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PREVIEW

SALVE REGINA UNIVERSITY

**HAITIAN CRISIS 1991-1994: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SHIFT
IN U.S. 21st CENTURY FOREIGN POLICY**

**A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE HUMANITIES PROGRAM OF THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMANITIES**

BY

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
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
This dissertation, written under the direction of the candidate's dissertation committee and approved by the members of the committee, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Salve Regina University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Humanities.


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ABSTRACT

The premise of this study is that the 1991-1994 crisis of Haiti following the end of the Cold War can be viewed as a catalyst for change in the focus of 21st century U.S. foreign policy. This policy shifted from selective commitments and conservative interpretations of national interests to broad commitments and globalized applications of national values.

The 1991-1994 Haitian crisis challenged an evident preference of the U.S. to develop into an authoritative, yet detached, spokesman for democracy. In seeking to limit its national and international roles to this former approach, the U.S. essentially achieved national policy disequilibrium based on a myopic view of foreign affairs. Much as it tried during the Cold War, the U.S. could not escape her global responsibility. In fact, because of the moral and political issues raised by the 1991-1994 crisis in Haiti, American foreign policy is evolving into increased globalism, however reluctantly and contrary to its early history of isolationism.

This new involvement with Haiti revealed unique cultural, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics to U.S. governmental officials and to an informed public. What is critical is that the 1991-1994 Haitian crisis occurred in the post-Cold War era. This crisis intersected with U.S. national introspection, a reemergent neo-isolationism, and an awakening sense of an "America first" domestic policy. While not forced to act there in the name of national security, the U.S. had not yet developed a leadership role beyond that of military defense against the threat of communism. In sum, Haiti's crisis took place while the U.S. was attempting to define its future national identity and

policies. Thus, Haiti, a third world nation seeking democracy, and a relatively minor country compared to other global entities, has served as a catalyst for a more humane U.S. foreign policy.

The 1994 U.S. military intervention in Haiti tested contemporary U.S. foreign policy. President Clinton, who applied his post-Cold War attention to developing a 21st century strategy, called for a revised foreign policy of “engagement and enlargement.” The U.S. military, long accustomed to a Cold War mind set typified by the expression “we do only the big ones,” was asked to pursue specific humanitarian objectives. Haiti thus presented a challenge to an entrenched foreign policy in requiring a new commitment to the strategic objective of democratization. In short, tiny Haiti helped modify the post-Cold War foreign policy of the United States. As a result, the 1994 military intervention of U.S. force in Haiti in pursuit of democratic principles is evidence of a shift in U.S. national security policies.

Based on historical research, examination of official documents, and interviews with scholarly experts, this study investigates the human implications of advanced technology, including political technology. It reviews the historical ties of the U.S. to Haiti, addresses the current socio-economic challenges there, examines immigration policies, and suggests crucial considerations in developing an effective ongoing U.S. foreign policy toward Haiti. It concludes with an assessment of options available to the U.S. that support the pivotal democratization of this small West Indian nation.

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PREVIEW

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Political power is now in the hands of technological structures” (Ellul)

This dissertation examines U.S. foreign policy with Haiti as a symbol of America's changing focuses in post-Cold War policy. In considering her history, current problems, and future needs, Haiti can be examined as a country open to the possibilities of receiving the benefits of a U.S. foreign policy based on a balance of technology, ethics, pragmatism and global leadership responsibilities. To demonstrate this thesis, key factors will be examined: early U.S. relations with Haiti and their effect on current relations; how Haiti's internal problems challenged Washington to establish a productive and stable foreign policy toward Haiti; and the national responsibilities of the United States as the world's leading superpower.

U.S. Political Power and Haiti

The colonial history of Haiti had left the people ill-adapted to thrive in the modern, fast-paced commercial world. Although independent for almost two centuries, Haiti lacked the natural resources, the trained manpower, and the sound government to maintain full economic strength and social progress. As with other small neighboring nations in this century, Haiti fell under the economic and political hegemony of the United States, which, driven by its concern for the defense of the hemisphere and the advantages of trade, extended her powerful technological

influence--political, military, and economic--southward to the Caribbean and Central America. When the 1991-1994 events in Haiti reached a crisis, the U.S. first offered the standard response of a military invasion, but the question remains, "What about the long-term consequences for these poor people?"

In demonstrating this power, was the United States engaging in neocolonialism, as her enemies charged, or was this an altruistic plan based on helping other countries -- as described in the various contemporary U.S. "good neighbor" policies? To understand American motivation and goals in this area, it is necessary to have a clear comprehension of the nature of the technological imperatives that have spurred these policies -- the determinants that have brought the U.S. to the rank of superpower in the second half of this century.

The Haitian Crisis occurred at a time when the U.S. had emerged from the Cold War as a military and economic leader but more importantly as "leader in technology." The U.S. gained her technological advantage from Cold War investments and America's open society. For instance, the U.S. has a major advantage of knowledge in its information technology. It is dominant in communication and information-processing technologies, space-based surveillance, direct broadcasting, high speed computers and the ability to integrate complex information systems (Nye and Owens 1996, 21).

As the U.S. adapts to her new role as "world leader," countries that would hardly get noticed will become recipients of the paradigm shift by which the U.S. becomes more actively involved in the development of democracy and the prevention

of human rights violations. Thus, technologies used to gain political and military advantage will have to be redirected to meet more humane political and social goals, which at the same time are consistent with U.S. domestic purposes.

With these goals as the primary focus of the U.S. technological advantages, new methods and a clearer understanding of U.S. capabilities must be addressed when developing foreign policy. The usual strategies of military intervention and financial assistance will have to be replaced with a strategy that uses technology--particularly political technology--to strengthen a country's combined social, political, and economic resolve to establish democracy.

As scholars like Albert Borgmann, Jacques Ellul, Andrew Feenburg, John K. Galbraith, Carl Mitcham, and Witold Rybczynski show, advanced technology differs in meaning based on the circumstances or problems encountered. For example:

- Technology as applied science leading to military and industrial power. This is only one meaning of the term, and a limited one at that (Galbraith 1985, xxxiii).
- Technology as knowledge, volition, process or activity, and products or artifacts (Mitcham 1994, 160).
- Technology as an ideology (Feenburg and Hannay 1995, 1-61).
- Technology as political process (Borgmann 1984, 107-108).
- Technology as government strategy for social problems (Ellul 1980, 1-20).
- Technology as any organized system, based on a theoretical premise, that purports to improve the lot of mankind (Rybczynski 1983, 197-198).

Thus, U.S. post-Cold War policy toward Third World nations like Haiti may

appropriately be viewed as a form of advanced American political technology.

Haiti is not a military or industrial power and communism is no longer an issue. U.S. Government political systems and commercial trade policies, however, are particularly relevant, and these, considered as technologies, deserve particular emphasis. If the abstract theories behind these political or commercial technologies are applied to Haiti simply to serve U.S. interests and without regard to Haiti's severe human problems, then again we witness the negative influence of modern technology on Third-World cultures and economies.

In applying its technology toward Haiti, the United States should develop a more humane policy by curbing narrow exploitation from abroad, by fostering democracy, and by providing technology that is suitable to the region. This approach, often called the application of "appropriate technology," is beginning to be taken seriously by Washington in dealing with other nations. With thoughtful application of such technology, the chances for promoting and maintaining democratic reforms abroad would have a far greater chance of success.

Technology's Role in U.S. Foreign Policy

The focus of this study, which examines the human implications of advanced technology, is that post-Cold War U.S. political technology toward other nations has undergone significant change, if not a paradigm shift. In this investigation of U.S. policy toward Haiti, technology may be defined as "the systematic application of scientific or other organized knowledge to practical tasks" (Galbraith 1985, 12). For Rybczynski technology is any organized system, based on a theoretical premise, that

purports to improve the lot of humankind (1983, 197-198). Similarly, Lubomir Gleiman views technology broadly as "the organization and institutionalization of knowledge, with capital, for practical purposes" (Gleiman 1992, 26). These operative definitions parallel those of such writers as Ellul, Langdon Winner, and Emmanuel Mesthene, other authors extensively studied in this humanities program. Based on these perspectives, U.S. decision-making mechanisms that use historic knowledge and tested strategies (the basis being to contain communism) in reacting to crises can be termed political technology. Following Galbraith, Rybczynski, Szylowicz, and others, the practical, humane purposes are clear. Each notes the need to control or impose limitations on technology, which by its very nature has inherent problems, providing a significantly nuanced technological role in the development of foreign policy. Haiti is an example of how advanced technology, though readily available, can be misapplied to an entire country, unless that technology is appropriate.

The growing view that technology is autonomous, that technology follows its own course, would lead one to expect that Third World countries rarely lacked basic technology. Advanced technology, however, is another issue. Like Rybczynski, Winner, Ellul, and others, John Kenneth Galbraith, in The New Industrial State, warns of the "imperatives and compulsions" of technology, which not only cause change but are also the result of change (Galbraith 1985, 20).

Langdon Winner, author of Autonomous Technology: Technics out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (1977), also treats this issue in "Techné and Politeia: The Technical Constitution of Society." In this essay, Winner traces the roots of

political technology to Plato's view that statecraft is a techné, one of the practical arts (Laws, 7.803b, translated by A. E. Taylor, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 1961, 1374). Winner explains that in Plato's interpretation, "the analogy between technology and politics works in one direction only: techné serves as a model for politics and not the other way around" (Winner cited in Hickman 1990, 399-400).

Jacques Ellul, Langdon Winner, Ivan Illich, and others examine the theme of an political technology that becomes autonomous. Concluding that technology has developed its own world, Ellul says, "Technology has fashioned an omnivorous world which obeys its own laws and which has renounced all tradition" (Ellul 1964, 14). Ellul does not have confidence in national politics or foreign policy to answer political questions in a truly humane way because he views both national policy and foreign policy as controlled by technique. Technique, he contends, serves as "a rationalizing mechanism" for justifying political purposes:

The political doctrine of today is a rationalizing mechanism for justifying the state and its actions....The role of [political] doctrines is fixed with precision by political techniques, and since nothing else can stem the tide of history or of techniques, there is no room for the supposition that political doctrines will change in the near future (Ellul 1964, 282-283).

During the Cold War, political technology meant reacting to outside influences as they affected U.S. (or U.S.S.R.) ability to counter national security threats. More broadly stated, such a policy is explained by Ellul's analysis of "technique," which he defines as "the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity" (1964, xxv).

The necessity to adapt U.S. policy to the changes in the world is emphasized further when Ellul talks about technique and political doctrine, especially when trying to apply the doctrine of traditional democracy (the rights of man, equality, the clash between power and liberty) in Haiti.

It is this technology which will have to be modified to include a more humanistic approach when developing 21st century policy. Haiti underscores the necessity of considering humanitarian values when applying technology to the process of political, economic, and social change. The question, then, is, "Which kinds of technology does Haiti need?"

In studying the relationship of the U.S. and Haiti, one can conclude that the major factor that controls the leadership of a country is that of power: power over technology and people. Throughout its history, unfortunately, technology in Haiti all too often has been applied or ignored for the selfish aims of its leaders instead of the improvement of the lives of the Haitian people. Further, the application of U.S. technology to Haiti has often been one-sided.

During the Cold War, a main focus of U.S. political technology was on weapons of destruction. Most foreign policy decisions related to the use of technology were directly influenced by threats to our national security. The possibility of mass destruction, devastation to the environment, and other negative aspects of advanced technology led to the conclusion that technology, if left self-directed, could overwhelm mankind. Only value-based views and relations with other countries could avert ill-advised use of political, military, or economic technology.

The U.S./Haiti relationship becomes more relevant today as we examine the role that human values play in the development of foreign policy, which Ellul, Winner, and others regard as a form of political technology. If left to develop on its own, based on the concept of autonomy, unguided technology would miss the mark. When developing a post Cold War relationship with Haiti, U.S. policy makers must understand that consideration of humanitarian values will be necessary in applying technology to the process of political, economic, and social change needed in that island nation. This study demonstrates the appropriate application of technology in Haiti where traditional factors, historical, political, and economic, would best shape the relationship between the U.S. and Haiti.

As a world power utilizing numerous forms of technology, the U.S. must focus its national resolve on her social responsibilities and recognize that the application of technology will have far-reaching global implications. The end of the Cold War brings with it the opportunity to explore more humanistic uses of technology directed toward improving the quality of life for those countries not possessing this technology. This can be done under the general guise of humanitarianism and, as in the case of Haiti, the promotion of democracy.

This assessment of Haiti points out that, without a directed humanitarian aim, the advantages of technology can easily be misapplied. "Directed" means with an understanding of technology's role in political decision-making. Specifically, how should the U.S. employ those elements of technology, whether physical devices, policies, or techniques, to derive the most good for most people? An examination of

Haiti today reveals a poor country in which numerous forms of technology are missing and that the U.S. is fully capable of providing. Thus the role of the U.S. in Haiti's economic and democratic development will be significant. Galbraith explains the need for a major U.S. role when he points out that "technology and the associated commitment of time are coupled...with large requirements for capital...matched in the modern economy by an equal and, on occasion, even greater capacity to provide it" (Galbraith 1985, 36).

While the U.S. embarks on examining her role in the development of democracy in Haiti through various kinds of technological assistance, history provides U.S. policy makers with many examples of the crucial roles of technology. According to recent commentators, "One of the ironies of the twentieth century is that Marxist theorists, as well as their critics, such as George Orwell, correctly noted that technological developments can profoundly shape societies and governments, but both groups misconstrued how" (Nye and Owens 1996, 21). Information technology is one example of a political technology that increases power through knowledge. One of the driving factors in the changes which occurred in the Soviet Union, for example, was that Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders understood that the Soviet economy could not advance from the extensive, or industrial, to the intensive, or post-industrial stage of development unless they loosened constraints on everything from computers to copying machines -- technologies that can also disseminate diverse political ideas (Nye and Owens 1996, 29-30).

A critical factor in regard to Haiti's development was the relationship of technology to slavery (Winner 1977, 20). This development will be studied in Chapter 3 as significant for U.S.-Haiti relations. As Dyksterhuis notes in a view that applies equally to Haiti, early Greek historians felt that ancient technology never developed to its full potential because of the institution of slavery, where the need for machinery became less important because of the ownership of slaves (Dyksterhuis 1961, 74). In Aristotle's Politics, the property owner's access to the world was through the instruments at his disposal, whether slaves or machines. Once these means become interchangeable, the machine becomes expendable (Baker 1958, 10).

The nearly two centuries of ties between the U.S. and Haiti suggest that examining technological development in relation to nature is also important. The U.S. has been able to control her natural resources while continuing to develop technologies in areas that preserve nature. More appropriately stated, she controls her natural resources in order to improve the overall quality of life. Conversely in Haiti, technology was imported to take advantage of its natural resources, but the country stopped short of developing the technology that would prevent the exploitation or destruction of these same resources. As noted above, contemporary critics such as Kenneth Galbraith, Langdon Winner, and Jacques Ellul focused their studies precisely on the power of technology and its human costs.

For the U.S. and other Western powers, politics and technology are intertwined. The focus of this technology is decided by leaders who understand the power of technology. This connection has not always been recognized. For some writers,

there was a clear division between technology, science, and politics. For example, in the 17th century, Frances Bacon argued that the benefits created by the application of science through technology would create greater benefits for a longer period of time than advantages that were political in nature. Bacon discussed man's ambitions in three groups. The first includes those who desire to extend their own power in their native country; the second means those who labor to extend the power of their country and its dominion over men; and the third group attempts to extend the power and dominion of the human race over the universe (Bacon 1955, 499). While the first two human goals are described by Bacon as political, he predicted that the political drive for power and conquest would become the guiding spirit of technology.

This belief underlies the combined power and autonomy of technology as discussed earlier. In this post-Cold War era, when moral issues tend to dominate political action, the belief by many scholars that technology runs its own amoral course has serious implications for political decision makers. Again, Jacques Ellul offers many examples aimed at demonstrating that "technique has become a reality in itself, self-sufficient, with its own special laws and its own determination" (Ellul 1964, 134). He reasons from the premise that technological development can be influenced by man's intelligence, morality, and politics. This view clearly applies if the U.S. is to support permanent political change in Haiti.

A study of Haiti illustrates her leaders' unfortunate ability to set the course of their country's slow development throughout her violent history. Winner holds that "political and economic actors of the world's nation states make conscious decisions

about what kinds of technological development to encourage and then carry out these decisions in investments, laws, sanctions, subsidies, and so on" (Winner 1977, 53-54). Unfortunately, the selfish goals of many Haitian leaders left the country farther and farther behind technologically. What human beings innovate, invent or introduce is always dependent on the prevailing attitudes or conditions. Technology in Haiti should be adapted to suit local needs and not as it has been imposed by others.

While the debate continues between those who represent technophilia or technophobia, that is, whether man controls technology or technology controls man, the problem created by a lack of appropriate technology in Third-World countries worsens. A certain amount of human resistance is associated with technology, but this does not prevent man from overcoming this resistance through creativity, intelligence or desire. Even while accepting that technology develops as a consequence of human need, one cannot ignore the disparity in technological advances between the United States and Haiti. One explanation could be historical determinism in the extreme. Lynn White notes that "as our understanding of history increases, it becomes clear that a new device merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter" (White 1966, 28). Another interpretation of this disparity could be, as Marx explains, that individual production is an expression of one's life: "The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life" (Marx and Engels 1964, 7).

The question confronting those interested in improving conditions in Haiti and other Third-World countries is, "How can appropriate technology be transferred to