

# OPERATION NEW DAWN: RHETORIC OR REAL POLICY CHANGE?

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PREVIEW

# OPERATION NEW DAWN: RHETORIC OR REAL POLICY CHANGE?

by

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THESIS

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## **Abstract**

Scholars have long explored questions concerning presidential foreign policy decision making as well as military performance in conducting operations. Studies have covered a wide variety of topics, including the organizational dynamics of the military bureaucracy, the effectiveness of military operations, how presidential rhetorical strategies influence the public agenda in foreign affairs, and, in turn, how public opinion influences presidential foreign policy decision-making. Despite these advances, there remains a notable gap in the literature with respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military bureaucratic responsiveness. In particular, when presidents use rhetoric to introduce key shifts in foreign policy directives, to what extent can subsequent actions taken by the military reflect real policy change? To date, scholars have yet to thoroughly examine the connection between foreign policy shifts in presidential rhetoric and the extent to which the military is able to effectively transform its operations to meet such executive policy directives.

In this study, I develop a full theoretical framework to explore this relationship and apply it by conducting a case analysis of the 2011 U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn (i.e., the shift from “combat” to “advice and assist” operations). My findings provide a new contribution to the literature on executive-bureaucratic performance and offer new avenues for future studies applicable to scholars, policy makers, and military professionals.

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PREVIEW



# **Chapter 1: Modeling Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Executive Policy**

## **Directives**

Scholars have long explored questions concerning presidential foreign policy decision making as well as military performance in conducting operations. Studies have covered a wide variety of topics, including the organizational dynamics of the military bureaucracy, the effectiveness of military operations, how presidential rhetorical strategies influence the public agenda in foreign affairs, and, in turn, how public opinion influences presidential foreign policy decision-making. Despite these advances, there remains a notable gap in the literature with respect to the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military bureaucratic responsiveness. In particular, when presidents use rhetoric to introduce key shifts in foreign policy directives, to what extent do the subsequent actions taken by the military reflect real policy change? Does the rhetoric of a policy directive match the reality of what occurs on the ground? To date, scholars have yet to thoroughly examine the connection between foreign policy shifts in presidential rhetoric and the extent to which the military is able to be responsive in effectively transforming its operations to meet such executive policy directives.

In this study, I develop a full theoretical framework that evaluates the gap between executive policy directives and bureaucratic outputs (which I refer to as the rhetoric-policy gap), as well as provide a systemic method to identify the extent to which bureaucracies are responsive in meeting such directives. This theoretical framework, titled the Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of Responsiveness (BEAR) Model, is then applied to a case study of the U.S. transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn (i.e., the shift from “combat” to “advice and assist” operations) to demonstrate how the model functions and to provide an

analysis of the case. My findings provide a new contribution to the literature on executive-bureaucratic performance and offer new avenues for future studies applicable to scholars, policy makers, and bureaucratic professionals.

## **1.1 THESIS ROADMAP**

In examining the relationship between presidential foreign policy directives and military bureaucratic outputs, this thesis is divided into six steps: 1) in chapter one, I will first examine the current literature on the executive-bureaucratic relationship, 2) next, I will develop and discuss the theoretical framework used to assess the rhetoric-policy gap and bureaucratic responsiveness, 3) starting chapter two, I will introduce the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to Operation New Dawn (OND) and explain why it was selected for the case study, 4) I will then discuss the pertinent literature specific to military bureaucracies and national security policy, 5) after which I will conduct the case analysis using the BEAR model, 6) and lastly, I will provide an assessment of the model developed. Below I provide greater detail on these six steps and offer the context for the rhetoric-policy gap and the complexities of bureaucratic responsiveness.

### ***Step One: Identifying the Gap in the Literature***

Although scholars have often alluded to the rhetoric-policy gap within a rich and expansive literature on presidential foreign policy decision making, no work to my knowledge has developed a full theoretical framework to directly explore the rhetoric-policy gap. Current research falls on the periphery of the topic and tends to cover varying components of such a gap (which I adopt into my model), focusing mainly on either presidential or bureaucratic performance, which is how I break down my assessment of the literature. Accordingly, I first

examine the literature on presidential power, the decision-making process of executive foreign (and domestic) policy outputs, and the increasing role that the executive has played in using the bureaucracy to meet policy goals. Thereafter, I discuss literature on the bureaucratic-executive relationship, the role of centralization and politicization, the components that make bureaucracies resilient or cooperative, and the current uses of the term “bureaucratic responsiveness.” In each part of this section, I will demonstrate where my contribution falls within this literature.

### ***Step Two: Constructing the Model***

In Section 1.3 of the thesis, I develop the Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of Responsiveness Model<sup>1</sup> (see Figure 1.1 below), and discuss its varying components. While the model is discussed in depth in the aforementioned section, here I provide a more general overview of its components and the terminology that will be referenced throughout the course of the thesis. The BEAR Model provides the theoretical framework that examines two phenomenon: the rhetoric-policy gap and bureaucratic responsiveness to policy directives<sup>2</sup>. The *rhetoric-policy gap* is the difference between an executive’s policy directive and the bureaucracy’s policy output(s). In other words, it is an assessment of whether the rhetoric of what the executive told the bureaucracy to do matches the reality of what actions the bureaucracy performed. Differing from previous research, the relationship between a policy directive and a policy output as proposed here does not examine the decision-making process, which occurs

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<sup>1</sup> Figure 1.1 is provided here for an overview, a full page layout of this model is found in Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> It is important to point out the difference between applying the BEAR Model, and using alternative theoretical frameworks, such as principal-agent theory. While principal-agent theory provides a framework to examine top-down models where a bureaucratic entity is the agent that the executive is directing (which can explain the presidential power node discussed further below), principal-agent theory cannot always capture the terminology and expectations found in a policy directive nor account for the rhetoric-policy gap as it applies to message compatibility (see Section 1.3). As applied here, the BEAR Model builds on and compliments the principal-agent theory framework as it can fill in additional information that would not otherwise be captured. Nevertheless, in other related research contexts, principal-agent theory can explain some phenomenon of bureaucratic responsiveness that the BEAR Model cannot, such that it may be adopted more broadly to complement the framework applied here (see footnote 42 below).

## Bureaucratic-Executive Assessment of Responsiveness (BEAR) Model




Figure 1.1: The BEAR Model

prior to an executive giving a policy directive, nor does it provide a method to assess the success of such policy output, which is an examination between the policy output itself and the desired result of such policy.<sup>3</sup> Instead, this model focuses on the actual policy directive given to the bureaucracy by the executive and the action(s) that the bureaucracy performed.

If one is looking only to assess the rhetoric-policy gap, a researcher or policy maker can use the criteria disused in Section 1.3 to examine the relationship between “Policy Directive” and “Policy Output” in Figure 1.1. To develop an assessment of the expected levels of the rhetoric-policy gap, one can use the complete model. The complete model includes a consideration for the key conditions that may contribute to (and thereby increase) the rhetoric-policy gap from the time a president sets out a directive (which itself includes an initial or baseline gap between what

<sup>3</sup> While this model is not directly employed to assess the elements of developing policy directives and the results of policy outputs, these are certainly important components to unraveling the bureaucratic-executive relationship and merit further consideration in future studies. For example, the success or failure of a policy output is not examined within the context of the model, as the BEAR Model focuses on what the output was in relation to the policy directive (i.e., whether the output matched what the president requested). Assessments of success and failure lend themselves to decision-making and principle-agent models where actors can assess if the output had the desired effect based on their goals and utility functions, and then determine whether or not to issue a new directive, or maintain the current one.

the president is proposing<sup>4</sup> and the general expected policy output) to the point where policy output(s) may be observed once the bureaucracy has acted, a part of the process I refer to as the *distortion effect*.<sup>5</sup> Such conditions are primarily driven by the level of presidential power, the compatibility of the message, and resiliency of the bureaucracy.<sup>6</sup> For example, if a bureaucracy seeks to intervene by resisting the policy directive given by the executive, one would expect a greater level of distortion between the policy directive and policy output. Likewise, a bureaucracy may actively seek to meet the policy directive, where the extent that a bureaucracy seeks to meet a policy directive is how in this thesis I use the term *bureaucratic responsiveness*.<sup>7</sup> Section 1.3 offers a full discussion of each of these components and concludes with the applicability of the model to future research.

### ***Steps Three to Six: Testing and Evaluating the Model***

Upon the development of the model, Chapter 2 of this thesis looks the test the model in the case of the transition from Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn. This task begins in Section 2.1 where I explain why the OIF to OND transition serves as a *best-test case*<sup>8</sup> for the BEAR Model due to the clarity of the policy directive, the identification of a completed

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<sup>4</sup> I focus mainly on the explicit words provided by the president within a given directive rather than attempting to investigate or speculate about presidential intent, which may at times differ from the president's stated intentions. It is appropriate to focus on the former as it constitutes the measure by which presidents are mainly appraised by outside observers, including the media, the public, and other Washingtonians.

<sup>5</sup> The distortion effect, discussed in depth later, includes *intended distortions*, which are a result of bureaucratic resiliency and presidential power, and *unintended distortions* which may be a product of message compatibility.

<sup>6</sup> External factors can also play a pivotal role in the distortion effect depending on the case-selected for study. This BEAR Model is constructed to examine the transition from OIF to OND where the effects of external factors are limited (see Section 2.1 for a discussion on why this is the case).

<sup>7</sup> Bureaucratic responsiveness has been operationalized to examine different relationships in previous research, see Section 1.2 for a discussion of the concept's previous uses and why this is the definition used in the BEAR model.

<sup>8</sup> By best test case, I mean to say a case for which the applicability and utility of the BEAR model is particularly high, thereby providing an opportunity to clearly outline the manner in which the BEAR model may be applied to its maximum potential. In conducting such a case analysis, I also make sure to point out and explain when and how distortion can occur, even when conditions are ideally suited for maximum bureaucratic responsiveness. See Section 1.2 for a full discussion.

policy output, and the limited effects of external factors distorting the rhetoric-policy gap. Next, in Section 2.2, I break down the literature that is pertinent for such case on foreign policy directives and military bureaucratic responsiveness, including with respect to research on national security policy development, the organizational-dynamics of the military bureaucracy, and the president-military relationship. In Section 2.3, I conduct a case analysis using the BEAR model, which primarily identifies the components of the model, as well as the implementation process for employing the model.

In the conclusion of the thesis, found in Section 2.4, I discuss the utility of the BEAR Model in the case analysis and propose future avenues of research. In the particular case of the transition from OIF to OND, I find that the policy directive was clear, bureaucratic responsiveness was high, and the rhetoric-policy gap was narrow as the distortion effect was primarily a product of message compatibility. While data limitations existed within the case study, the BEAR Model provided an adequate framework to assess the relationship between presidential foreign policy objectives and military bureaucratic responsiveness.

## **1.2 THE EXECUTIVE-BUREAUCRATIC RELATIONSHIP**

While the rhetoric-policy gap has only been alluded to in previous works, many components of the BEAR Model have connections with existing research. The model itself formalizes and links the concepts found in research areas related to public-administration, presidential, communication, and bureaucratic performance. Considering the breadth and richness of research in these fields, I divide the applicable literature used in this theoretical framework into three sections: (1) the role presidential power plays in the policy process, (2) the decision-making process of policy directives, and, lastly, (3) how bureaucratic performance and responsiveness are assessed.

### 1.2.1 Presidential Power and the Policy Process

As the concept of the presidential power is central to the study of the American political system, it is a topic that has been well studied and is often the subject of much debate, particularly in the realm of determining (1) what presidential power is and (2) the effectiveness of such power. As the BEAR model adopts a top-down approach<sup>9</sup> to the policy implementation process, I adopt the operationalization of presidential power vis-à-vis Neustadt's (1960, 1990) power as persuasion thesis, making the case that this method provides the greatest utility when assessing the bureaucratic-executive relationship. In this section, I will discuss how I define presidential power, how it has been expanding, and the role such power plays in directing bureaucratic agencies.

#### *What is Presidential Power?*

The summer before his victory in the 1952 presidential election, General Dwight Eisenhower, with his military background which encompassed his ability to order soldiers to execute and follow orders, was in for a rude awakening. Speculating on how Eisenhower would adjust to the presidency, then-President Truman reportedly stipulated that "He'll sit here and he'll say, 'Do this! Do that!' *And nothing will happen.* Poor Ike—it won't be a bit like the Army. He'll find it very frustrating" (Neustadt 1960, 1990).

The Truman perspective on presidential power limitations was famously noted and expanded upon by Neustadt (1960, 1990) who argued that the president's political power should be examined beyond the context of legal and institutional frameworks because the president operates in an environment where there are numerous independent actors and structural power

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<sup>9</sup> The top down approach is based on the starting point of analysis, where in the BEAR Model, the assessment begins when the president provides a policy directive to the bureaucracy which must then be executed. This is different than bottom up models which deal with the president responding to public demand or the bureaucracy seeking to influence presidential decision-making.

bases that can limit the executive's capabilities (see also Edwards 2000, 2009). Therein, Neustadt emphasizes that presidential power centers on a president's ability to persuade the public, Congress, other key Washingtonians, or bureaucratic actors as a means to achieve the president's policy goals. The study of presidential power using this thesis revolves around studying the strategies, tactics, and options available to a president to generate certain policy and political actions. In this regard, it is necessary to assess (1) whether the president is inherently weak or strong (based on formal mandates, public opinion, the composition of Congress, etc.), (2) the type of bargaining options available to him (such as veto power), and (3) presidential power projections and limitations (such as utilizing a formalized process).

The difficulty with utilizing Neustadt's power approach is twofold. First, it "specifies little about how to measure concepts, test propositions, or analyze data" (Edwards 2000). Second, the approach tends to emphasize actions and decisions made by a president from that of the president's perspective, which in turn, tends to neglect other elements of the political system such as the state of the economy, the mood of the electorate, and Washington politics (Miroff 1980). Additional concerns arise over Neustadt's view that leadership is based on a president's ability to bargain, whether in the context of "what is leadership" or in the components that make up bargaining (See Hargrove 2001 for a full discussion).

These criticisms notwithstanding, Neustadt's approach is ideally suited for the BEAR Model as it is a top down model, where criticisms of the method emphasizing the presidential perspective (Miroff, 1980) actually compliment the model as the directive is given from the president and bureaucratic responsiveness is evaluated from such directive. Secondly, I consider



a president's executive administrative authority<sup>10</sup> to direct bureaucracies by determining if any gap exists between policy directives and bureaucratic output and assessing the extent to which the president is able to move the bureaucracy to carry out such directives.

### ***Presidents Directing Bureaucracies***

Beyond the Neustadt view that presidential power is the power to persuade, presidential power has been seen as expanding in both an administrative and legal context. Laying out eleven factors on how presidential power inevitably expands, including constitutional indeterminacy and precedential effects of executive action, Marshall (2008) notes that part of the expansion of presidential power is directly related to the expanding federal administrative bureaucracy and, subsequently, how presidents have tried to control it.

The expanding bureaucracy has presented a dilemma for presidents as bureaucracies have historically enjoyed a considerable amount of immunity from congressional, judicial, and executive control, either as a result of indifference, information asymmetry, or lack of constitutional clarity (see Benze 1985). This is amplified by the debate of “who controls the bureaucracy,” between the competing parties of bureaucracy itself, the executive, and Congress.<sup>11</sup> The executive-bureaucratic relationship in particular has traditionally suffered from constitutional ambiguity with regards to executive authority and a lack of institutional controls which provides the bureaucracy “‘escape routes’ from presidential control” (Benze 1985, 773).

Even with these limitations, studies have shown that presidents have found ways to influence and control bureaucratic institutions. Notably, most studies on presidential control of bureaucratic institutions center on the specific constitutional constructs of the institution itself

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<sup>10</sup> By executive administrative authority, I refer to the president's authority to direct bureaucrats within the framework of the law, and regulatory authority as the generation of binding laws, a power derived from Congress, which has also been called legislative control (see Rudalevige 2009).

<sup>11</sup> See Hammond and Knott (1996) for a discussion on role that these actors play in bureaucratic control.

and the delegated powers provided through presidential appointments. Moe (1985) laid the groundwork for exploring presidential control of bureaucracies vis-à-vis *centralization*, or the process by which bureaucratic policy development and decision making occurs under the Executive Office of the President (EOP)—either in close proximity to (or directly within) the White House, and *politicization*, for which presidents employ their appointment powers to place political appointees in the outer executive bureaucracy. Studies on politicization tend to focus on the process of political appointments, its effects on the bureaucratic makeup, and the effectiveness of these politicized institutions where, for example, politicization can streamline bureaucratic efficiency and political appointments can also be used as a tool of presidential power in bargaining (Lewis, 2008). Centralization on the other hand, tends to be a structural change of control and has been shown to fluctuate over time and by policy issue, despite previous research indicating that centralization has increased over time (Rudalevige, 2002). Further, current research seems to indicate that centralization and politicization are not complimentary methods, but are substitutes in presidential strategy, a finding which has been difficult to identify because of the complexity in measuring the concepts directly (Rudalevige and Lewis, 2005). Though the BEAR Model adopts some components of this literature, many of the complications noted in past works can be avoided in applying the model by virtue of its focus on examining specific policy directives. For example, concerns raised by (Rudalevige, 2002) on fluctuations of centralization by policy issue over time are not as pertinent when employing the BEAR Model, which examines a particular policy over a period of time, rather than tracking the total effects of centralization on a bureaucratic organization. Similarly, while the politicization of a particular agency through appointments changes over time (see Rudalevige and Lewis

2005), there is minimal variation in such politicization within the bureaucratic agencies over these periods since the BEAR Model is used for cases studies.

Despite the mixed effects seen in studies of politicization and centralization, and even with the long tradition of bureaucratic immunity, recent literature suggests that presidents have increasingly found new methods to utilize their administrative authority over bureaucracies to advance presidential policy objectives. Utilizing more extreme measures of centralization and politicization, administrations have taken steps to replace or develop new bureaucratic agencies, exercised greater control over the budgetary process, and relocated more of the bureaucratic processes within the EOP.<sup>12</sup> As Kagan (2000) explains, using much of the framework laid out by President Reagan, the control of the federal administrative bureaucracy expanded significantly under the Clinton White House as it issued formal directives to the bureaucracy, delivered executive orders on bureaucratic practices, mandated and or limited specific reporting of the actions taken by agencies, and increased budgetary control through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). In this regard, the constitutional ambiguity alluded to by Marshall (2008) provides a grey area where presidents can administratively seek to increase their control of bureaucratic agencies, a trend that continued under the George W. Bush White House.<sup>13</sup> This significant shift of presidential control amplifies the necessity to have an effective measure to examine the rhetoric-policy gap as it provides a mechanism for the public, media, Congress, and even the EOP and the bureaucracies to be able to assess the degree of distortion that occurs when an agency attempting to meet a particular policy objective.

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<sup>12</sup> See Robert Maranto's (1993) analysis of President Reagan's relationship with the bureaucracy for examples of these mechanisms in use, such as in employing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and utilizing the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to control the budgetary process, or in examining President Kennedy's creation of the Peace Corps to circumvent the State Department in seeking out specific foreign policy ambitions.

<sup>13</sup> Refer back to the Marshall (2008) article on expanding presidential power.

### 1.2.2 Executive Decision Making

Before examining bureaucratic responsiveness to executive policy directives, it is important to first unravel the components that make up such presidential policy objectives. Presidential policy directives are developed through the decision-making process, which scholars have examined at the psychological, individual, group, and structural levels. Further, a significant amount of research has focused on the actors who seek to influence executive decision making, including the media, the public, interest groups, Congress, and bureaucrats.<sup>14</sup> In this section, I first examine characteristics of the decision making process relevant to this research before moving specifically to the bureaucratic-executive relationship where Allison's (1964, 1999) seminal work plays a significant role in the development of the BEAR Model.

#### *Unraveling the Decision Making Process*

The different pieces that make up decision making scholarship can be broadly placed into three categories, identifying the decision itself, the models of the actors involved, and the framework that actors operate in.<sup>15</sup> While identifying a decision would appear to be relatively straightforward, Langley et al. (1995) demonstrated the complexities of the topic as decisions can vary depending on where the decision is made, if it is verbal or written, the nature of the intent of such decision, and in the characteristic of a decision itself (e.g., is a decision a decision if no subsequent actions are taken to its announcement?). While a full discussion on identifying decisions (policy directives) is found in Section 1.3, suffice to say, in the BEAR Model context, decisions are the actual terms and words provided by the executive in the form of speeches,

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<sup>14</sup> Pertinent literature on third party actors influencing executive decision making is found in the discussion of the model itself in Section 1.3.

<sup>15</sup> It should be noted that much of the terminology and theories found in the political science literature on decision making is borrowed heavily from social psychology and economics, for which terms such as “bound-rationality” and “utility” are adopted and applied in a political context.

written mandates, or executive orders, and the intent behind such directives are irrelevant in the application of the Model.

Moving to a discussion of key actors and the framework they operate in, much of the scholarship has circled around whether the individuals or the operating environment are the primary forces which drive decisions. In the “three waves” of scholarship on the subject (see Art 1973; Farnham 1990), the first and third waves focused on individual actors calculating to ensure their best outcome could be attained given the political context that the actors operated in.<sup>16</sup> This was done initially through examining individual beliefs in their utility functions (broadly called rational choice theory), and later in a psychological perspective adopting the cognitive research program (Farnham, 1990). Recent attempts have even been made to try and bridge the rational choice and cognitive models through poliheuristic theory (e.g., Mintz 2004). While the role of the individual is important in the context of Neustadt’s (1960, 1990) view of presidential power, the BEAR model itself is more closely connected to the “second wave”, where the emphasis of analysis lies more on the political system itself. In this perspective, the structure that the actors operate in is considered a better predictor than the actors themselves as the structure sets the “roles” that each of the actors plays (Farnham, 1990). One of the bigger names of the second wave, Graham Allison (1964, 1999), identified key types of operating structures that influence decision-making.

### ***Bureaucratic Inputs in Presidential Decision-Making***

Graham Allison’s (1964, 1999) seminal work sought to identify the process under which executive-bureaucratic decision-making occurs and addressed some of the key components that make up the interaction between the executive branch and bureaucratic agencies. Allison

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<sup>16</sup> See Huntington (1961) and Neustadt (1960, 1990) and Stein and Tanter (1980) for examples of such literature.

developed three models of analysis which he then applied to the decision-making that occurred during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. This included Allison's primary and widely employed rational actor model (or rational policy model), as well as the secondary alternative models: the organizational process model and bureaucratic politics model. The rational policy model has broad applicability for assessing actions taken by nation-states and demonstrates that actions are taken based on state-level outputs as actors seek to maximize utility in their decision making.

Along with the rational policy model, Allison's other two models further provide a foundation towards developing a full framework of bureaucratic responsiveness to executive policy shifts. First, the bureaucratic politics model posits that a bureaucracy is not an unconscious entity that simply executes policy objectives, but rather a conglomeration of individuals in critical administrative positions who take part in a bargaining game and have their own perceptions, priorities, and goals. In this model, it is important to note that presidential administrations are also bargaining with the public. According to Allison, in responding to the public's desire for positive slogans, the Kennedy administration sought to clearly distinguish the differences between offensive and defensive weapons. My model formalizes this relationship by acknowledging that with public pressures on the president, an administration must seek from bureaucratic entities a clarification of its proposed policy initiatives to ensure that an administration can meet its goals in line with public demands. Simply put, the president will rely on bureaucratic agencies to adapt to the rhetoric of the administration, regardless of any differences between how intent or able the agency actors may be to immediately (and substantively) respond to the president's policy directives, how long substantive implementation of the initiative may actually take, or the extent to which such implementation may fall in line with public expectations.

Allison's second model posits that the president is in charge of loosely allied organizations. Here, a clearer view develops of how bureaucracies can constrain foreign policy options. Identified as the organizational process model, decisions made by an administration trigger organizational routines based on pre-existing procedures and practices, and are limited based on the capacities of such bureaucracies. Organizations typically formalize these procedures through the use of standard operating procedures (SOPs), which determine how an organization may effectively execute those tasks as actions and whether they are completed simultaneously or sequentially throughout the bureaucracy to ensure that goals are met. This doctrine of the organization is shaped by elements such as the allocation of resources, the statutory authority, the culture of the organization, the process of internal bargaining, and the institutional history which makes bureaucracies rigid and typically slow to adjust to rapid policy shifts. Additionally, these factors also influence the bureaucracy's ability to meet policy objectives and helps one determine how the organization views the measure of success or failure in meeting those goals. Within a communicative context, additional disturbances can arise, as in the case of the naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis where President Kennedy's view of the attributes of a blockade were different from that of the Navy, which generated a different result than what the Kennedy administration had intended.<sup>17</sup>

While Allison focused on how bureaucratic outputs affected presidential decision-making, my model will assess how bureaucratic resiliency and capacity outputs affect the bureaucracy's ability to meet policy directives once the president has directed a change by adopting the identified element of doctrine, SOPs, culture, and/or communicative disturbances.

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<sup>17</sup> The difference between the views of the executive and the bureaucracy on definition and concepts associated with particular terms is part of the distortion effect, specifically unintended distortion, or the distortion that occurs as a result of message incompatibility. See a further discussion in Section 1.3.

### **1.2.3 Bureaucratic Performance and Responsiveness**

Assessments of bureaucratic performance and responsiveness have varied with regards to how scholars operationalize responsiveness, where the performance of the agency is based on whom or what the agency is responding to. As Grace Saltzstein (1992) points out, despite the increase of academic literature on the topic in reaction to presidential administrations having a more direct role in controlling bureaucracies, there remains little consensus in the field on the conceptualization or measuring of responsiveness, as well as in the theoretical components that map out the relationship between the prominent actors involved.

Broadly speaking, the varying scholarly conceptualizations of bureaucratic responsiveness fall in relation to disagreements on the degree of independence that a bureaucracy has and whether such agencies should be responsive to the public directly or to the state. For example, in the public perspective, bureaucracies functioning within a democratic form of government are argued to be responsive to the wishes of the public, either directly, or through the directions given to the bureaucracy by elected officials. In this way, bureaucratic outputs should respond the demands of the public, or the “consumer,” which can be measured by the level of satisfaction that the public has of the output.<sup>18</sup> This perspective differs from the state centric view where bureaucracies are argued to be simply extensions (or “agents”) of the state itself, where bureaucratic performance is more directly associated with the ability of the agency to fulfill its mission rather than the preferences of the public or elected officials (Saltzstein, 1992). Variations of each of these perspectives is based on the level of autonomy that the bureaucracy itself is considered to have, such that a finding that a bureaucratic entity is “responding to the public” may in fact be the result of the bureaucracy’s own internal values or its composition

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<sup>18</sup> See Sharp (1981) and Ostrom (1975) for examples of bureaucracies responsiveness to public demands.