originate with God, divine friendship is characteristic of both man and God, and that magnanimity is reserved only for men who have done great acts in honor of God. This is the complex form of Christian Aristotelianism taken by the Tesoro: regardless of authorial intention and regardless of sources (neither of which can ever be known), it is possible to observe the fusion of Christian and Aristotelian content that was being transmitted by the Tesoro as Aristotle's own.
Part II: Dante’s *Convivio* and the Ethics

A. Introduction: Aristotelian Ethics and the *Convivio*

The figure of Brunetto Latini is famously immortalized by Dante Alighieri in *Inferno* XV as “la cara e buona imagine paterna / di voi quando nel mondo ad ora ad ora / m’insegnavate come l’uom s’eterna”.\(^{142}\) Although this well known passage implies an instructor-pupil relationship between Brunetto and Dante, scholars are not certain of the extent to which Brunetto was actually Dante’s teacher; though the encounter between Brunetto and Dante in *Inferno* XV establishes this popular notion, there is a dearth of historical evidence to back it up.\(^{143}\)

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Dante’s awareness of Latini’s Trésor is certain on account of its mention in the same Infernal canto in which Brunetto’s parting words to Dante following their encounter are: “sieti raccomandato il mio Tesoro / nel qual io vivo ancora, e più non cheggio.”144 Although the choice of words—“Tesoro”—appears to imply that Dante’s Brunetto is referring here to the same Italian vernacularization that met our scrutiny in the previous chapters, the critical consensus is that this is not a direct reference to the vernacular Tesoro, but rather the Trésor, Tesoretto, or a combination of the two.145

Although a direct line of influence cannot be established between Tesoro and Convivio, it is still valuable to read these works in conjunction with one another for their treatment of the Ethics. The commonality between Tesoro and Convivio lies in each of these works’ identity as an attempt on the part of an Italian author of the same period to bring Aristotle’s Ethics to the masses,146 and they both share the stated objective of being encyclopedic. Each employs the allegory of the work’s title in describing the dynamic of

144 Inferno, XV.119-20, 160.
145 Robert Hollander provides a thorough history of critical responses to this matter, concluding that Dante is referring here to the Tesoretto, which refers to itself as “Tesoro” multiple times; “INF 15.119” in Dante Alighieri, Robert Hollander, and Jean Hollander, Inferno (New York: Doubleday, 2000).
its composition (one a metaphorical “treasure” and the other a “feast”);\textsuperscript{147} thus \textit{Tesoro} begins:

\begin{quote}
Questo libro è intitolato \textit{Tesoro}. Perché, così come il signore che vuole accumulare in poco spazio cose di grandissimo valore, non soltanto per il proprio piacere, ma per accrescere la propria potenza e rendere sicuro il proprio stato in guerra e in pace, raccoglie le cose più care e i gioielli più preziosi che può, secondo la sua buona intenzione, del tutto similmente il corpo di questo libro è composto di sapienza, essendo tratto da tutte le parti dela filosofia in breve sommario.\textsuperscript{148}
\end{quote}

The encyclopedic objective is a bit more diffuse in the introductory metaphor of \textit{Convivio}. As “tutti li uomini naturalmente desiderano di sapere,”\textsuperscript{149} and only a blessed few have the opportunity in life to study philosophy (eat the bread of angels)—“Oh beati quelli pochi che seggiono a quella mensa dove lo pane de li angeli si mancua!”\textsuperscript{150}—Dante intends to collect the crumbs from the table of the blessed few and disseminate it among his worthy peers:

\begin{quote}
Intendo fare un generale convivio di ciò ch’i’ ho loro mostrato, e di quello pane ch’è mestiere a così fatta vivanda, sanza lo quale da loro non potrebbe essere mangiata; e ha questo convivio, di quello pane degno, cotale vivanda qual io intendo indarno essere ministrata.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Tesoro}, 3:4.

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Convivio}, I.1.41.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Convivio}, I.7.42.

\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Convivio}, I.11-12.43.
Still, in spite of their common objectives, the two works differ widely in approach. 

*Tesoro* disseminates the *Ethics* in the form of a straightforward summation. The Aristotelianism of *Convivio* is eclectic; nowhere does Dante specifically purport to summarize the entire contents of the *Ethics* in Latinian fashion. Structuring *Convivio* as a series of three canzoni surrounded by auto-commentary, Dante refers openly to the *Ethics* but draws on it sporadically while advancing his own theses.

*Convivio* is a prosemetric work in four books, all in the Italian vernacular.

Dante had originally planned to compose *Convivio* in fifteen books: one introductory book, followed by fourteen books each consisting of a canzone followed by prose commentary. However, having begun composing *Convivio* around 1304, Dante abandoned the text prior to its completion in or around 1308, and began composition of the *Commedia* within the following year.

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153 Dante’s linguistic choice in composing the *Convivio* is commonly understood as a valorization of the Italian vernacular, in a literary period in which commentaries were traditionally composed in Latin. Bemrose writes, “There had of course been works of instruction written in medieval vernaculars; Italian examples include Brunetto Latini’s encyclopaedic *Tesoretto* and *La composizione del mondo*, Ristoro d’Arezzo’s work on astronomy. But the vast majority of academic writing had been in Latin; Dante’s choice of the vernacular, which he confidently feels is now, in his hands, mature and versatile enough for the task ahead, is a reaction against a venerable tradition.” 90. See R. Weiss, “Links Between the ‘Convivio’ and the ‘De Vulgari Eloquentia,’” *The Modern Language Review*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Apr., 1942), 156-68.

from the outset the central importance of Aristotle to the entire treatise, by beginning
with a direct quotation from Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*: “Si come dice lo Filosofo nel
principio de la Prima Filosofia, tutti li uomini naturalmente desiderano di sapere.”

After this, Dante introduces and explains the metaphor of the banquet of knowledge,
specifying which readers are invited to his banquet. In the following chapters of Book I,
Dante addresses potential objections to his self-commentary, laments his exile and
personal misfortune, explains his choice to write in the vernacular instead of Latin,
expresses his love of the Italian vernacular and lambastes Italian natives who write in
foreign tongues.

Book II is devoted to explicating the canzone “Voi che ‘ntendendo il terzo ciel
movete,” beginning with a discussion of the literal and allegorical senses of the text as
Dante addresses the presence of a lady who has come to compete with his memory of his
deceased love, Beatrice. Providing a literal exposition of his canzone, Dante discusses


155 Dante Alighieri, *Convivio*, ed. Giorgio Inglese (Milano:Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli,
2004), I.1.41; citing *Metaphysics* I, 1, 980a, 21.

156 Dante’s discussion here of the literal, allegorical, and anagogical senses of the text—and
more specifically, his division between the allegory of the poets and the allegory of
the theologians—are one of his notable contributions to medieval literary theory. See
Minnis, Scott, and Wallace 382-394; Cecil Grayson, “Dante’s Theory and Practice of
Society, 1980), 146-65; Richard Hamilton Green, “Dante’s ‘Allegory of Poets’ and the
Mediaeval Theory of Poetic Fiction,” *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring,
1957): 118-128; Jean Pépin, *Dante et la Tradition de l’Allégorie* (Montreal: Institut
25, No. 1 (Jan., 1950): 78-86.

157 See Dronke, 1-50.
the structure of the cosmos,\textsuperscript{158} angels,\textsuperscript{159} and the immortality of the human soul. In his allegorical exposition, Dante reveals the identity of his new love: she is Lady Philosophy, and through the writings of Boethius and Cicero she came to console him in the wake of Beatrice's death. Having referenced the third heaven in the title of his canzone, Dante describes its allegorical meaning, and in doing so assigns each heaven with a corresponding branch of learning.\textsuperscript{160}

Book III begins with the canzone, "Amor che ne la mente mi ragiona," describing Dante's love for Lady Philosophy. As in the previous book, Dante begins with literal exposition of the canzone and follows with allegorical exegesis. However, the primary thrust of Book III surrounds the subject of man as philosopher: why man seeks to practice philosophy, and how philosophy finds its perfection in God but is practiced with relative imperfection by even the greatest of men, such as Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Dante's conception of the cosmos is heavily indebted to Aristotle's \textit{De caelo}; see Patrick Boyde, \textit{Dante Philomythes and Philosopher: Man in the Cosmos} (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981), 132-71.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid. 172-201: Boyde also provides an in depth study of Dante's angels.

\textsuperscript{160} In Bemrose's summation, "The seven lowest heavens (from the moon to Saturn) may, in each case because of some special attribute, be likened to one of the seven Liberal Arts, that is the disciplines of the \textit{trivium} and \textit{quadrivium}—the backbone of medieval education. Thus the Moon is like grammar, Mercury like dialectic (i.e. logic) and Venus, our third heaven, like rhetoric, and so on. But there are ten heavens and only seven Liberal Arts, so Dante compares the highest three spheres to more exalted disciplines. The heaven of the Fixed Stars is likened to physics and metaphysics, the \textit{Primum Mobile} to ethics (even loftier, note) and the Empyrean, the highest heaven, is not surprisingly linked with theology, the divine essence." 96-7. This division, in Etienne Gilson's view, amounts to Dante arguing for the primacy of ethics over metaphysics, a move which takes him philosophically out of step with both Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas; it is only possible because "metaphysics as conceived by Dante remains \textit{in itself} the loftiest and most perfect of the sciences, but that it is not so \textit{as far as we are concerned} ... The noblest of our sciences is that of man's happiness \textit{qua} man: ethics; as for metaphysics, we should certainly place it first if our mastery of it were equal to our mastery of ethics. Its only fault is that it is a little too much for us." \textit{Dante and Philosophy}, Trans. David Moore (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1949), 122; see 121-29.
Socrates, and Seneca. Philosophy is defined as the “amoroso uso di sapienza, lo quale massimamente è in Dio, però che in Lui è somma sapienza e sommo amore e sommo atto;” that is, the loving use of knowledge, most perfectly performed by God who thinks, loves, and acts perfectly. Ultimately, Convivio III closes with an emphasis on morality as that which creates the beauty we ascribe to wisdom, which is in turn the body of Lady Philosophy: “Così come la bellezza del corpo resulta da le membra in quanto sono debitamente ordinate, così la bellezza de la sapienza, che è corpo di Filosofia, come detto è, resulta da l’ordine de le virtudi morali, che fanno quella piacere sensibilmente.”

Book IV constitutes the fullest elaboration of ethics provided by the prematurely abandoned Convivio. The central importance of morality to the practice of philosophy having been established in Book III, Dante focuses here on nobility and its definition. Dante’s intention in Book IV is, in Bemrose’s words, to demonstrate that “Gentilezza, that is, nobility—but very much in an ethical sense—is the source of all human virtues, moral and intellectual.” In doing so, he is primarily concerned with the false notions of nobility that attribute it to wealth or lineage, and he attacks them methodically—including the opinion of his own Emperor, Frederick II. Simultaneously, he concerns

161 Convivio III.XIV.8, 202: “Li filosofi eccellentissimi ne li loro atti apertamente lo ne dimostraro, per li quali sapemo essi tutte l’altre cose, fuori che la sapienza, avere messe a non calere: onde Democrito, de la propria persona non curando, né barba né capelli né unghie si togliea; Platone, de li beni temporali non curando, la reale dignitade mise a non calere, che figlio di re fue; Aristotile, d’altro amico non curando, contra lo suo migliore amico, fuore di quella, combatteo, si come contra lo nomato Platone; e perché di questi parliamo, la loro vita disprezzaro, si come Zeno, Socrate, Seneca, e molti altri?”
162 Ibid., III.xii.12, 196.
163 Ibid., III.xv.11, 207.
164 Bemrose, 101.
himself with questions of authority: tracing the Imperial authority back to its Roman roots while questioning the rectitude of opposing the Emperor, as well as establishing Aristotle as the single most authoritative voice of moral philosophy. Arguing for the joint efforts of philosopher and Empire, Dante concludes that the Emperor should retain power but should always rule by the principles of philosophy. Following a lengthy exposition of the evils of riches, Dante reveals that nobility—"nobilitade"—is "perfezione di propria natura in ciascuna cosa." Locating the perfection of man’s nature in the practice of the moral virtues, Dante describes this practice, explicating specifically the moment in the earlier canzone in which the Ethics is referred to by name. The active and contemplative lives are discussed, as well as the "seed" of the faculty of reason planted into man by God while man is still in his mother’s womb. Convivio IV closes with a description of the ages of man and the different ways in which nobility manifests itself in each age. The work contains no conclusion because it was never completed; although in Convivio I.i.14, Dante made clear his intention to write and explicate 14 canzoni, we have only the four books outlined above.

There is not a strong scholarly consensus regarding the actual edition of Ethics consulted by Dante in the composition of Convivio. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello asserts that Dante uses that made by Grosseteste between 1246-7: "In all instances in which more than one version of the Ethics exist, it is clear that Dante used that made by Robert

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165 This moment in Convivio has been viewed as foreshadowing the famous "two suns" argument of Dante’s later political treatise, De Monarchia: “The imperialist theory sketched out in Chapters iv and v looks powerfully forward to Dante’s later work, and can without exaggeration be seen as a dry run for Books I and II of the Monarchia” (ibid., 104).

166 Convivio, IV.xvi.4, 283.

Grosseteste.” Dante appears also to intermittently reference Aquinas’ commentary as his source of the *Ethics*, as Gilson, Moore, and Dronke have observed. As Moerbeke’s translation of Aristotle was the one upon which Aquinas’ commentary was

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169 In *Convivio* IV.xiii.l 1.71, Dante claims to reference *Ethics* VI; Gilson remarks, “I have not found this passage in Aristotle, *Ethics* VI. On the other hand, St. Thomas Aquinas, in his *In X libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum espositio* (ed. A. M. Pirotta, Turin, Marietti, 1934), says: ‘Et hujus rationem assignat [Aristoteles], quia omnia consonant vero. Et hujus ratio est, quia, ut dicetur in sexto hujus, verum est bonum intellectus.’ (ed. cit., lib. I, lect. 12, no. 139). In fact, we read in lib. VI, lect. 3-4, No. 1143: ‘Quamvis enim per ista duo quandoque verum dicatur tamen contingit quod eis quandoque dicitur falsum, qod est malum intellectus, sicut verum est bonum intellectus.’ As this formula, which occurs twice in St. Thomas’s commentary, is not in the text of Aristotle, it seems that Dante is here quoting Aristotle according to that commentary. It may even be conjectured that his reference is borrowed from the former of the two passages from the commentary that we have just reproduced: *in sexto hujus*. Dante has understood *hujus libri*; hence the formula that he uses: ‘la veritade ... che e l’ultima perfezione nostra, si come dice lo Filosofo nel sesto de l’Etica, quando dice che ‘l vero é lo bene de lo intelletto’ (loc. cit). Dante thought that St. Thomas said that Aristotle had said it; he therefore confidently asserted that Aristotle had said it.” 101.

170 In *Convivio* IV.xiii.11.71, Dante alleges that Aristotle speaks against the poet Simonides in *Ethics* X: “nel decimo dell’Etica, contra Simonide poeta parlando.” Moore observes that Aristotle does not reference Simonides anywhere in *Ethics*, but Aquinas mentions him in the *Summa contra Gentiles*. As Dante quoted the *Summa contra Gentiles* earlier in *Convivio* IV.xv.1.125 and references it in *Convivio* IV.xxx.1.29, Moore concludes that Aquinas is likely Dante’s source of the Simonides reference. See Moore, *Studies in Dante. First Series*, 105.

171 Moore writes: “This indirect presence of the *Ethics* commentary is pervasive in the *Convivio*.” *Studies in Dante. First Series*, 55.
based and with which it circulated, if Dante consulted these two works simultaneously, it is also possible that he made use of the Moerbeke translation.

The problem is that it cannot be said for certain what Dante studied, where, or with whom; as Robert Crouse has pointed out, there are two major obstacles to the study of Dante's philosophy: "unresolved questions of literary history," and "lacunae in the intellectual biography of Dante." The only intellectual biography provided by Dante is contained in his narrative works (particularly the *Vita Nuova* and *Convivio*) by the citations he uses and references he makes. In Crouse's summation, from Dante's own words, this is what can truthfully be surmised of his intellectual background:

We know from the *Convivio* that [Dante's] first philosophical mentors were Boethius and Cicero, and that the *Consolatio* of Boethius and the *De amicitia*, along with other works of Cicero, had an enduring influence upon him. Those studies moved him, he tells us, to attend 'the schools of the religious and the disputations of the philosophers.' By 'schools of the religious,' he means,

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172 C.I. Litzinger, introduction to *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, by St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, C. I. Litzinger, and Ralph McInerny (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox, 1993), xii. Increasing the probability of Dante having encountered the Moerbeke revision is the statistical reality that in 1308, the estimated date at which Dante began composition of *Convivio*, Moerbeke's revision of Grosseteste was, of the two versions of *Ethics*, in greater circulation. Grosseteste's *Ethics* was circulating in at least the 33 MSS surviving today (estimated to date from 1246-47) while Moerbeke's revision of Grosseteste circulated in an additional 246 MSS (dating from 1250-60). Dod, 77.


174 Dante divulges this information in *Convivio* II.xii.1-8, 120-22: "Misimi a leggere quello non conosciuto da molti libro di Boezio, nel quale, cattivo e discacciato, consolato s'avea. E udendo ancora che Tullio scritto avea un altro libro, nel quale, trattando de l'Amistade, avea toccate parole de la consolazione di Lelio, uomo eccellentissimo, ne la
presumably, those of the Florentine Dominicans at Santa Maria Novella, the Franciscans at Santa Croce, and perhaps the Hermits of St. Augustine at Santo Spirito. In those schools he would have encountered some of the most sharply divergent currents of late thirteenth-century philosophy; at Santa Croce, both Pier Giovanni Olivi and Ubertino da Casale, prominent leaders of the ‘Spiritual’ or ‘Joachimite’ faction of the Franciscan order, had very recently been teachers; while at Santa Maria Novella, the dominant master, during Dante’s time, and long thereafter, was the stalwart Thomist, Remigio Girolami. Through his studies at the University of Bologna, and his close friendship with Guido Cavalcante, his ‘primo amico,’ he would have become familiar with Latin Averroist interpretation of Aristotle.

Further deepening our understanding of Dante’s intellectual biography, particularly as it relates to the Convivio, Ascoli has pointed out that Dante underwent a period of rapid intellectual growth immediately following his exile from Florence in 1301:

morte di Scipione amico suo, misimi a leggere quello...cominciai ad andare...ne le scuole de li religiosi e a le disputazioni de li filosofi.” For additional general background on Dante’s education, see Sergio Cristaldi, La ‘Vita nuova’ e la restituzione del narrare (Messina: Rubbettino Editore, 1994); Charles T. Davis, Dante and the Idea of Rome (Oxford: Clarendon, 1957); Ronald Witt, In the Footsteps of the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

175 See Bemrose, 21-9; Cosmo, 38 and 50-53; Giorgio Petrocci, Vita di Dante (Rome-Bari, 1984), 32-33; Nick Havely, Dante and the Franciscans: Poverty and Papacy in the Commedia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39-43.


During this ... his intellectual and poetic activities evidently underwent a sort of ‘growth spurt’: not so much in the technical skills of versification, which were already highly developed, but in the reflective examination of the moral and philosophical dimension of his poetics, and the conscious attempt to integrate it not only with other important elements of vernacular literature, but also with those of the master discourses of classical and Christian Latin philosophical and theological culture.178

Immediately prior to the composition of the *Convivio*, Dante underwent a period of intellectual development that was probably the most intense of his entire life thus far.179 The absence of references to the *Ethics* in the *Vita Nuova*180 suggests that it was during this period of growth that Dante encountered Aristotle’s Ethics for the first time. Thus, in the *Convivio* we find a heavy reliance upon the Ethics of Aristotle, which is greatly indebted to Dante’s youthful enthusiasm for the promising new text he had so recently discovered. This will ultimately result in what some scholars see as an over-reliance


179 According to Gilson, the recency of Dante’s philosophical scholarship is further evidenced in the *Convivio* by “the way in which he inserts, just as they stand, chunks of doctrine of varying origin, without always smoothing or adapting them as he ought.” 84.

180 Although there is certainly no explicit reference to the *Ethics* in *Vita Nuova*, Crouse mentions in passing that the influence of Aristotle’s *Physics, De Anima*, and *Metaphysics* can be found in *Vita Nuova*, although their impact is “particularly evident from the *Convivio* onwards.” 143. Still, one of the most reliable experts in the field of medieval philosophy, Etienne Gilson, makes not a single mention of Aristotle in his lengthy study of philosophy in the work. 1-72.
upon Aristotelianism—a "crisis of philosophism," as Gilson calls it—that he will later correct in the *Commedia*. Whether or not this is true lies beyond the scope of this dissertation—what we will see here, however, is that Dante’s enthusiasm for Aristotle is such that the Philosopher is the most referenced authority in the whole of the *Convivio*, receiving 104 mentions (followed distantly by the Bible, mentioned only 69 times). As individual works, only the Bible is referenced more frequently than the *Ethics* in *Convivio*.

**B. Survey of Literature**

A survey of the literature on this subject does well to begin with Edward Moore, described by Lorenzo Minio-Paluello as “the greatest of English Dante scholars.” Still widely consulted today, Edward Moore’s century-old *Studies in Dante* treats the presence of scripture and classical authors across the entire Dantine corpus. Moore considers the influence on Dante not only of Aristotle but of Plato, Homer, Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Lucan, Statius, Juvenal, Cicero, Livy, Orosius, Boethius, Seneca, and St. Augustine. Addressing the numerous obstacles to conclusively identifying Dante’s sources of Aristotle, Moore’s analysis does not seek to identify every citation of, or reference to,
Aristotle in Convivio. Rather, this study’s greatest contribution is that it identifies the various forms taken by Dante’s uses of Aristotle. Moore classifies three types of borrowing by Dante: correct attribution of Aristotle’s ideas to Aristotle, the mistaken attribution of ideas to Aristotle that are not his own, and the faithful recounting of Aristotelian ideas without attributing them to Aristotle. Additionally, Moore observes that Dante’s definitions of the moral virtues “are reproductions, more or less exact, of the definitions given by Aristotle” of Temperance, Meekness, and Prudence.

Fifty years later, Bruno Nardi addresses the complex of issues arising from what little is known of Dante’s exact sources of Aristotle in the Convivio. Nardi examines the various types of Aristotelianism presented in the Convivio (and the rest of the Dantean corpus), focusing particularly on discrepancies between Averroism and Thomistic Aristotelianism. On the issue of the causa finalis of human life in Convivio, Nardi points out that Dante does not share the position of Aquinas, who believed in the Augustinian tradition that human philosophy alone is not sufficient to satisfy the natural desire to

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186 On the impossibility of prudence without goodness, Moore cites the example of Convivio IV.xxvii.11.46 and notes its similarity to Ethics VI.xiii.6 (1144b30-32). 100. N.B. Moore’s citations correspond to Tutte le Opere di Dante Alighieri, ed. Edward Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894).

187 In Convivio IV.xiii.11.71, Dante alleges that Aristotle speaks against the poet Simonides in Ethics X: “nel decimo dell’Etica, contra Simonide poeta parlando.” Moore observes that Aristotle does not reference Simonides anywhere in Ethics, but Aquinas mentions him in the Summa contra Gentiles. As Dante quoted the Summa Contra Gentiles earlier in Convivio IV.xv.1.125 and references it in Convivio IV.xxx.1.29, Moore concludes that Aquinas is likely Dante’s source of the Simonides reference. See Moore, Studies in Dante. First Series, 105.

188 Moore: “I add now five passages in which some difficulty occurs in identifying Dante’s quotations of the Ethics, or in which Aristotle seems to be quoted inaccurately” (ibid.,103). Three of these are passages from Convivio: I.xi.11.46, I.xii.11.75, and IV.xiii.11.71.

189 Moore, Studies in Dante. First Series, 98. Moore also observes here that Dante follows Aristotle’s order of the three Social Virtues.
know, a desire that can only be satisfied by Christian beatitude. Instead, Dante agrees with the Averroist reading of Aristotle, that on earth it is possible to look upon the face of Lady Philosophy and acquire human perfection in the form of perfected reason. Dante justifies his belief by stating that our desire matches the possibility of the thing desired, and thus we naturally do not desire to know things that are impossible for us to know about God; Nardi points out that, once again, Dante's opinion is in accordance with that of Aristotle but not with that of Aquinas.

Nardi uses an example like this to illustrate the principle that Dante's philosophy in Convivio cannot be classified as adhering to any single school of thought. On the general subject of philosophy in Convivio, Nardi points out that Dante’s Lady Philosophy is an amalgam of reason, faith, philosophy, and theology. Thus, reading for the presence or influence of just one philosopher alone in the work is a near impossibility; Dante's philosophy in the Convivio is rather:

Da una parte, la theia ton epistémon d’Aristotile, la conoscenza delle cose umane e divine di Cicerone, la filosofia come la intende e la rappresenta

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192 Convivio III.xv.8-10; Nardi, Dante e la cultura medievale, 61.
193 Nardi, Dante e la cultura medievale, 61. See Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III. In Dante’s view, the intellect cannot be used perfectly in this lifetime. Convivio IV.xxii, 13, 18.
194 Nardi, Dante e la cultura medievale, 163.
Boezio;\textsuperscript{197} dall'altra, invece, è la Sapienza dei libri salmonici, il Logo del Vangelo giovanneo, per mezzo del quale Iddio fece tutte le cose, e che avendo acconciato e ordinato in principio il processo dell'uomo, poiché questo ebbe smarrita la retta via, venne a lui in similitudine umana, per raddrizzare il suo cammino.\textsuperscript{198}

Nardi thus devotes his readings of philosophy in the \textit{Convivio} to examining the interplay of these forces: the Aristotelian, Ciceronian, Boethian, and Biblical.

Nardi's contemporary, Etienne Gilson, is most well known for his scholarship on medieval philosophy. However, he also made a significant contribution to the field of Dante studies with his work, \textit{Dante and Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{199} Gilson contends that, in the \textit{Convivio}, Dante constructs a universe in which the science of ethics is awarded a supreme position above metaphysics. This begins when Dante encounters a problem while undertaking in \textit{Convivio} II to explicate the canzone "Voi che 'ntendendo il terzo ciel movete."\textsuperscript{200} Combining the sciences of the trivium and quadrivium, there are seven; adding to them physics, metaphysics, ethics, and theology, there are eleven. However, there are only ten heavens: those of each of the seven planets, the two moving heavens, and the unmoving heaven embracing the whole.\textsuperscript{201} The necessity encountered by Dante, Gilson writes, is that he must choose two sciences to be grouped together; additionally, he must arrange the sciences hierarchically in order to assign them to their appropriate


\textsuperscript{197} See R. Murari, \textit{Dante e Boezio} (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1905), 339.

\textsuperscript{198} Nardi, \textit{Dante e la cultura medievale}, 163. See \textit{Convivio} III.xiv, 7; xv, 5, 16-17.


\textsuperscript{200} \textit{Convivio} II.ii, 89.

\textsuperscript{201} Gilson, 101.
places in the cosmos. Having equated grammar with the Moon, dialectics with Mercury, rhetoric with Venus, arithmetic with the Sun, music with Mars, geometry with Jupiter, and astronomy with Saturn, Dante is left to contend with the division of physics, ethics, and metaphysics between the Firmament and the Crystalline heavens.202

The Convivio’s greatest philosophical originality lies in Dante’s solution to this problem, according to Gilson. He considers:

If the question is put to any philosopher who is familiar with scholasticism, his answer will be as follows: since metaphysics is the loftiest of the sciences, it must be matched with the highest heaven, in other words the Crystalline, which would lead one to assign physics, as also ethics, to the Firmament. In fact, Dante’s procedure is quite different.203

Dante’s conclusion, Gilson remarks, is philosophically counterintuitive: he assigns physics and metaphysics to the Firmament204 and ethics to the Crystalline heaven,205 thereby awarding ethics premier universal status over metaphysics. Gilson points out that this conclusion is not only unusual, but revolutionary:

The thesis which Dante here maintains is quite extraordinary for the Middle Ages. Taken literally, it amounts to the maintenance of the primacy of ethics over metaphysics, a doctrine which at any rate could not claim the authority of Aristotle and perhaps still less that of St. Thomas Aquinas.206

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202 Ibid., 102-3.
203 Ibid., 103.
204 Convivio II.xiv.1-13, 130-34.
206 Gilson, 105.
Outlining the centrality of Aristotle’s *Ethics* to the *Convivio* as evidence of this primacy, Gilson concludes that the entire thrust of the *Convivio* is to impart moral philosophy.\(^{207}\)

Furthermore, Gilson defines Dante’s approach to moral philosophy by locating it somewhere between that of Aristotle and Aquinas, explaining that Dante is less focused on the Christian *causa finalis* of life than Aquinas and, like Aristotle, is more focused on the politics of earthly life.\(^{208}\) Ultimately, Gilson contends, Dante focuses on the virtues because they are proper to human life, governing “the special function of man *qua* man,” and are “the correct voluntary choice of an intelligent being.”\(^{209}\) This is why ethics, as the mover of human actions, is equated with the *Primum Mobile*; as such, Gilson remarks:

> With ethics, which corresponds to the *Primum Mobile*, begins ... the order of motive influences and direct positive actions which pervade the entire order of natural sciences, down to the modest but indispensable science of grammar. All taken together form Wisdom, and because ethics summons and prescribes them, and directs them towards their goal, it is ethics that endows them with harmony and beauty: ‘*La moralitade è bellezza de la sapienza.*’ (III.xv.11)\(^{210}\)

Thus the science of ethics is primary to the universe of the *Convivio*, and Aristotle’s *Ethics*, being Dante’s source of moral philosophy, attains comparable status.\(^{211}\)

\(^{207}\) Ibid., 110.
\(^{208}\) Ibid., 111.
\(^{209}\) Ibid., 112.
\(^{210}\) Gilson, 121; *Convivio* III.xv.11, 207 (In this edition of *Convivio*, the same passage is rendered “*la moralitade è bellezza de la Filosofía*”).
\(^{211}\) This is by no means all that should be said of the Dantean universe, however; Gilson’s subsequent consideration of the transcendency of theology and the primacy of contemplation lead him to the ultimate conclusion that Dante professes “not a
Like Gilson, Lorenzo Minio-Paluello is another noted Aristotelian scholar who brings his expertise to bear on the subject of Dante.\textsuperscript{212} Taking a historic perspective based on his deep knowledge of Aristotle in the Middle Ages, Minio-Paluello considers Dante’s possible sources of Aristotle and suggests that “Dante’s reading of Aristotle may well have been much less extensive than the pervasive presence of some kind of Aristotelian background might suggest.”\textsuperscript{213} Minio-Paluello considers three means by which Dante gained familiarity with the Philosopher: through direct encounters with Latin translations of Aristotelian texts, by reading Aristotle’s views as systematically collected by Dante’s contemporary philosophers and theologians, and through lectures and discussions.\textsuperscript{214} Looking closely at the books that were once contained on the shelves of the library of Santa Croce in Florence,\textsuperscript{215} where Dante is likely to have studied, he points out that nearly all the works of Aristotle as we know them today\textsuperscript{216} were available to Dante in Greco-Latin translations by the time he began work on the \textit{Convivio}.\textsuperscript{217}

Still, Minio-Paluello emphasizes that although we know which of Aristotle’s works were circulating at the time Dante wrote the \textit{Convivio}, it is still impossible to say

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{215} These books are now kept at the Laurentian Library. Ibid., 66.
\textsuperscript{216} The exceptions are: the \textit{Ethica Eudemia}, the fragmentary \textit{Constituion of Athenians}, and short fragments of other works. Ibid., 66.
which of the works he actually read in their manuscript form.\textsuperscript{218} This uncertainty notwithstanding, it is undoubtable that Dante had direct knowledge of "much if not the whole of the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}."\textsuperscript{219} Proof of this is found in the direct references made by Dante throughout the body of his works, where Minio-Paluello counts at least one hundred cases in which Dante’s evidence of the \textit{Ethics} is evident.\textsuperscript{220} Wherever differences between editions of the \textit{Ethics} are discernible, Minio-Paluello asserts that Dante clearly uses Robert Grosseteste’s revision of Moerbeke.\textsuperscript{221} When relying upon intermediate sources of Aristotle, Dante never mentions these sources by name; it has only been the work of scholars to identify these intermediate sources through their inconsistencies with the Aristotelian original. Thus Dante has been shown to have garnered a great deal of information on the various works of Aristotle from Albertus Magnus’ encyclopedic works, particularly the \textit{Meteorologica}, \textit{De Caelo}, and \textit{De Animalibus}.\textsuperscript{222} There is also evidence that he at times may have consulted Aquinas’ \textit{De Anima}, \textit{Physics}, \textit{Metaphysics}, and \textit{Politics}, as well as Giles of Rome’s \textit{De Regimine Principum} (Dante’s likely source of Aristotle’s \textit{Politics}).\textsuperscript{223}

Further, Minio-Paluello considers the influence of Dante’s teachers by examining his relationship with Brunetto Latini, suggesting that the introduction to \textit{Trésor II} echoes Dante’s “Aristotelian ideal;” he writes: “It would be difficult to imagine a simpler and

\textsuperscript{218} Minio-Paluello, 67.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid. Unfortunately, Minio-Paluello does not tell us where he has found these, or indicate how they are distributed across the Dantean corpus.
\textsuperscript{221} Ibid. Minio-Paluello gives no indication of how he has reached this conclusion, nor does he cite any additional sources on this matter.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
neater summary of Dante’s Aristotelian ideal than this beginning of Brunetto’s ‘version’ of Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea.*”

He suggests also that Dante was likely to have attended Remigio de Girolami’s lectures on philosophy at the Dominican Convent of Santa Maria Novella, and notes that one of Remigio’s only written works surviving today is an introduction to the study of the *Ethics.*

From this diversity of sources, Minio-Paluello suggests that Dante assimilated the philosophical content of the *Ethics* also found in the *Convivio,* which he summarizes as follows:

Every thing of nature tends to its good, its own actualization ... the form of man is his soul, which has different powers at different levels: the lowest is the power of self-movement which is present in all living beings; the highest belonging only to human beings, is the intellect which—though a part of the soul qua form of the body—is ‘divine’ and immaterial. Human intellects contemplate universal truths; contemplating is man’s aim, his happiness or beatitude. For the achievement of his aim man acquires, through training and choice, the actualization of potential virtues.

Ultimately, Minio-Paluello points out, Dante uses the *Ethics* more than he adheres to it.

Thus, Dante frequently begins an argument by presenting Aristotelian ideas as Aristotle’s

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224 Ibid., 70.
226 Minio-Paluello, 65-66.
own, but then expands upon them by adding his own material, without giving any indication that he is doing so.\textsuperscript{227} In this manner, Minio-Paluello writes, "'Aristotle' appears to accompany and inspire Dante, offering him the tools necessary for building his new theory."\textsuperscript{228} As such, the content attributed to the \textit{Ethics} as found in Dante's works should be viewed in light of these considerations.

Eighteen years after Minio-Paluello, Robert D. Crouse reopens the matter of Dante philosopher.\textsuperscript{229} Emphasizing philosophy's centrality to the Dantean oeuvre, he writes: "to understand Dante the poet is to understand Dante the philosopher."\textsuperscript{230} Moral philosophy is of such importance to Dante, Crouse further maintains, that it is the primary mission of the \textit{Commedia}.\textsuperscript{231} Like Minio-Paluello, noting impediments to the study of Dante's philosophical background ("lacunae in his intellectual biography" and "unresolved questions of literary history"),\textsuperscript{232} Crouse, too, considers Dante's likely philosophical sources. Adding to Minio-Paluello's suggestion that Dante likely encountered Remigio de Girolami at Santa Maria Novella, he also suggests that Dante may have studied with the Franciscans at Santa Croce, the Hermits of St. Augustine at

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid., 75.
\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., 77.
\textsuperscript{229} Robert D. Crouse, "Dante As Philosopher: Christian Aristotelianism," \textit{Dionysius}, 16 (1998): 141-156. As the greater part of Crouse's article dedicates itself to a reading of \textit{Paradiso}, and concludes that Dante's Aristotelianism is a Thomistic, Christian Aristotelianism, it ultimately considers only Dante's mature philosophical thought as represented in the \textit{Commedia}. 155. No close readings of \textit{Convivio} or the other minor works are provided.
\textsuperscript{230} Crouse, 141.
\textsuperscript{231} See Dante's letter to Cangrande—\textit{Epistola} XIII,16—in which this point is made clear: "Genus vero phylosophie sub qui hic in toto et parta proceditur, est morale negotium, sive ethica..." From the text established by the Società Dantesca Italiana, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (Florence, 1960), as printed in L. Blasucci, ed., \textit{Dante Alighieri, Tutte le opere} (Florence, 1981).
\textsuperscript{232} Crouse, 141.
Santo Spirito, as well as with Pier Giovanni Olivi and Ubertino da Casale at Santa Croce (both famous for their Joachimite positions). Crouse additionally hypothesizes that Dante’s encounter with the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle likely came through his friend Guido Cavalcanti and his studies at the University of Bologna, and maintains that Dante’s representation of Aristotelian moral philosophy is colored also at times by Aquinas, Avicenna, Algazali, and Albertus Magnus.

While Crouse, like both Moore and Minio-Paluello, emphasizes the centrality of the *Ethics* to *Convivio*, he diverges from them on the matter of the edition of the *Ethics* likely consulted by Dante directly. Crouse makes no reference to Minio-Paluello’s belief that Dante used Grosseteste’s revision of Moerbeke, instead citing Moore’s earlier assertion that Dante most likely used the version of the *Ethics* that accompanies the Aquinas commentary—that is, the Moerbeke version. However, lack of consensus on this point is to be expected given the multitude of sources of the *Ethics* available to Dante, and his varied style of citing and applying Aristotelian ideas. In reality, a lack

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233 Ibid., 142.
235 As Dante tells us himself in *Convivio*; find Averroes in *Convivio* IV.13; Thomas in II.14, 8; Avicenna in II.13, III.14, and IV.21; Algazali in II.13, IV.21; and Albertus Magnus in II.13; III.5; IV.13. Crouse, 144.
237 See Moore, *Studies in Dante. First Series*, 100, 103, 105; Minio-Paluello, 67, 75.
of verbatim citations of Aristotle in *Convivio* makes it nearly impossible to decide this point conclusively.

In the context of this debate, it remains to be asked: who is the Aristotle that we see represented in *Convivio*? What aspects of Aristotelian moral philosophy are used faithfully by Dante, and what liberties does Dante take with their interpretation and presentation? Finally, which ideas of Dante's own does he attribute to Aristotle, without saying that he is doing so? These are the questions that I will seek to address in the following chapter.
1. The Aristotelian “Perfected Soul” and Dantean “Nobilitade”

Dante acts as a social critic in the Convivio by accusing his contemporaries of having lost touch with the true meaning of “nobilitade.” With the tone of an impassioned invective, Dante accuses:

Intra li quali errori uno io massimamente riprendea, lo quale non solamente è dannoso e pericoloso a coloro che in esso stanno, ma eziando a li altri, che lui riprendano, p[o]rt[a] d[o]lor[e] e danno. Questo è l’errore de l’umana bontade, in quanto in noi è da la natura seminata, e che <<nobilitade>> chiamare si dee; che [per] mala consuetudine e per poco intelletto era tanto fortificato, che [l’] opinione quasi di tutti n’era falsificata; e de la falsa opinione nascevano li falsi giudicii, e de’ falsi giudicii nascevano le non giuste reverenze e vilipensioni; per che li buoni erano in villano aspetto tenuti, e li malvagi onorati ed esaltati.

(IV.1.6-7)\(^{238}\)

Using the personal pronoun “io,” a means of self-identification required of English speakers but not of Italians, Dante invokes himself as a forceful and opinionated narrative presence in the text. Here, he gives a partial definition of true nobility that will hold fast for the duration of the Convivio: it is “l’umana bontade, in quanto in noi è da la natura seminata.”\(^{239}\) Dante says here what the Tesoro perhaps only hints: common,
contemporary assumptions about nobility are incorrect.\(^{240}\) Dante admonishes his readers that, due to their holding of this belief, they live in a society in which “li buoni erano in villano aspetto tenuti, e li malvagi onorati ed esaltati.”\(^{241}\) True nobility, Dante says, has nothing at all to do with money or social status. The seeds of its possibility are planted in us at birth, and it is up to us, by exercising our free will, to bring it from potentiality into actuality. This seed analogy is one Dante himself employs, writing at the outset of *Convivio* IV.1 that “bontade ... è da la natura seminata,”\(^{242}\) and expanding on this seemingly insignificant detail at great length in *Convivio* IV.21.\(^{243}\)

*Convivio* IV begins with a brief introductory passage followed by the canzone, “Le dolci rime d’amor;” the chapters following the canzone, comprising the rest of book IV, consist of its prose commentary.\(^{244}\) In this canzone, lines 79-80, Dante says that he is going to define “che cosa è gentilezza, e da che vène, / e dirò i segni che ‘l gentile uom tene.” (79-80)\(^{245}\) Thus the stanza ends with a promise to define “gentilezza”; the following stanza, in which his definition begins, does not make it five lines without mentioning the *Ethics* by name:

Dico ch’ ogni vertù principalmente

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\(^{241}\) *Convivio* IV.1.6-7, 214.

\(^{242}\) *Convivio* IV.1.6-7, 214.

\(^{243}\) *Convivio* IV.21.4, 297.

\(^{244}\) For Dante’s use of self-commentary as “a strategic mode of self-authorization,” see Ascoli, 88.

\(^{245}\) *Convivio* IV, 218.
Mentioning the *Ethics* specifically by name in a canzone, in which space is limited and conventions of rhythm, meter, and rhyme must be observed, nothing can be taken for granted. The *Ethics* is the only literary work Dante mentions by name in any of the *Convivio*'s three canzoni, which in and of itself shows us how important the work was to Dante, and particularly how important it is to *Convivio* IV.

Having defended himself and his premise, Dante presents and overturns a set of incorrect definitions of nobility in preparation for arriving at his own. His own definition of nobility, we will see momentarily, is grounded in the *Ethics* to such an extent that “l’Etica” is specified by name in line 85 of book IV’s canzone, “Le dolci rime d’amor.”

Just prior to this, in the poem’s third stanza, Dante had revealed that the emperor is responsible for perpetuating the first erroneous definition of nobility—“fu chi tenne impero / in diffinire errato” (45-6)—by claiming that riches can confer nobility upon their owner. In *Convivio* IV.10, he elaborates more fully the emperor’s incorrect conception of nobility:

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246 *Convivio* IV, 218.
247 Ibid.
248 Ibid., 217.
Poi dico similemente lui errare, che puose de la nobilitade falso subietto, cioè
‘antica ricchezza’, e poi procede[t]e a ‘defettiva forma’, o vero differenza, cioè
‘belli costumi’, che non comprendono ogni formalitade di nobilitade, ma molto
picciola parte, si come di sotto si mostrerà.\(^{249}\)

Dante's definition of nobility will be borrowed from the *Ethics* and its concluding
thoughts on the causa finalis of human life; in anticipation of this, as reflected by the
passage above, in a single swift blow he is able to confidently knock down what he sees
as the incorrect but socially prevalent claims, supported by the empire, that either
ancestral wealth ("antica ricchezza") or fine manners ("belli costumi") confer nobility.\(^{250}\)

It is worth noting here that Dante does not say that these things play no role, but
rather that they play a small role ("molto picciola parte"),\(^{251}\) in true nobility; this claim
accords with similar claims made in the *Ethics* surrounding the issue of wealth—that is,
that it does not lead to virtue in and of itself, but that it can facilitate the attainment of the
virtue of magnificence. Thus Aristotle writes:

For this reason the poor man will not be munificent, since he has not the resources
from which he may spend large sums becomingly. If he tries to do so, he is
unwise for this would be improper and inopportune. And what is according to
virtue is done rightly. A great expenditure is suitable for those who have wealth
themselves, from their parents, or from others transferring it to them; likewise for

\(^{249}\) *Convivio* IV.10.5-6, 256-7.

\(^{250}\) Ibid.

\(^{251}\) Ibid.
the noble and those renowned for fame or other similar public acclaim, since all
these things have a certain greatness and distinction.\textsuperscript{252}

For Aristotle, ancestral wealth may facilitate the attainment of the virtue of magnificence;
since a life lived virtuously and in accordance with reason is a happy life, and
magnanimity is a virtue facilitated by wealth, then wealth may indirectly contribute to a
man's happiness. One might assume that Dante, by acknowledging the "picciola parte"
played by ancestral wealth and fine manners in his definition of nobility (which for him,
we will find momentarily, is consonant with the Aristotelian conception of the good life
presented in \textit{Ethics X}), is indirectly referring to the Aristotelian notion of magnificence
and the syllogism spelled out above. Still, Dante is not speaking here about
magnificence, and so it remains to be seen what he means when he says in \textit{Convivio}
IV.10 that ancestral wealth and fine manners play a small role in true nobility. The most
he tells us in \textit{Convivio} IV.10 is that true nobility is indifferent to riches. That is, riches
can neither confer it nor take it away:

\begin{quote}
Dico che le divizie, come altri credea, non possono dare nobilitade; e, a mostrare
maggiore diversitade avere con quella, dico che non la possono tòrre a chi l’ha.
Dare non la possono, con ciò sia cosa che naturalmente siano vili, e per la viltade
siano contrarie a la nobilitade ... Ancora: tòrre non la possono, però che da lunghi
sono di nobilitade, e per la ragione prenarrata che [ciò che] altera o corrompe
alcuna cosa convegna essere congiunto con quell[a].\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Ethics} 1122b26-33, 231.
\textsuperscript{253} \textit{Convivio} IV.10.9-12, 258.
Dante speaks very differently than Aristotle on this matter. For Aristotle, in the above passage from *Ethics* IV, wealth is a morally neutral and necessary entity. Wealth even escapes judgment in Aquinas’ commentary on the same passage.\(^{254}\) In Dante’s contrasting view, wealth cannot confer nobility upon its owner because riches “naturalmente siano vili.”\(^{255}\) While Aristotle certainly never asserts that wealth alone confers nobility, both he (and Aquinas) acknowledge that it is useful as a means to this end—Aquinas even acknowledging in his commentary that “it is becoming that great sums be disbursed by the highborn and renowned, i.e., those established in honor and other similar things.”\(^{256}\) This is a far cry from Dante’s claim that wealth, because of its baseness, is actually contradictory to true nobility: “e per la viltade siano contrarie a la nobilitade.”\(^{257}\)

In *Convivio* IV.14, Dante explicates the fourth stanza of “Le dolci rime d’amor,” and doing so considers the Aristotelian fourfold concept of causality in order to undercut popularly held definitions of nobility. Here, Dante takes issue with the emperor’s rejection of the concept of social mobility, writing: “Ne voglion che vil uom gentil divegna, / né di vil padre scenda, / nazion che per gentil già mai s’intenda.” (61-3)\(^{258}\) In his commentary on these lines, Dante employs Aristotle’s concept of the efficient cause to undermine the imperial opinion. The fourfold definition of causality—consisting of a material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause—is put forth by Aristotle in

\(^{254}\) Aquinas, comments 722-724 in *Ethics*, 233.
\(^{255}\) *Convivio* IV.10.9-12, 258.
\(^{256}\) Aquinas, comment 724 in *Ethics*, 233.
\(^{257}\) *Convivio* IV.10.9-12, 258.
\(^{258}\) Ibid., 217.
both the *Physics* II.3\textsuperscript{259} and *Metaphysics* V.2,\textsuperscript{260} although Dante is familiar with both of these works, directly citing the *Physics* 11 times and the *Metaphysics* 14 times in the *Convivio*, he never quotes Aristotle’s definition of causality directly. Still, it is of fundamental importance to his reasoning in the *Convivio*, both on a general and local level. On a general level, the notion of the final cause is of fundamental importance to Dante in his overarching mission in the *Convivio*. Considering the final cause of human life—that is, the ultimate goal that by nature man is designed to fulfill—is a question that he uses the Ethics to answer. Here in *Convivio* IV.14, on a local level, Dante challenges his opponents with the necessity that there be an efficient cause of nobility:

Oppinione di questi erranti è che uomo prima villano mai gentile uomo dicer non si possa; né uomo che figlio sia di villano similemente dicere mai non si possa gentile. E ciò rompe la loro sentenza medesima, quando dicono che tempo si richiede a nobilitade, ponendo questo vocabulo <<antico>>; però ch’è impossibile per processo di tempo venire a la generazione di nobilitade, per questa loro ragione che detta è, la quale toglie via che villano uomo mai possa esser gentile per opera che faccia, o per alcuno accidente, e toglie via la mutazione di villano padre in gentile figlio; ché se lo figlio del villano è pur villano, e o figlio fia pur figlio di villano e così fia anche villano, e anche suo figlio, e così sempre, e mai non s’avrà a trovare là dove nobilitade per processo di tempo si cominci.\textsuperscript{261}


\textsuperscript{260} Aristotle, *Basic Works*, 752.

\textsuperscript{261} *Convivio* IV.14.3-4, 273.
In this passage, Dante pinpoints a critical flaw in his opponents’ reasoning. The problem, according to Dante, is that proponents of contemporary notions of nobility claim that a man of low birth can never become noble; in their view, nobility can only be inherited (“Uomo prima villano mai gentile uomo dicer non si possa; né uomo che figlio sia di villano similemente dicere mai non si possa gentile”). 262 However, Dante argues, this cannot be true, because this argument renders it impossible to pinpoint the moment in time when any given family’s nobility first began: “È impossibile per processo di tempo venire a la generazione di nobilitade.” 263 What Dante, as a student of Aristotle, is looking for but cannot find in his opponents’ argument is a first cause of nobility. In Aristotle’s view, all things must have an efficient cause—defined in the Metaphysics as “that from which the change or the resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made and the change-producing of the changing.” 264 According to Dante’s opponents, the efficient cause of a man’s nobility is his father’s nobility. However, Dante counterargues that his opponents fail to provide a first cause of human nobility. In Metaphysics V.1, Aristotle writes:

That from which a thing can first be known—this also is called the beginning of the thing, e.g. the hypotheses are the beginnings of demonstrations. (Causes are spoken of in an equal number of senses; for all causes are beginnings). It is

262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Metaphysics V.2, 1013a 30, 752.
common, then, to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known.265

Where is the first cause of man's nobility? When does it first come to be known? This is where his opponents' argument breaks down, and along these lines, Dante concludes that inherited nobility—in the sense in which it is commonly understood—is an utter impossibility. What Dante is doing here is using Aristotelianism to pave the way for his own moral philosophy, the amalgam of classical, Christian, and Aristotelian thought that will comprise the final half of Convivio IV. Here, by introducing the process of inquiry facilitated by the fourfold concept of causality, Dante is paves the way for his own explanation of the first cause of human nobility, of which he begins to speak in Convivio IV.16.

In Convivio IV.16, Dante proclaims: “Convienesi procedere al trattato e la veritade;”266 he is ready to give his version of the truth of the matter. Indeed, in Convivio IV Dante provides a philosophically viable concept of nobility that is unlike the emperor's conception, which he has previously discredited on Aristotelian terms for its failure to provide a first cause of inherited nobility. Dante's definition of true nobility relies upon Ethics X, as Dante borrows the Aristotelian concept of human perfection and recasts it as his own definition of nobility.267 Present in this definition, and characteristic of Dante's overall use of the Ethics in Convivio, is a purposeful interweaving of Aristotelian argumentation and Biblical supporting examples.

265 Ibid., V.2, 1013a 15, 752.
266 Convivio IV.16.2, 282.
267 See M. Trovato: “For Dante nobility, equated with metaphysical goodness, becomes the intrinsic value of reality (bonum rei), hence the essential component of human nature (bonum hominis).” 88.
This is immediately evident in Dante's straightforward definition: "'Nobilitade' s'intende perfezione di propria natura in ciascuna cosa."\(^{268}\) The notion of the perfection of a thing's nature is drawn directly from Aristotle, and it plays a key factor in the *Ethics*. From the outset, Aristotle poses the question, "What is the highest good of all human actions?"\(^ {269}\) The answer, by way of ten books of complex reasoning, is founded on the same notion that Dante borrows as his definition of nobility. Since happiness consists in the perfection of the highest thing in us, which is the intellect for human beings, the highest good of all human actions is to live a life of contemplation. But this conclusion comes in *Ethics* X; as early as *Ethics* I.10, Aristotle brings to the table the concept of goodness as it relates to activity in accordance with nature:

As the good of a flute player or sculptor or any artist, or of anyone who has some special activity, seems to consist in that activity and its skillful performance, so also the good of man who has an activity characteristic of himself precisely as man. Have a weaver and a tanner a special work and activity while man precisely as man has none? Is he left by nature without a purpose? If the eye, hand, foot, and each member have a proper operation, surely we will not refuse to concede an activity proper to man as man. What therefore will it be? Life belongs even to plants and we are in search of something characteristic of man. The life of nutrition and growth must then be ruled out. Even the life of sense experience, which is a step higher, is shared with the horse, cow, and other animals. The remaining type of life belongs to the rational part of man and finds its expression

\(^{268}\) *Convivio* IV.16.4, 283. 
\(^{269}\) *Ethics* I.4.1095a14-17, 15.
in actions. This rational part either follows the dictates of reason, or it possesses and exercises the power of understanding. Of the two functions, the latter seems the more correct, for when we speak of reasoning, we signify the exercise of our rational powers. The function of man, therefore, is activity of the soul according to reason or at least not independent of reason. Now as a rule we classify in the same way the function of an artist and of a skillful artist, of a flute player and a good flute player. This applies generally where skill is an addition to the function, for a flute player is one who plays the flute and a good flute player one who plays the flute well. If then we place the function of man in a certain kind of life, that is, of an activity of the soul according to reason, it will be proper to a good man to act well and to the best of his ability according to reason. In every case the good of man will consist in action conformable to virtue, and if there are a number of virtues, action conformable to the best and most perfect of them. Further, it must extend to a complete life. A single swallow or one good day does not mean that spring has come. So one day (of goodness) or a short practice of virtue does not make a man blessed and happy.\footnote{We know that Dante was familiar with this passage from the \textit{Ethics} because he cites it directly in \textit{Convivio} 1.9, borrowing the example of the swallow to illustrate a different point than the one for which Aristotle originally employed it.} 

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was claimed by an arbitrarily determined set of self-proclaimed aristocrats, the idea that men could be judged by other, attainable standards opened a door in what otherwise was an impenetrable wall of nepotism and oligarchy. If man’s unique function is activity of the soul according to reason, and its attainment is the highest good for mankind, then why wouldn’t this perfection of the soul be able to trump the antiquated (and philosophically not viable) notion that nobility is inherited only by some, while all men proceed from a single common ancestor?

Thus the notion of the perfected soul becomes the cornerstone of the Dantean concept of nobility. Immediately following the definition given by Dante above, that “nobilitade’ s’intende perfezione di propria natura in ciascuna cosa,”272 he continues:

Onde non pur de l’uomo è predicata, ma eziando di tutte cose—ché l’uomo chiama nobile pietra, nobile pianta, nobile cavallo, nobile falcone—qualunque in sua natura si vede essere perfetta. E però dice Salomone ne lo Ecclesiastes: <<Beata la terra lo cui re è nobile>>, che non è altro a dire, se non: lo cui rege è perfetto, secondo la perfezione de l’animo e del corpo; e ciò si manifesta per quello che dice dinanzi quando dice: <<Guai a te, terra, lo cui rege è pargolo>>, cioè non perfetto uomo; e non è pargolo uomo pur per etade, ma per costumi disordinati e per difetto di vita, si come n’ammaestra lo Filosofo nel primo de l’Etica.273

There are a couple of important points to be made regarding Dante’s use of citations here. Everything in this passage is provided in support of his definition of “nobilitade” which,

272 Convivio IV.16.4, 283.
273 Ibid., IV.16.4-5, 283.
we have already observed, founds itself on the content of *Ethics X*. However, it is interesting to note that this is not where Dante gives Aristotle direct credit. Instead, Dante allows this idea to pass for his own, and credits Aristotle in this passage with an example of marginal importance, regarding the wayward habits of young men. The second important thing about this passage relates to what I mentioned above; that is, that the Bible is given secondary status to Dante’s own argumentation. The examples from Ecclesiastes are plucked from the Bible to stand alongside Dante’s own Aristotelian assertions that, as we have just observed, he does not attribute directly to Aristotle.

Still, Aristotle is by no means cast aside here. In fact, Dante offers a concise definition of perfection from Aristotle’s *Physics* II that underscores again his own definition of perfection:

Questa perfezione intende lo Filosofo nel settimo de la Fisica quando dice:

<<Ciascuna cosa è massimamente perfetta quando tocca e aggiunge la sua virtude propria, e allora è massimamente secondo sua natura; onde allora lo circulo si può dicere perfetto quando veramente è circulo>>, cioè quando aggiunge la sua propria virtude; e allora è in tutta sua natura, e allora si può dire nobile circulo.

Just as the circle is perfected according to its nature (that is, with each point on its circumference being equidistant to its center), so man is perfected according to his nature by rational use of the intellect. Both Aristotle and Dante are in agreement on this point; what is different about Dante’s and Aristotle’s definitions of perfection, though, is

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274 See Minio-Paluello: “‘Aristotle’ appears to accompany and inspire Dante, offering him the tools necessary for building his new theory.” 77.
275 *Convivio* IV.16.7-8, 284.
276 Ibid., IV.16.8, 284.
that Dante connects Aristotelian "human perfection" with his own "nobility." This is the original moment in Dante's thought: if the Aristotelian notion of human perfection is correct, and it is the highest good attainable by mankind, then it is Aristotelian human perfection that we should be using to measure one man's worth in relation to another. "Nobilitade," the word used in Dante's society to signify one man's status over another, remains the same; its definition, however, is radically altered to align completely with the Aristotelian concept of perfection.

2. Aristotelian Virtues and Vices in Convivio

Further into Convivio IV.16, Dante leads in to his own discussion of virtue and vice by bringing to light a small but significant point from the Ethics regarding the origin of virtuous behavior. Aristotle gives his view on the sources of virtues in Ethics II.2:

Not only the production, increase, and destruction of virtues have identical sources and causes but the actions themselves also have the same sources and causes. We see this in the more obvious actions like bodily strength. A man becomes strong from taking abundant nourishment and from hard work. Then when he is strong, he will be more able to do these things. We find the same thing in the virtues since we become temperate by giving up pleasures, and having become temperate we can very easily give up pleasures. The same is true of the virtue of fortitude. We become brave by accustoming ourselves to despise and
endure terrors, and having become brave we are very capable of enduring terrors.\textsuperscript{277}

This chicken-or-the-egg scenario regarding the origin of virtues is a dilemma that Aristotle will ultimately address in \textit{Ethics} X, where he will suggest that the law forces young men to practice the good habits that will eventually take root as virtues.\textsuperscript{278}

However, the main problem that Aristotle is addressing right here is that virtues appear to have both the same sources and the same causes. For Dante, this problem becomes a conclusive point of departure into his own discussion of virtue. Sidestepping the chicken-or-the-egg conundrum, Dante plunges ahead with its implications: we might not understand the causes of things, but we can know the things from their effects. He writes:

Dico adunque che con ciò sia cosa che in quelle cose che sono d’una specie, si come sono tutti li uomini, non si può per li principii essenziali la loro ottima perfezione differire, convien quella e differire e conoscere per li loro effetti. E però si legge nel Vangelo di santo Matteo—quando dice Cristo: ‘Guardatevi da li falsi profeti’—: ‘A li frutti loro conoscere quelli’. E per lo cammino diritto è da vedere questa differizione, che cercando si vae per li frutti: che sono morali vertù e intellettuali, de le quali essa nostra nobilitade è seme, si come ne la sua differizione sarà pienamente manifest[o].\textsuperscript{279}

Here again, as in the previous example from \textit{Convivio} IV.16.7-8, in which Dante cites the \textit{Physics} as a source of an idea that is far more central to the \textit{Ethics}, Dante does not give

\textsuperscript{277} \textit{Ethics} II.2.1104a27-1104b3, 87.
\textsuperscript{278} Ibid., X.14.1180a1-14, 638.
\textsuperscript{279} \textit{Convivio} IV.16.9-10, 285.
Aristotle credit for this borrowed revelation, and instead uses direct Biblical (rather than Aristotelian) evidence for support. Also, as we saw above in the previous example, Dante is not just taking examples straight from Aristotle; rather, he is borrowing ideas from Aristotle and applying them towards his own objectives. Here, for Dante, Aristotle’s conundrum of the first cause of virtues is a foregone conclusion, and becomes a launching point into his own direct treatment of virtue. Thus he writes that “Non si può per li principii essenziali la loro ottima perfezione diffinire;” although the highest principles guiding man’s virtues cannot be known (i.e., their first causes), we are not at a loss, for they can still be known by their effects: “Conviensi quella e diffinire e conoscere per li loro effetti.”280 Here, we witness the extent to which Dante has digested and, in a sense, metabolized the Ethics. He operates as a fully formed thinker who is so well versed in the trajectory of his model text that he is free to move beyond it, using its challenges to spur himself forward into his own inquiry.

Dante has already said, in the previous chapter, that human perfection—in which nobility consists—is created by virtue. In Convivio IV.17, Dante makes it clear that he primarily means virtue in the Aristotelian sense. Christianity does not yet enter into this early discussion of virtue; as Dante introduces it to his readers, it is purely an Aristotelian concept. Because we have seen in other instances that Dante does not credit Aristotle for ideas he is using to bolster his own originality, it is clear from the amount of credit he gives Aristotle here that the Philosopher’s definition of virtue is part and parcel with his own. Leaving all other definitions of virtue aside, Dante emphasizes his reliance on Aristotle alone:

Dove aperse la bocca la divina sentenza d’Aristotile, da lasciare mi pare ogni altrui sentenza, volendo dire quali queste sono, brevemente secondo la sua sentenza trapasserò di quelle ragionando.\textsuperscript{281}

What follows in two long paragraphs amounts to an extremely condensed summation of the virtues and vices content of the \textit{Ethics}. In a single paragraph, Dante breezes through the eleven virtues named in the \textit{Ethics}, each given a sentence long definition. He mentions, in this order, \textit{fortezza, temperanza, liberalitade, magnificenza, magnanimitade, amativa d’onore, mansuetudine, affablilitade, veritade, eutrapelia}, and \textit{giustizia},\textsuperscript{282} but he gives no space to naming their corresponding vices of excess and defect, pausing only to mention that “ciascuna di questa vertudi ha due inimici collateralì, cioè vizii.”\textsuperscript{283}

From here, Dante adopts an argument that he attributes to \textit{Ethics} I but is also characteristic of \textit{Ethics} X. This is the idea that virtue stems from habit, which is born out of chosen activity. We will recall that in \textit{Convivio} IV.7, Dante put great emphasis on the matter of choice in the attainment of virtuousness and therefore nobility; here, Dante finally pinpoints the Aristotelian origin of this idea:

\textit{E ciascuna di queste vertudi ha due inimici collateralì, cioè vizii, uno in troppo e altro in poco; e queste tutte sono li mezzi intra quelli, e nascono tutte da un principio, cioè da l’abito de la nostra buona elezione; onde generalmente si può dicere di tutte che siano abito elettivo consistente nel mezzo. E queste sono quelle che fanno l’uomo beato, o vero felice, ne la loro operazione, si come dice}

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid., IV.17.3, 286.
\textsuperscript{282} Ibid., IV.17.4-7, 286-7.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., IV.17.7, 287.
lo Filosofo nel primo de l’Etica quando diffinisce la Felicitade, dicendo che
‘Felicitade è operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta.’

The passage in the *Ethics* to which Dante refers here is I.10.1098a 16-18, where
Aristotle writes:

> If then we place the function of a man in a certain kind of life, that is, of an activity of the soul according to reason, it will be proper to a good man to act well and to the best of his ability according to reason. In every case the good of man will consist in action conformable to virtue, and if there are a number of virtues, action conformable to the best and most perfect of them.

Certainly, Inglese is correct to observe that Dante’s summation of Aristotle’s words from *Ethics* I (“Felicitade è operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta”) echoes this passage above (“In every case the good of man will consist in action conformable to virtue”). Indeed, both passages reflect the shared notion that the perfectly lived life—in which true human happiness is found—consists in the life lived according with virtue. However, although even Dante himself tells us in the passage cited above that he is referring to *Ethics* I, I believe that here Dante is also referring to the role of habit in the attainment of virtue (“Nascono tutte da un principio, cioè da l’abito de la nostra buona elezione”) that is more of a concern for Aristotle in *Ethics* X than in *Ethics* I. Indeed, many of the sentiments that Dante and Inglese locate in *Ethics* I are also found in *Ethics* X; for

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284 Ibid., IV.17.7-8, 287.
285 This observation is made by Giorgio Inglese in *Convivio* footnote 8, 287.
286 *Ethics* I.10.1098a 16-18, 40.
287 *Convivio* IV.17.7-8, 287.
288 *Ethics* I.10.1098a 16-18, 40.
289 *Convivio* IV.17.7-8, 287.
example, in *Ethics* X.9, Aristotle writes, “A life lived in conformity with virtue is thought
to be a happy one,”\(^\text{290}\) a sentence that perhaps more closely echoes Dante’s summation
that “Felicitade è operazione secondo virtude in vita perfetta.”\(^\text{291}\)

On first glance, Dante’s assertion that virtue is born of the habit of choosing well
(“Queste vertudi ... nascono tutte da un principio, cioè da l’abito de la nostra buona
elezione”\(^\text{292}\) might appear to be at odds with what Aristotle says in *Ethics* X, that
“Happiness is definitely not a habit.”\(^\text{293}\) Indeed, for Aristotle, happiness is not a habit,
but is rather an activity: “We must place happiness in the class of activity.”\(^\text{294}\) How, then,
is Dante tying the idea of habit into his discussion of virtue and happiness? He appears to
be borrowing from *Ethics* X.14, where Aristotle acknowledges the role of good habits in
the development of virtuous behavior:

The man who is going to be virtuous must have careful rearing and good habits;
then he should live according to a moral code and refrain from evil either by his
own will or by coercion. This is possible only to men whose lives are directed by
intelligence and right order having coercive force. Certainly this power is not
contained in the precept of a father nor does it belong to anyone who is not a ruler
or a person in authority. But the law includes coercive force, whereas instruction
proceeds from prudence and reason.\(^\text{295}\)

\(^\text{290}\) *Ethics* X.9.1177a1, 618.
\(^\text{291}\) *Convivio* IV.17.7-8, 287.
\(^\text{292}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{293}\) *Ethics* X.9.1176a33, 618.
\(^\text{294}\) Ibid., X.9.1176b2, 618.
\(^\text{295}\) Ibid., X.14.1180a14-22, 639.
Thus, for both Aristotle and Dante, good habits are instrumental to the development of virtues, which in practice (activity) create happiness. When Dante writes, "Queste vertudi ... nascono tutte da un principio," he is referring to "l'abito de la nostra buona elezione"—the same habits that Aristotle attributes to the virtuous man when he writes, "The man who is going to be virtuous must have careful rearing and good habits." This is a key distinction that we find at play in Convivio IV.7-8, and although Dante attributes his views in this passage to Ethics I, they appear also to have been formed in part under the influence of Ethics X.

3. Dante's Christian Aristotelianism

Still, Dante's Christianity—and the contrast it draws between the active and the contemplative life—forces him to part ways with Aristotle at this point in his discussion. In Ethics X.10, Aristotle is quite clear that perfect human happiness consists in the activity of contemplation. He writes:

If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue ... this activity is contemplative—a conclusion in harmony both with our previous discussion and with the truth. For contemplation is the highest operation, since the intellect is the best element in us and the objects of the intellect are the best of the things that can be known.298

296 Convivio IV.17.7-8, 287.
298 Ethics X.10.1177a12-21, 623.
For Aristotle, contemplation is an activity; in Dante’s view, however, based on the Christian example of Martha and Mary (who embodied the active and contemplative life, respectively), the Bible treats activity and contemplation as separate and opposite entities. Thus, in *Convivio* IV.17.9-10—immediately following Dante’s adoption of the Aristotelian definition of happiness in the previous paragraph, *Convivio* IV.17.8—Dante distinguishes himself from Aristotle by differentiating himself as a Christian Aristotelian. Citing the Biblical example of Martha and Mary, he explains that it is best to live a life of contemplation:

Veramente é da sapere che noi potemo avere in questa vita due felicitadi, secondo due diversi cammini, buono e ottimo, che a ciò ne menano: l’una è la vita attiva, e l’altra la contemplativa; la quale, avvena che per l’attiva si pervegna, come detto è, a buona felicitade, ne mena ad ottima felicitade e beatitudine, secondo che pruova lo Filosofo nel decimo de l’Etica. E Cristo l’aferma con la sua bocca, nel Vangelo di Luca, parlando a Marta, e rispondendo a quella: ‘Marta, Marta, sollicita se’ e turbi intorno a molte cose: certamente una cosa è necessaria’, cioè quello che fai. E soggiugne: ‘Maria ottima parte ha eletta, la quale non le sarà tolta’. E Maria, secondo che dinanzi è scritto a queste parole del Vangelo, a’ piedi di Cristo sedendo, nulla cura del ministerio de la casa mostrava; ma solamente le parole del Salvatore ascoltava. Che se moralemente ciò volemo esponere, volse lo nostro Segnore in ciò mostrare che la contemplativa
In terms of the type of lifestyle prescribed, which is the larger issue at stake, Dante and Aristotle are in perfect agreement here: it is best to live a life of contemplation. However, it is important to Dante that he include in the Convivio the Christian distinction between activity and contemplation. This is a small departure from the Ethics, but it is a meaningful one given that Dante does not explicitly acknowledge it. The reason for this departure may be that Dante takes into account two separate implied readers here. For the astute Christian reader with in depth knowledge of Aristotle, Dante’s reference to Mary and Martha will satisfy their potential objections to the Aristotelian notion of contemplation as an activity. At the same time, for the benefit of the Christian reader engaging with the Ethics for the very first time in the Convivio, Dante does not undermine Aristotle’s authority, avoiding any explicit mention of this contradiction between Christianity and Aristotelianism. Thus the example of Mary and Martha is included here to placate the former type of reader while the potential for conflict remains undetected by the latter.

Etienne Gilson points out another aspect of the consideration Dante demonstrates for his implied readers. In Gilson’s view, Dante does not exclude the active life from all virtue, and in doing so, he defends the interests of “the honest folk engaged in the active life whom the Banquet was to win over to philosophy.”

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299 Convivio IV.17.9-11, 287-88.
300 Gilson, 131.
[Dante] has therefore suggested to them as an aim their beatitude, in other words the kind of felicity which may normally reward the kind of life they lead. Dante has no need to take back what he has said, for if Mary’s part is better, Martha’s is good; but, conversely, the fact that such people are lawfully engaged in the active life and are entitled to expect from it the special happiness that crowns it does not authorize them to believe that their part is the better. Who knows even whether they may aspire to the other? ... Whatever the truth on this point, it is impossible to suppose that Dante does not here cleave with the utmost sincerity to the thesis which he propounds.\(^{301}\)

D.S. Hutchinson has remarked that, in the *Ethics*, Aristotle offers “only three reputable reasons to prefer living to not living,” all of which are only available to “young gentlemen of property.”\(^{302}\) But what about those people whose circumstances do not permit them a choice? These are the individuals for whom, from the outset, Dante has claimed to be writing the *Convivio*. Not the nobility or those born to a life of privilege, but the working men, schooled only in the vernacular, who otherwise would be deprived of access to the beneficial teachings of Aristotle. It is no wonder, then, as both I and Gilson have observed, that Dante felt it was necessary to make certain modifications to the content of the *Ethics* in order to accommodate these readers. In considering these readers, and adapting the *Ethics* to their needs, Dante defeats one of the major obstacles to the widespread acceptance of the *Ethics*; at the same time, he demonstrates a forward-

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\(^{301}\) Ibid.

thinking, egalitarian approach towards the text by tinkering with its undesirable aspects.

What is most remarkable about Dante’s manipulation of the *Ethics* in this regard is that he appears to pull it off seamlessly without ever blatantly contradicting Aristotle or undermining Aristotelian authority. Rather, as exemplified above in his subtle approach to the contradiction between the Aristotelian and Christian notions of the active and passive lives, the complex philosophical surgery of meeting contradictions is glossed over by a breezy and effortless tone, taking readers by the hand and leading them Dante’s way without allowing them any awareness at all of what is being done: that they are witnessing a contradiction between Aristotelianism and Christianity, or that they are a party to Dante’s new and original Aristotelian-Christian synthesis.

This synthesis crescendos when Dante argues that the truest nobility—of a man entirely free of vice—cannot be attained by anyone without God’s help. He writes, explicating his canzone, that:

> Nessuno, per poter dire: ‘io sono di cotale schiatta’, non dee credere essere con essa, se questi frutti non sono in lui. E rende incontanente ragione, dicendo che quelli che hanno questa grazia, cioè questa divina cosa, sono quasi come dèi, senza macula di vizio; e ciò dare non può se non Iddio solo, appo cui non è scelta di persone, si come le divine Scritture manifestano.\(^{303}\)

While this might appear to be an infusion of the Augustinian notion of Grace into the *Ethics*—which indeed it is\(^ {304}\)—it has more in common with what Aristotle says in *Ethics* X than one might think. In *Ethics* X.14, Aristotle introduces a very similar concept,

\(^{303}\) *Convivio* IV.20.3-4, 294.

\(^{304}\) See Trovato 85; Maria Corti, *La felicità mentale: nuove prospettive per Cavalcanti e Dante* (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1983), 60.
arguing that if a man has a virtuous nature, it is because “some divine cause”\(^{305}\) has arranged for it to be so:

Some philosophers think that men are virtuous by nature; others, that they become virtuous by practice; still others, that they become virtuous by instruction.

Certainly what pertains to nature is not in our power but comes from some divine cause to a man who is very fortunate.\(^{306}\)

Here, Aristotle refers to a “divine cause” that is not further specified, leaving his language open enough to allow the Christian thinker to adopt his idea. It is possible that Dante’s interpretation of this passage was colored by his reading of the Aquinas commentary:

But what pertains to nature manifestly is not in our power but comes to men from some divine cause: from the influence of the heavenly bodies in regard to man’s physical condition, and from God Himself—who alone governs the intellect—in regard to the movement of man’s mind to good.\(^{307}\)

On this matter, both Dante and Aquinas are in concordance on their readings of Aristotle. Even then, it is just as possible that Dante reached this conclusion on his own, as the Aristotelian passage lends itself seamlessly to Christian appropriation.

Dante’s interpretation of this Aristotelian philosophical material is informed not just by the Bible, but also by Aristotle’s *On the Soul* and Guido Guinizzelli’s “Al cor gentil ripara sempre Amore.”\(^{308}\) Still explicating “Le dolci rime d’amor,” he writes:

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\(^{305}\) *Ethics* X.14.1179b18-31, 638.

\(^{306}\) Ibid.

\(^{307}\) Aquinas, comments 722-724 in *Ethics*, 640.

\(^{308}\) *Convivio* IV.20.6-8, 295.
Poi, quando dice: Ché solo Iddio a l’anima la dona, ragione è del suscettivo, cioè del subietto dove questo divino dono discende; ch’è bene divino dono, secondo la parola de l’Apostolo: ‘Ogni ottimo dato e ogni dono perfetto di suso viene, discendendo dal Padre de’ lumi’. Dice adunque che Dio solo porge questa grazia a l’anima di quelli, cui vede stare perfettamente ne la sua persona, acconcio e disposto a questo divino atto ricevere. Ché, secondo dice lo Filosofo nel secondo de l’Anima, ‘le cose convengono essere disposte a li loro agenti, e a ricevere li loro atti’; onde se l’anima è imperfettamente posta, non è disposta a ricevere questa benedetta e divina infusione; si come, se una pietra margarita è male disposta, o vero imperfetta, la vertù celestiale ricever non può, si come disse quel nobile Guido Guinizzelli in una sua canzone che comincia: Al cor gentil ripara sempre amore.309

At stake here are those individuals who are “sanza macula di vizio.”310 By Dante’s summation, the Bible, Aristotle, himself, and Guido Guinizzelli are all in agreement on the way in which God bestows this privileged purity of soul upon some individuals. On the first point—that “Ogni ottimo dato e ogni dono perfetto ... [discendono] dal Padre”311—Dante and Aquinas are in agreement. On the second point—that the soul must be dwelling perfectly with in its body in order to receive the gift of Grace—Dante brings the concept of Christian Grace into alignment with Aristotelian thought in On the Soul. As an illustration of this dynamic, Dante turns to Guinizzelli for a particularly medieval illustration: the precious stone (“pietra margarita”), improperly disposed,

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309 Ibid.
310 Ibid., IV.20.3, 294.
311 Ibid., IV.20.6-8, 295.
cannot receive “la vertù celestiale.” Once again, Dante’s synthesis of these diverse sources is unapologetically seamless; he does not give any justification for why we should think that any of them are compatible with one another. Assuming that they are, he surges forward in the apparent hope that his readers will not stall on this point or find any contradictions.

4. Seed Analogy and the Infusion of Grace

The previous argument lays the groundwork for Dante’s explanation of the origin of human nobility, found in *Convivio* IV.20.9. There are two important points to keep in mind here when considering this definition. The first is that it is clearly grounded in a small aspect of *Ethics X*—employing the analogy of a seed. What is a minor example for Aristotle becomes central to Dante. The second thing to keep in mind is that Dante does not acknowledge that he is borrowing this information from Aristotle; and we shall see in a moment that this is in no small part due once again to Dante’s unwavering belief in his own originality. The definition of nobility given by Dante is this:

È manifesto che nobilitade umana non sia altro che ‘seme di felicitade’, messo da Dio ne l’anima ben posta, cioè lo cui corpo è d’ogni parte disposto perfettamente. Ché, se le vertudi sono frutto di nobilitade, e felicitade è dolcezza comparata, manifesto è essa nobilitade essere semente di felicitade, come detto è.

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312 Ibid.
313 Ibid., IV.20.9, 296.
That is, God plants the seed of happiness—nobility—in the soul that dwells within a perfectly disposed body. This definition, Dante points out, provides us with “tutte e quattro le cagioni”\textsuperscript{314} of nobility: its material cause (the properly disposed soul), formal cause (the seed), efficient cause (God), and the final cause (happiness). Although Dante does not mention Aristotle here, he appears to have based his own definition on a passage from \textit{Ethics} X.14, in which Aristotle also employs a seed analogy in a similar context:

Some philosophers think that men are virtuous by nature; others, that they become virtuous by practice; still others, that they become virtuous by instruction. Certainly what pertains to nature is not in our power but comes from some divine cause to a man who is very fortunate. However, discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone but the soul of the hearer must be prepared by good habits to rejoice in the good and hate the evil, just as the soil must be well tilled to nourish the seed. Indeed the man who lives according to passion will not listen to a discourse on virtue nor will he understand it. How is it possible to persuade such a man? In general, passion does not yield to argument but to violence. Obviously there must pre-exist a natural disposition in some way akin to virtue by which a man loves what is good and hates what is evil. (X.14.1179b18-31)\textsuperscript{315}

It is clear once again at this point that Dante’s definition of nobility is synonymous with Aristotle’s concept of virtue. Arguments that Aristotle employs in his treatment of virtue are the same ones used by Dante to speak of nobility; the likeness between these two passages demonstrates this dynamic. Here, like Dante, Aristotle is discussing the

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., IV.20.10, 296.
\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Ethics} X.14.1179b18-31, 638.
causality of virtue. Although Aristotle does not use the same language as Dante, who points out exactly which of the four causes he is identifying, three of the four are present in this passage. The efficient cause of virtue is "some divine cause" (for Dante, God); the material cause, a "natural disposition in some way akin to virtue" (Dante’s properly disposed soul); and, for both men, the formal cause is like a seed.316

In Convivio IV.21, Dante expounds on his analogy of the seed, bringing in additional examples from diverse sources to illustrate the way in which the seed may be planted in the properly disposed soul. In his own words, this is a "speziale capitolo"—a special chapter—because it is where he will "chiarire .. come questa bontade discende in noi."317 Here, his aim is to create a great synthesis for his readers, and so using knowledge from the worlds of philosophy, science, and Christianity, he seeks to demonstrate that his definition of nobility is viable within all of these systems of thought. Thus, he tells his readers, he will explain "prima per modo naturale, e poi per modo teologico."318 It is relevant to our discussion of Dante’s reception of the Ethics to point out the way in which Dante presents this amalgam of sources as being entirely unproblematic. Given that his entire definition of nobility, and thus the entire thrust of Convivio IV, hangs in the balance here, we can easily conclude that very much is at stake. Therefore, the fluidity with which he moves between these diverse sources, although characteristic of the Convivio as a whole and certainly something we have discussed before, is again notable. Dante illustrates rather than argues for the compatibility of Christianity and Aristotelianism; by giving us natural (Aristotelian) and theological

316 Ibid., X.14.1179b18-31, 638.
317 Convivio IV.21.1, 296.
318 Ibid., IV.21.1, 296.
(Christian) explanations for his seed analogy, Dante juxtaposes the two systems of thought without reservation, expecting his reader to do the same.

5. Aristotelianism and the Highest Good

At this point in the *Convivio*, Dante is advancing towards his ultimate Christian-Aristotelian synthesis, where he will conclude that the highest good attainable by mankind—the life of contemplation Aristotle discusses in *Ethics X*—is linked to human blessedness. As we witnessed earlier, the Christian distinction between the active and the passive life is a major concern for Dante here, and once again it provides a source of conflict for the synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelianism. In *Ethics X.11*, Aristotle concludes, “The life of the intellect is best and most pleasant for man since the intellect more than anything else is man. This life, therefore, will be the happiest.”319 The problem for Dante, of course, is that because Aristotle did not believe in the afterlife, his account of happiness does not provide for the Christian notion of beatitude. For this reason, he makes a distinct departure from Aristotle in asserting that there are two types of ultimate happiness available to mankind: the first, an imperfect happiness attainable in this lifetime; and the second—perfect happiness consisting in beatitude, the Christian afterlife. Dante writes:

E cosi appare che nostra beatitudine (questa felicitade di cui si parla) prima trovare potemo quasi imperfetta ne la vita attiva, cioè ne le operazioni de le morali virtudi, e poi perfetta quasi ne le operazioni de le intellettuali virtudi. Le

319 *Ethics* X.11.1177b31-1178a8, 627.
quali due operazioni sono vie expedite e direttissime a menare a la somma beatitudine, la quale qui non si puote avere.\textsuperscript{320}

The problem for Dante is that if he were to adopt Aristotle's definition of happiness wholesale—that perfect happiness is attainable through contemplation in this lifetime—it would leave no room for an even more perfect happiness in the Christian afterlife. Still, by accepting the Aristotelian definition of happiness with the modification that it is applicable to man's earthly life only, Dante is able to maintain that man's desire for happiness can be fulfilled in this lifetime.\textsuperscript{321} Therefore, Dante makes a key modification to the Aristotelian system of moral philosophy, now rendering it compatible with Christianity. Aristotelianism is useful to us—up to a point. After death, our truly greatest happiness will only be ours through Christian beatitude.\textsuperscript{322}

As Dante draws \textit{Convivio} IV to a close, having used the conclusion of the \textit{Ethics} as a point of departure, he appears to leave Aristotelian ethics behind. From his original conclusion—derived from \textit{Ethics} X, as we have observed, centering on the "seed of nobility" planted in us by God—he launches into an elaboration of how the human "seed of nobility" takes its root in us and manifests itself throughout the course of a lifetime:

\begin{quote}
Questo seme divino, di cui parlato è di sopra, ne la nostra anima incontanente germoglia, mettendo e diversificando per ciascuna potenza de l'anima, secondo la essigenza di quella. Germoglia dunque per la vegetativa, per la sensitiva e per la razionale; e dibrancasi per le vertuti di quelle tutte, dirizzando quelle tutte a le
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Convivio} IV.23.18, 305.
\textsuperscript{321} See Dronke, 44.
\textsuperscript{322} Dronke maintains, along with Nardi, Corti, and Vasoli, that Albertus Magnus might have influenced Dante to some extent insofar as the idea of a "contemplative earthly felicity" is concerned. 44-45.
loro perfezioni, e in quelle sostenendosi sempre infino al punto che, con quella parte de la nostra anima che mai non muore, a l’altissimo e gloriosissimo Seminado[re], al cielo ritorna.\(^{323}\)

Here, Dante emphasizes once again that the seed is gifted to us for our lifetime by a divine “Seminatore”—God. Until it returns, along with our immortal soul (“quella parte de la nostra anima che mai non more”), to God at the time of our death, it lives in us and grows, branching out into each power of the soul (“ciascuna potenza de l’anima”) and manifesting itself in the virtues (“e dibrancasi per le vertuti di quelle tutte”).\(^{324}\) Once again, Dante places his emphasis on the life of man, but he remains consistent in reminding us that eternal beatitude also awaits us. Thus he places extra emphasis here on God as the divine “Seminatore”; and we are reminded that we have left the realm of Aristotelian ethics, in which the highest beatitude was a life lived in contemplation of Truth.

6. Virtue in the Four Ages of Man, and the Abandonment of Aristotle:

Convivio IV.xxiii-xxx

In the final chapters of Convivio,\(^{325}\) Dante’s last words before abandoning the text, he presents a series of virtues assigned to each of the four ages of man. It is an odd addition to the text, which has up to this point upheld Aristotle’s Ethics as the ultimate authority on all issues of virtue and vice. This list of virtues stands out because it does

\(^{323}\) Convivio IV.23.3, 306.
\(^{324}\) Ibid., IV.23.3, 306.
\(^{325}\) Ibid., IV.xxiii-xxx.
not have any clear precedent. Additionally, it is frequently overlooked in the scholarship on Dante and moral philosophy.\textsuperscript{326} Still, precisely because here Dante speaks directly of virtues yet does not reference the Ethics, Convivio IV.xxiii-xxx merits closer scrutiny.

The distinct features of Dante’s theory here are fairly simple: there are four ages of man, which are reflected also in the four humors, four seasons, and four parts of the day.\textsuperscript{327} The first age is \textit{adolescenzia} (hot and moist, spring, the day up to tierce), lasting until age twenty-five.\textsuperscript{328} The second is \textit{giovinezza} (hot and dry, summer, nones), completed at age forty-five.\textsuperscript{329} The third is \textit{senettute} (cold and dry, autumn, vespers), enduring until the seventieth year.\textsuperscript{330} The fourth age is \textit{senio} (cold and moist, winter, from vespers onward), lasting for more or less ten years until death.\textsuperscript{331} Utterly unique to Dante’s ethics is the theory that there are different virtues for each of these ages; the way that Dante explains it:

\begin{quote}
Per tutte queste etadi, questa nobilitade, di cui si parla, diversamente mostra li suoi effetti ne l’anima nobilitata ... È da sapere che la nostra buona e diritta natura ragionevolmente procede in noi, si come vedemo procedere la natura de le piante in quelle; e però alti costumi e altri portamenti sono ragionevolì ad una etade più che ad altra, ne li quali l’anima nobilitata ordinatamente procede per una semplice
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{327} Convivio IV.23.13-14, 309.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., IV.23.13-24.2, 309-10.
\textsuperscript{329} Ibid., IV.23.13-24.4, 309-11.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., IV.23.13-24.5, 309-12.
Dante’s ethics sustains what is to the best of my knowledge the original view that the “seed of nobility” manifests itself differently depending on the age of its human carrier. Thus, Dante’s conclusion is that in each stage of his life, the seed of inborn nobility manifests itself differently by projecting different outward virtues—an assertion that is unmistakably a serious departure from the Ethics, in which the habit of virtue leads to happiness. In Ethics X, Aristotle says here that the coercive force of the law enables young men to develop the proper habitual behaviors that will serve to produce their happiness later in life; to eventually attain happiness, a man “should live according to a moral code and refrain from evil either by his own will or by coercion.” The role of coercion in helping men to attain the proper habits is so important, says Aristotle, that “it seems fitting that each man should do something to help his children and friends become virtuous; or at least select the means for it. Apparently this can best be done ... if a man becomes a legislator.” It is notable that, in support of the above assertion, Dante makes no mention of the usual suspects—Aristotle and the Bible—in support of himself. Instead, he calls on his more infrequently used references: Cicero, Virgil, and Egidius the Hermit. We should take Dante’s abandonment of his regular pattern—supporting himself first with Aristotle’s Ethics, then with the Bible—as a sign indicating that something is amiss. In what is certainly a change of pace for him in the Convivio, Dante

332 Ibid., IV.24.7-8, 312-13.
334 Ibid., X.15.1180a32-34, 643.
335 Convivio IV.24.9, 313.
is suddenly calling upon lesser authorities, and stilling the voices of the greater authorities.

The content of these passages is striking insofar as it appears to ignore many of the virtues central to Aristotle’s *Ethics*, and instead introduces additional virtues to which he has not previously attended. While nearly every virtue named by Dante is to be found in the *Ethics* in some capacity, some—notably courtesy, and the surrendering of the noble soul to God during the age of senio—are Dante’s alone. In addition, a large number of virtues that are important in the *Ethics*—too many to list—are nowhere present in Dante’s ethics for the four ages. All in all, Dante’s ethics consists of sixteen virtues. In the age of adolescenzia, Dante elaborates, the predominant virtues should be *obbedienza* (obedience), *soavidade* (sweetness), *vergogna* (shame), and *adornezza corporale* (bodily adornment). In gioventute, they are *temperanza* (temperance), *fortezza* (strength), and the ability to be *amorosa* (loving), *cortese* (courteous) and *leale* (loyal). In senetta, Dante considers it virtuous to be *prudente* (prudent), *giusta* (just), *larga* (generous or liberal), and *affabile* (affable). Finally, in senio, the soul will do two things; we shall set these aside for just a moment in order to first address the other twelve virtues included by Dante in his ethics, examining what of their content is borrowed from Aristotle and what, if any, is original.

It is worth noting that, in naming these virtues nearly all of which are discussed at length in the *Ethics*, Dante chooses to eschew the Aristotelian source in favor of other, less authoritative sources to cite in support of his assertions. In illustrating the virtue of

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336 Ibid., IV.24.11, 313.
337 Ibid., IV.26.2, 319.
338 Ibid., IV.27.2, 323.
obbedienza, for example, Dante references only the Bible, in the voice of Solomon, Proverbs, and Colossians. Indeed, here we find the integration of a virtue much more characteristic of Christian moral philosophy than Aristotelian; ultimately, the Christian ethic is founded on the principle that “God is our father. God commands us to obey him. We ought to obey God because he knows what is best for us, and what is best for us is to obey Him.” While the subject of obedience is treated indirectly by Aristotle—in *Ethics* VIII.11, where he explains that “By nature a father rules his sons, an ancestor his descendants, and a king his subjects,” and in *Ethics* III.7 and 8, where he discusses the taking of counsel—an emphasis on obedience as such, like that of Dante’s, is not found. While Aristotle receives less emphasis in this section, though, he is not abandoned entirely; just a few moments later, Dante gives Aristotle (and, surprisingly, *Ethics* VIII, the very book he overlooked just moments ago) a nod, but a general one. Remarking, “Noi non potemo perfetta vita avere sanza amici, si come ne l’ottavo de l’Etica vuole Aristotile,” he makes a generic reference to the *Ethics*. In fact, the Dantean virtue of soavitate, which he says is acquired “per soavi reggimenti, che sono dolce e cortesi[s]si[ma]mente parlare, dolce e cortesemente servire e operare,” bears a strong resemblance to the Aristotelian virtue of amiability which, among other things, belongs to the man who, “considering it honorable and useful … aims to cause no offense, and even to give pleasure, for he is concerned with pleasure and sadness which occur in social

341 *Ethics* VIII.11, 1161a18-20, 515.  
342 *Convivio* IV.25.1, 315.  
343 Ibid., IV.25.1-2, 315.
intercourse.” 344 However, Dante does not credit Aristotle with this specific idea. By selectively including Aristotle on minor points and excluding him on major definitions, Dante maintains a delicate balance in building his own authority while remaining amenable to Aristotle, whom he has already established as being the superlative Moral Philosopher.

Ascoli points to a moment earlier in the _Convivio_ that is one instance of this same strategy for subduing the voice of Aristotle. In _Convivio_ IV.3.6, Dante attributes a definition of nobility to Emperor Frederick II: that nobility consists in “antica ricchezza e belli costumi.” 345 Revealing that this opinion “ultimately derives not from Frederick at all, but rather from the _Politics_ of Aristotle (8.1294a.20-22),” 346 Ascoli suggests that attributing Aristotle’s idea to the Emperor is a safer way for Dante to disagree with Aristotle indirectly, thereby not undermining his authority; thus Dante could both “draw upon [the authority of Aristotle], appropriating himself as humble mediator, and attack it obliquely, opening the way for his own redefinition of an autonomous and personal autorità.” 347 This ambivalent attitude towards the very sources of authority he has built up on his own may seem self-defeating; however, in the opinion of both Ascoli and Gilson, it is a fundamental characteristic of Dante’s treatment of authority as a whole. Noting this “Dantean strategy for simultaneously respecting authority and circumventing it,” Ascoli elaborates:

345 _Convivio_ IV.3.6, 227.
346 Ascoli, 106.
Over half a century ago, Etienne Gilson pointed to a curious feature of Dante’s attitude toward authorities in a number of different fields or institutions—notably the political, the philosophical, and the ecclesiastical—which he dubbed the *aporia dantesca* ... what Gilson remarked upon is a consistent doubleness in Dante’s treatment of the nature and scope of human authority. On the one hand Dante desires to make an individual absolutely authoritative within his own domain, and yet, on the other, he defines the limits of that domain, beyond which this individual possesses no special authority.  

Ascoli points out that Gilson’s theory of the *aporia dantesca* was in fact tailored to his reading of the *De Monorchia*, but Ascoli, finding it also applicable to the *Convivio*, includes it in his discussion thereof. To these observations, I should only like to add that, in the case of Aristotle in the *Convivio*, Dante both obeys and contradicts the *aporia dantesca* at once by both allowing and then, ultimately, limiting the authority of Aristotle in the realm of Moral Philosophy. In fact, Aristotle’s role as the superlative Philosopher will be called into question when the need for a Christian moral philosopher arises.

By alternately relying upon and failing to acknowledge the authority of Aristotle, demonstrating the same ambiguity Ascoli noted earlier in the *Convivio*, in these final pages of book IV Dante fails to secure for himself a steady spot amongst canonical authorities. One example of this Dante’s discussion of *vergogna*, in which it is evident that Dante is borrowing from Aristotle, although he does not say so. In particular, Dante assigns this virtue to *adolescenzia*, the youngest age of man; similarly, Aristotle is specific in *Ethics* IV.17 that shame belongs primarily to the young, writing:

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348 Ibid., 102.
This passion is not becoming to persons of every age but only to the young. We are of the opinion that it is well for the young to feel shame because, living according to their emotions, many of them would fall into sin but are restrained by shame. Moreover, we are in the habit of praising youngsters who have a sense of shame.\textsuperscript{349}

Although Dante's definition of shame is more multifaceted than Aristotle's, emphasizing that \textit{vergogna} is in fact comprised of three emotions: \textit{stupore} (awe), \textit{pudore} (modesty), and \textit{verecundia} (sense of shame), its assignment to the young in particular is unquestionably Aristotelian. Still, here again Dante eschews Aristotelian examples in favor of an illustration from the \textit{Thebaid} of Statius.\textsuperscript{350} Why would Dante fail to cite the \textit{Ethics} here, and choose instead a less philosophically authoritative literary work? This could of course be due to the lacunae in Dante's intellectual biography spoken of by Crouse;\textsuperscript{351} it could be that Dante had never read or encountered this part of the \textit{Ethics}. But this still does not explain why this portion of the \textit{Convivio} is even necessary: if the \textit{Ethics} is truly authoritative, why is there need for further talk of virtue and vice, outside of Aristotelian terms?

This question persists throughout the final passages of \textit{Convivio}, in which Dante continues to expound this developing new theory of the virtues. On the virtue of temperance (\textit{temperanza}) in \textit{giovinezza}, Dante's only illustration comes from Virgil's

\textsuperscript{349} \textit{Ethics} IV.17.1128b15-19, 274.
\textsuperscript{350} \textit{Convivio} IV.xxiv.8, 317.
\textsuperscript{351} See Crouse, 141.
While the bulk of the *Convivio* has been rigorously reliant upon the *Ethics* as the authoritative source of moral philosophy, at this point Dante turns to literary examples in support of his argument. Still, the evidence of Aristotelian influence can still be observed. For example, *adornezza corporale*—though not an Aristotelian virtue—is still founded on Aristotelian principles (which, again, go unreferenced by Dante). For Dante, physical beauty exists,

*Quando [il corpo] è bene ordinato e disposto, allora è bello per tutto e per le parti;*  
ché l’ordine debito de le nostre membra rende uno piacere non so di che armonia miracile, e la buona disposizione, cioè la sanitade, getta sopra quelle uno colore dolce a riguardare.

By Dante’s definition, physical beauty arises from a body whose members are working in harmony and according to each of their disposition. Similarly, in *Ethics* I.10, Aristotle expresses the belief that—as best summarized by Aquinas—

>The final good of everything must be found in its operation. If then man has some characteristic activity, his final good which is happiness must consist in this.

Consequently, happiness is the proper operation of man.

Apparently, in his definition of beauty, Dante is borrowing this Aristotelian concept—that “the final good of everything must be found in its operation”—and applying it to the members of the human body—something that Aristotle himself acknowledges when

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352 *Convivio* IV.26.8-9, 321. Although any reader of the *Commedia* will not doubt the immense authority Dante ascribes to the poet Virgil, as we have previously established, Dante has not yet in the *Convivio* attempted to convince us that Virgil is worthy of such an authoritative position, particularly in the realm of moral philosophy.  
353 Ibid., IV.25.12, 318-19.  
354 Aquinas, comment 119 in *Ethics*, 41.  
355 Ibid.
he writes, "If the eye, hand, foot, and each member have a proper operation, surely we
will not refuse to concede an activity proper to man as man." In Dante’s reasoning, if
each bodily member has a characteristic activity, and the youthful bodily members
perform these activities well, then physical beauty will result. This is how Dante can
consider *adornezza corporale* to be a virtuous activity; because it falls under the
definition of an “activity” based on this Aristotelian description of the final good of each
thing. Based on our experience of the earlier chapters of *Convivio* IV, it is certainly
uncharacteristic of Dante to find such a use of Aristotelianism with absolutely no
reference to the Philosopher; but yet again, in this context, Aristotle is not mentioned.

While in Dante’s discussions of *prudenza* and *larghezza*, the *Ethics* is given brief
acknowledgement, the pattern of not referring to his Aristotelian source persists as the
dominant trend in Dante’s description of the four ages of man, as he treats the qualities of
being temperate, loving, and affable. Just as temperance for Aristotle concerns
controlling the pleasures of the body, for Dante, *temperanza* involves controlling the
animal appetite. Evidentiary support provided by Dante, however, is not Aristotelian
at all; instead, he provides multiple examples of temperance from Virgil’s *Aeneid*.
Similarly, Dante’s treatment of the quality of being *amorosa*—loving—in *Convivio*
IV.26.10-11, is unmistakably similar to Aristotle’s discussion of “loving and being
loved as related to friendship” in *Ethics* VIII.8, 1159a12-1159a-24. However, Dante

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356 *Ethics* I.10.1097b30-33, 40.
357 See Ibid., III.19.1118a1-2, 195.
358 See *Convivio* IV.26.6, 320.
359 Ibid., IV.26.8-9, 321.
360 Ibid., IV.26.10-11, 321.
361 *Ethics* VIII.8, 1159a12-1159a-24, 503-4.
gives no mention of Aristotle; his illustrations come, once again, from the *Aeneid*.\textsuperscript{362}

Again, in describing affability,\textsuperscript{363} Dante’s sentiments echo those of Aristotle,\textsuperscript{364} but his only outside support comes from Cato, voiced by Cicero in *On Old Age*\textsuperscript{365}

As the voice of the Philosopher is progressively stilled, one cannot help but recall the moment from the *Commedia* in which Dante finally abandons his once faithful leader, Virgil; in a narrative form—as Dante stands poised to move to the earthly paradise, and leaves Virgil behind—Dante expresses a viewpoint that has philosophical and spiritual underpinnings. At this point in the narrative and the spiritual geography of the Dantean Christian afterlife, Virgil has reached the limit of where his literary expression can carry him. Would it be so strange to suggest that, at this point in the *Convivio*, Dante is similarly leaving the Philosopher behind as he ventures into uncharted territory? Just as in Purgatory, where Virgil’s authority wanes while Dante’s confidence grows, also in the *Convivio*, Dante appears to progressively sideline Aristotle when he has reached the limit of where pagan moral philosophy is capable of taking us. At the same time, a close reading of these passages demonstrates that the Aristotelian influence can still be felt.

The virtues proper to this final chapter of a man’s life are consistent with the Dantean vision that there is a limit to the felicity that can be achieved by man on earth. Indeed, these virtues reflect a deep understanding that there is a greater beatitude awaiting man on the other side of death; in Gilson’s words, they reflect the Dantean understanding that:

\textsuperscript{362} *Convivio* IV.26.10-11, 321-22.
\textsuperscript{363} See Ibid., IV.27.16, 327.
\textsuperscript{364} See *Ethics* VIII.8.1159a27-1159b3, 503.
\textsuperscript{365} *Convivio* IV.27.16, 327.
Only theology can finally lead us to perfect contemplative beatitude, but it cannot do so in this life. This is also the reason why, holding as it already does undivided sway in the Empyrean of souls, the truth of science is not of this world. Only in the next will it lead us to that vision of God face to face of which it is the instrument.\textsuperscript{366}

In \textit{Convivio} IV.28, Dante characterizes the final chapter of man’s life as a preparation for this ultimate vision of God. Twice utilizing the image of sailing into port (which will become one of many symbological programs of the \textit{Commedia}), Dante describes the virtuous activity of these final years by way of analogy:

\begin{quote}
Come lo buono marinaio, come esso appropinqua al porto, cala le sue vele, e soavemente, con debile conducimento, entra in quello; così noi dovemo calare le vele de le nostre mondane operazioni e tornare a Dio con tutto nostro intendimento di cuore, sì che a quello porto si vegna con tutta soavitade e con tutta pace. E in ciò avemo da la nostra propria natura grande ammaestramento di soavitade, ché in essa cotale morte non è dolore né alcuna acerbitate, ma si come uno pomo maturo leggiermente e sanza violenza si dispicca dal suo ramo, così la nostra anima sanza doglia si parte dal corpo ov’ella è stata.\textsuperscript{367}
\end{quote}

It is fitting that these tender words precede Aristotle’s ultimate citation in the \textit{Convivio}: from his \textit{On Maturity and Old Age}, where he writes that “sansa tristizia è la morte ch’è ne la vecchiezza.”\textsuperscript{368} With these final words, inserted in the \textit{Convivio} as an actual

\textsuperscript{366} Gilson, 151.
\textsuperscript{367} \textit{Convivio} IV.28.3-4, 329.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid., IV.28.4, 329.
quotation from Aristotle, the Philosopher’s voice is heard one last time as he reminds us that a life fully lived need not be mourned in death.

Simultaneously, how can one help but wonder if Dante is manipulating us to accept his moving beyond Aristotelian ethics by suggesting—through this final use of Aristotle—that a philosophy fully extended and elaborated, having reached the extent of its limitations, can be set aside without reconsideration or regret? This is the ultimate fate of the *Ethics* in the Christian universe: it reaches its limitations when we come to speak of the afterlife. One cannot help but think again of the harrowing moment in *Purgatorio* that Dante would soon write, in which Virgil speaks his final words to Dante in the poem:

‘Il temporal foco e l’eterno
veduto hai, figlio; e se’ venuto in parte
dov’ io per me piú oltre non discerno.
Tratto t’ho qui con ingegno e con arte;
lo tuo piacere omai prendi per duce;
...
Non aspettar mio dir piú né mio cenno;
libero, dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio,
e fallo fora non fare a suo senno:
per ch’io te sovra te corono e mitrio.\(^{369}\)

This moment in *Purgatorio*, in which Dante’s beloved leader is forced to leave him behind as Dante moves into the blessed realm of Paradise, is a much more elegant

elaboration of the same dynamic that we see unfolding between Dante and Aristotle in the final chapters of Convivio. Thus, in Convivio IV.28, as in Purgatorio XXVII, Dante recounts the moment in which his pagan leader is set aside en route to his ultimate conclusions. Elaborating the final virtues that prepare man for the Christian afterlife, Dante moves beyond Aristotle by means of his own “arbitrio”—the same freedom with which he is charged by Virgil in Purgatorio. As a symbolically dying Aristotle in the Convivio tells us, in his last words, that “Sanza tristizia è la morte ch’è ne la vecchiezza,” we understand not to mourn his absence in the final two chapters of Convivio because—as in the words of Virgil in Purgatorio—he has carried us to the furthest extent of where his art and ingegno can take us. Ultimately, the Commedia would become Dante’s supreme Christian ethics, reframing the Convivio’s unbalanced emphasis on Aristotelianism with a centralized Christian vision.

370 Convivio IV.28.4, 329.
D. Conclusion

This dissertation has examined two considerably diverse approaches to the *Ethics*. In the first half, we traced the transmission of the *Ethics* by means of Brunetto Latini’s *Tesoro* and its precursors; in the second, we witnessed the same work as metabolized and put to use by Dante in the *Convivio*. For Dante, the *Ethics* is both an authority on the science of moral philosophy and a tool for advancing his own Christian Aristotelian arguments. When borrowing ideas from the *Ethics*, Dante demonstrates familiarity with the text as a whole; at the same time, the diversity of sources through which he likely gathered knowledge of the work is undeniable, and evidenced by the way in which he sometimes confuses an argument from the *Ethics* and the book in which it is found. Sometimes it is not even the *Ethics* at all, but an idea of Aristotle’s found in multiple works\(^{371}\)—the fourfold definition of causality—that enables Dante to make his case. Thus, in *Convivio* IV Dante uses the Aristotelian fourfold definition of causality to build an original thesis of his own, challenging proponents of ancestral nobility to provide its first cause, and demonstrating the impossibility of this task.

Where Christianity is at odds with the *Ethics* (such as on the topic of the active versus the contemplative life), Dante sides with Christianity; his personal breed of Christian Aristotelianism lies in the way in which he navigates these apparent contradictions, choosing in this case to depart from the *Ethics* without acknowledging it. The centerpiece of Dante’s Christian-Aristotelian strategy is to manipulate the *Ethics* in order to maintain its palatability to his Christian readers, while not explicitly undermining

\(^{371}\) See *Physics* II.3 and *Metaphysics* V.2.
Aristotle’s authority. Above all, Dante utilizes the Aristotelian notion of the perfected soul as his own definition of human nobility, but he modifies Aristotle’s conclusion—that a life best lived is a life of contemplation—by specifying that two ultimate felicities await man: that of the earthly life well lived, and that of the Christian afterlife, experienced in beatitude.

Indeed, our reading of the Convivio sheds a great deal of light on the Commedia, and our understanding of the role that Aristotle plays therein. It is not just that Aristotle himself is beached in Limbo as “I maestro di color che sanno” alongside the other great thinkers of antiquity; it is the way in which their presence in Limbo is explained by Dante that forces us to recall the final chapters of Convivio IV. When Dante and Virgil encounter the virtuous pagans, Virgil explains God’s reasoning behind their position in the hierarchical order of the afterlife:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Or vo’ che sappi, innanzi che più andi,} \\
\text{ch’ei non peccaro; e s’elli hanno mercedi,} \\
\text{non basta, perché non ebber battesmo,} \\
\text{ch’è porta de la fede che tu credi;} \\
\text{e s’è’ furon dinanzi al cristianesmo,} \\
\text{non adorar debitamente a Dio;} \\
\text{e di questi cotai son io medesmo.} \\
\text{Per tai difetti, non per altro rio,} \\
\text{semo perduti, e sol di tanto offesi}
\end{align*}\]

\[372 \text{ Inferno IV.131, 42.}\]
che sanza speme vivemo in disio.\textsuperscript{373}

Here, the divide between faith and reason, so critical to our understanding of the final chapters of \textit{Convivio} IV, is made manifest by both the pagans’ physical separation from God by their exclusion from Purgatory proper and by Virgil’s stated reason for it: “perché non ebber battesmo, / ch’è porta de la fede che tu credi.”\textsuperscript{374} In \textit{Convivio}, Dante ultimately had no choice but to move beyond the \textit{Ethics} when writing about the preparation for the Christian afterlife, because Aristotle does not make any considerations applicable to this topic. For Dante’s purposes in the \textit{Convivio}, Aristotle’s authority was limited to helping man attain the final cause of human life only. Here in the \textit{Commedia}, we see Aristotle’s power again limited symbolically as his inability to move anywhere else in the Christian afterlife is evident. Bound for all eternity to the shores of the Acheron, Aristotle’s relegation to Limbo in the \textit{Commedia} is a metaphorical rendering of the viability of Aristotelian thought in a Christian universe.

It is for this reason that the \textit{Ethics} is mentioned once—and only once—by name in the \textit{Commedia}. Taking place as Virgil and Dante further their descent into the \textit{Inferno}, Virgil explains to Dante God’s rationale behind the punishment of sins there. His words to Dante are: “Non ti remembra di quelle parole / con le quai la tua Etica pertratta / le tre disposizion che ‘l ciel non vole, / incontinenza, malizia, e la matta / bestialitade?”\textsuperscript{375} Attached to this reference to the \textit{Ethics} is a very specific possessive pronoun—“la tua”—which personally attached Dante to the work and recalls the degree to which he championed it in the \textit{Convivio}. Above all, it is most meaningful to us to consider that the

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., IV.33-42, 36.
\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., IV.35-36, 36.
\textsuperscript{375} Ibid., XI.79.83, 114.
conclusion of the *Convivio* and the premise of the *Commedia* is the same in this regard: the *Ethics* relates to earthly life. Thus, in the *Convivio*, the *Ethics* allows us to attain happiness on earth; in the afterlife of the *Commedia*, the *Ethics* also governs the structure of the *Inferno*—the most earthly of realms, which is detached from God.

Thus, for this reason, we find an effort begun by Brunetto Latini in the *Trésor* but brought to completion by Dante Alighieri in the *Convivio* to carve out a specific role for the *Ethics* within the Christian life and cosmos. While in both cases, this effort was born out of a desire to create a rendering of the *Ethics* that was especially applicable to the lives of the common people, what emerged from their labor was in fact something quite different: an interpretation of Aristotelianism that assigned it a proper place beneath the ultimate interests of Christianity in the lives of its Christian readers.

This stands in stark contrast to the Christian approach to Aristotelianism championed by St. Thomas Aquinas. In John Haldane’s summation,

> The Thomistic genius lay in the capacity to see how Greek thought and Catholic doctrine might be synthesized into a Christian philosophy. So far as this vision concerned ethics, it took the form of showing that the previously noted parallels between ideas of virtue originating in the philosophy of classical antiquity and those recurrent within Christian thought could be developed so as to give a rational foundation to ethics and thereby demonstrate an account of true virtue which could be compelling to any intelligent human being.  

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Ultimately, in the annals of history, Thomism would reign supreme over the Latinian and Dantine approaches to Christian Aristotelianism. Past its prime, and read by later generations, the Tesoro would eventually lose its status as a relevant summa, with more up to date knowledge constantly being discovered. The fate of the Dantine approach to Aristotelian Ethics, however, is more complicated. If we are to consider the ultimate transmission of the Convivio's original breed of Christian Aristotelianism, it can only be called a failure; first, because the Convivio never actually reached the hands of its implied readers, and second, because few readers have historically acknowledged what may be Dante's efforts at the end of Convivio IV to create his own Christian virtue ethics. However, that being said, if we are to consider the fate of the same ideas as re-elaborated in the Commedia, their future becomes a bit brighter. In fact, I would go so far as to suggest that these same ideas, when imbedded in the poetic medium of the Commedia, were far more successful at impacting a Christian readership. How many critics, after all, would attack the representation of Aristotelianism in the Commedia as not being sufficiently Thomistic? We will never know why Dante abandoned his writing of the Convivio when he did; however, it is tempting to suggest that it was in part his understanding of the limitations of the Christian Aristotelianism of the Convivio that might have fueled his treatment of the Ethics in the Commedia.
Appendix 1: Tesoro MSS Tradition

While Sorio (1857), DeVisiani (1869), Sundby/Mussafia (1884)\textsuperscript{377}, and Gaiter (1877) have all worked on the manuscripts, the most recent information on the manuscript tradition of the Tesoro was provided in 2007 by Paolo Squillacioti in La tradizione manoscritta delle opere di Brunetto Latini.\textsuperscript{378} Squillacioti builds upon the work of Carla Mascheroni in I codici del volgarizzamento italiano del Tresor di Brunetto Latini,\textsuperscript{379} considering also that of Julia Bolton Holloway in Brunetto Latini: An Analytic Bibliography\textsuperscript{380}; where he refers to additional texts, they are footnoted below. For the dates of the oldest mss., Squillacioti relies upon S. Bertelli, I manoscritti della letteratura italiana delle Origini;\textsuperscript{381} this is indicated below by the name “Bertelli,” along with the number and the scheda.

Below, I utilize Squillacioti’s method of annotating the mss. Thus, I = incomplete copy and F = fragments or extracts; lacking these indications, the ms. is complete.

\textsuperscript{377} This is not an edition of the Tesoro, but rather an Icelandic version of the Rhetoric that nevertheess contains background information on Brunetto’s life and works. Holloway, in Brunetto Latini, 62; and Emmanuele Testa, in ‘Bibliografie essenziali critiche: BL 1220?-1294,’ Rivista di Sintesi Letteraria, 3 (1938): 79-93, both report that this study is based on Chabaille’s Li Livres dou Tresor par Brunetto Latini, ed. P. Chabaille (Paris: Imprimérie Impériale, 1863).
\textsuperscript{378} Paolo Squillacioti, “La tradizione manoscritta delle opere di Brunetto Latini” in Tresor, XLVII-LIX.
\textsuperscript{381} S. Bertelli, I manoscritti della letteratura italiana delle Origini. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, (Firenze: 2002).
### Tesoro MSS Tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, G 75 sup.; [sec. XIV]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ar</td>
<td>Firenze, Archivio di Stato, Carte Gianni codici 48; [Cibei(^{382}): 1340-1350; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As</td>
<td>Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Ashburnham 540; [sec. XIV]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canonici Italiani 31; [sec. XV]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo, Bo(^{1})</td>
<td>Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, Manoscritti n. 596 (HH) 6/4 (già 2117 bis); [Longobardi(^{383}): sec. XIV s.q.; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br</td>
<td>London, British Library, Addit. 39844; [Bolton: 1425]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigi L. VI. 210; [sec. XIV]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C(^1)</td>
<td>Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Chigi L. VII. 249; [Leonardi(^{384}): sec. XIV primo quarto; manca in Mascheroni]; F.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca</td>
<td>Roma, Biblioteca Casanatense, 1911; [sec. XV]; I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cs</td>
<td>Biblioteca personale di Arrigo Castellani(^{385})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Codice appartenuto a Roberto De Visiani(^{386})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{385}\) Squillacioti’s note: “Del ms, un membranaceo del quarto-quinto decennio del XIV secolo, contenente, oltre a parte del primo libro del Tesoro toscano, un volgarizzamento delle Lettere a Lucio di Seneca, Castellani ha dato notizia nella nota Sull’ origine della forma elsa, in ‘Studi linguistici italiani’, VI della III serie, 2001, pp. 76-77, a p. 76 n. I. Manca in Mascheroni e Bolton.” LI.

D² = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 16; [Bolton\textsuperscript{387}: 1446; manca in Mascheroni]; F

F = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 47; [sec. XV]

F¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 48; [sec. XIV]; I

F² = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 82; [sec. XV]; I

F³ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. VIII. 36; [Bertelli 33: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.]; I

F⁴ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Magl. VIII. 1375; [Bertelli 67: sec. XIV in.]; I

F⁵ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Landau-Finaly 38; [Bertelli 58: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]

F⁶ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Magl. XXIII. 127; [Bertelli 86: 1334; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F

F⁷ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 72; [Bertelli 6: metà sec. XIV; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F

G = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 4; [sec. XIV]; I

G¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 26; [sec. XIV]; I

G² = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 83; [sec. XIV]

L = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 19; [sec. XIV]

L¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 20; [sec. XIV]; I

L² = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 21; [sec. XV]; I

L³ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 22; [sec. XIV]; I

raffrontato con più altri e col testo originale francese da R. De Visiani, Bologna 1869. L’ipotesi che possa coincidere con il ms F⁵, già avanzata da R. Spongano in ‘Studi e problemi di critica testuale’, XXXV, 1987, p. 320, n. 1, e poi da D. Dotto, \textit{Il primo e il terzo libro della versione toscana del \textless\textless Tresor\textgreater\textgreater}, è stata nuovamente presentata da Sandro Bertelli al convegno brunettiano di Basilea del giugno 2006.” LI.

\textsuperscript{387} Holloway, \textit{Bibliography}, 27; in \textit{Twice-Told Tales}, 524 the ms is not given.
L⁴ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 23; [sec. XIV]
L⁵ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, LXXVI 70; [sec. XV]; I
L⁶ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, LXXVI 74; [sec. XV]; I
L⁷ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XC inf. 46; [sec. XIV]; I
M = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, 5035 (già It. II. 53); [sec. XIV]; I
M¹ = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, 6090 (già It. VIII. 26); [manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]
M² = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino 483; [sec. XV]; I
M¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino 585; [sec. XIV]
P¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino 585; [sec. XIV]
P² = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino-Panciatichi 67; [Bertelli 130: sec. XIV in.; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F
R = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2196; [sec. XV]; I
R¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2221; [sec. XIV]
R² = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 818; [De Robertis-Miriello: 1449; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F
R³ = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 1317; [De Robertis-Miriello; 1451; manca in Mascheroni e Bolton]; F
S = San Daniele del Friuli, Biblioteca Comunale, 238; [1368]; I
T = Milano, Biblioteca Trivulziana, 165; [sec. XV]
V = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 3216; [sec. XV]; I
V¹ = Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 5908; [sec. XV]; I

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388 This is the only contemporary MS ascribed to Bono Giamboni. Mussafia, 287; Holloway, Bibliography, 28.
389 Squillacioti’s note: “Segnalato da D. Dotto, Il primo e il terzo libro della versione toscana del ‘Tesor’”.
Versione di Raimondo da Bergamo

Bg = Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, 4910 (già It. II 54); [Beltrami\textsuperscript{392}: secc. XIV ex. o XV in.].

Versione salentina

N = Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, ital. 440; [1459]

Versione siciliana

Pa = Palermo, Biblioteca Comunale, 2-Qq-B-91; [Palumbo\textsuperscript{393}: sec. XV ex.]; F.

Teso versificato

P3 = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino 807

P4 = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Palatino Panciatichi 29

Traduzione di Celio Malaspini

T1 = Torino, Biblioteca Nazionale, ital. LXXXIX, n. IV. 48 [secc. XVII ex. – XVIII in.]\textsuperscript{394}

\textsuperscript{391} Squillacioti’s note: “Segnalato da J. Bolton Holloway, Bibliography, p. 29 (non datato), poi in Twice-Told Tales, p. 527.

\textsuperscript{392} P.G. Beltrami, Tre schede sul Tresor, 182-90.

\textsuperscript{393} P. Palumbo, Versione di alcuni capitoli del Tresor in un manoscritto siciliano (Palermo, 1989), p. 9.

Appendix 2: Editions of Tesoro

Il tesoro. Treviso: Girardo Flandrino, 1474.


Il tesoro. Venice: Marchio Sessa, 1533.

L’Ethica D’Aristotile ridotta / in compendio da ser / Brunetto Latini. Lione: Giovanni de Tornes, 1568.* 395

L’Ethica D’Aristotile. Venice: Occhi, 1750.* 396

Trattato delle quattro virtù cardinali compendiate da ser BL sopra L’etica d’Aristotile. Verona: P. Bisesti, 1837.* [JBH: from Tresor II. ME: n.b. this is not Tesoro but Tresor]


Etica d’Aristotile compendiata da ser BL. Ed. Francesco Berlan. Venice: Società Veneta dei Bibliofili, 1844. [JBH: “From Tresor II. Useful edition.” ME: n.b. this is not Tesoro but Tresor. Still, annotations could be useful to me?]


395*It is unclear why, but the 1568, 1750, and 1837 editions are included by Holloway in Bibliography, 46-48, but not by Beltrami, Squillacioti, Torri, and Vatteroni, in Tresor, L-LII.


Volgarizzamenti del Due e Trecento, a cura di C. Segre, Torino 1953 (capp. 3.73-81, pp. 59-84).


397 Holloway’s note: “Argues in preface that Tesoro and Tesoretto function like Boethius’ Menippian satire and that Tesoretto is the ‘chiave’ of Tesoro (see Giovanni Villani. Istorie fiorentine. Milan: Società tipografica dei classici italiani, 1802-03.) Also maintains that L’etica d’Aristotile, extract from Tesoro, Libro VI (Tresor II), is the work Villani mentions as Libri de’ vizi e delle virtudi (F29). Carmody claims this text is spoiled by attempting to model it on Chabaille. Rev.: 1. Thor Sundby. R, 9 (1880), 469-72.” Bibliography, 50.

398 This edition contains a bestiary and is intended for children. Holloway, Bibliography, 51.

399 A bestiary based on Castilian translation of Tresor. Ibid., 54.
Appendix 3: Mussafia Division of Tesoro MSS Families

Division of MSS is borrowed directly from Mussafia. For reference purposes, I have marked each of these with the letter assigned to them by Squillacioti. Note that Mussafia only considers Florentine MSS, hence the relative brevity of this list.

Prima Famiglia

L = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 19; [sec. XIV]
L² = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XC inf. 46; [sec. XIV]; I
F¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 48; [sec. XIV]; I
F² = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 82; [sec. XV]; I
L² = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 21; [sec. XV]; I
L³ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 22; [sec. XIV]; I
G = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 4; [sec. XIV]; I
G² = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 83; [sec. XIV]
R = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2196; [sec. XV]; I

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400 Mussafia, 2-4.
401 Cf. Appendix 1.
402 Mussafia, 2.
403 Mussafia’s note: “Completo. Corrisponde quasi interamente all’ edizione del quattrocento, giacchè salvo qualche varietà d’ortografia e poche parole diverse è tutto quella.” Ibid.
404 While Squillacioti marks this MS as incomplete, Mussafia marks it as complete. Squillacioti, LI; Mussafia, 2.
405 Notated by Mussafia as Magliabechiano Palch. II, Cod. 48. XV. secolo, 2.
406 Notated by Mussafia as Magliabechiano Palch. II, Cod. 82. XV. secolo. “Codice miscellaneo, che fra altri scritti contiene oltre i primi cinque libri, il 1 capitolo dell’ Etica, e i cap. 30-35 della Retorica.” Ibid.
407 “I primi cinque libri.” Ibid., 3.
408 Notated by Mussafia as Gaddiano Cod. 83. XV. secolo, Ibid.
Seconda Famiglia: Group A

L⁴ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 23; [sec. XIV]⁴⁰⁹

Seconda Famiglia: Group B

F = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 47; [sec. XV]⁴¹⁰

L¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, XLII 20; [sec. XIV]; I⁴¹¹

G¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Gadd. 26; [sec. XIV]; I⁴¹²

F³ = Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. VIII. 36; [Bertelli 33: secc. XIII ex. – XIV in.]; I⁴¹³

Seconda Famiglia: Group C

R¹ = Firenze, Biblioteca Riccardiana, 2221; [sec. XIV]⁴¹⁴


⁴¹² “Concorda pienamente col precedente, salvo qualche aggiunta su Cesare.” Ibid.

Palatino E. 5. 5. 26. XV. secolo.\textsuperscript{415}

\textsuperscript{414} "Ha strettissima affinità col codice Visiani, anche nella grafia e nelle forme della lingua. Mancano quindi i cap. 11 a 18; le aggiunte nel primo libro sono quelle del cod. Visiani; [capitolo di storia ecclesiastica?]; Maometto ed aggiunta storica nel secondo libro; Capitolo di Natura, cui tengono dietro parecchi altri dello stesso argomento. In luogo del libro VII. il liber Constumantiae. Completo." Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{415} "Affine al Riccardiano e quindi al Visiani. Ommette i cap. 11 a 18; ha le stesse aggiunte. Solo un capitolo di Natura. Manca il VII. libro, ed in fine del volume quale appendice il Liber Constumantiae. Completo." Mussafia, 3.
Appendix 4: Marchesi (1903) list of l'Etica MSS

Surviving MSS of Taddeo Alderotti's l'Etica, as provided by Concetto Marchesi in 'Il Compendio volgare dell' Etica aristotelica e le fonti del VI libro del Tresor'. GSLI, 42 (1903), 1-74.

Cod. Ashburnhamiano 955, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Magliabechiano 12. 8. 57, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Magliabechiano A. 2. 3. 2, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Magliabechiano 2. 4. 274, membr. sec. XIV, cc. scr. 44
Cod. Marciano (mss. ital.) II, 3, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Palatino 634, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Riccardiano 1538, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Riccardiano 1651, [vecch. segn. N. IV. 27], membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Riccardiano 1270, membr. sec. XIV
Cod. Ambrosiano C. 21. inf., membr. del sec. XV, di cc. 58
Cod. Laurenziano 89 Sup. 110, membr. sec. XV, di cc. 42
Cod. Laurenziano 76. 70, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 118
Cod. Magliabechiano 2.4.106, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 77
Cod. Magliabechiano 2.2.72, cartac. sec. XV
Cod. Magliabechiano 21.9.90, cartac. sec. XV
Codice Marciano (mss. ital.) II, 134, membr. sec. XV, cc. 64
Codice Marciano (mss. ital.) II, 141, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 48
Cod. Mediceo-Palatino 43, membr. sec. XV, di cc. scr. 54
Cod. Palatino 501, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 44, miscell.

Cod. Palatino 510, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 111, miscell.

Cod. Palatino 729, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 45

Cod. Riccardiano 1084, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 49

Cod. Riccardiano 1357, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 248.

Cod. Riccardiano 2323, sec. XV, di cc. 51

Cod. Riccardiano 1610, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 26

Cod. Riccardiano 1585, cartac. sec. XV, di cc. 69


Cod. Napolitano Nazion. XII. E. 35.
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_____. *Nel mondo di Dante*. Rome, 1944.


_____. “Dante’s Allegory.” *Speculum* 25, 1 (January, 1950): 78-86.


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Medicine, and the University, 1200-1550: Essays in Honour of Pearl Kibrel XX (1976): 105-18.


Sowell, Madison U. “Brunetto’s Tesoro in Dante’s Inferno.” Lectura Dantis 7 (Fall 1990): 60-71.


